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Since at least the Cold War and with renewed fervor in recent years, citizens have acted 
on the urge to topple memorials and other visual reminders of historical violence. However, 
societies show no signs of ceasing to erect new commemorative markers, and people continue to 
live in physical environments saturated with reminders of historical mass violence. What such 
markers around us say about histories of genocide, slavery, war, and colonial violence is a 
profoundly political issue. Should commemorative projects gloss over or acknowledge past 
genocide, colonial violence, racial terror, and slavery? How should various victim groups be 
portrayed in the physical environment? Should commemoration aim to be politically instructive, 
and if so, what should it instruct? And how visceral should the depictions of violence be – should 
they show the public sanitized or jarring images? These questions are hotly debated in a number 
of contexts where states and publics continue to grapple with painful histories and enduring 
oppression. Through close readings of monuments and memorials as elements of the aesthetic 
environment, this dissertation examines the ways that the political and the aesthetic intersect in 
physical space.   
This dissertation’s central claim is that the work of markers of historical mass violence 
ought to be to work against future mass violence. Through three case studies of the political 
aesthetic of commemoration in a variety of national, cultural, and political contexts, the 
dissertation explores more promising ways of relating to the past that might cultivate an aversion 
 iv 
to future mass violence. The first case study explores the theme of bodily vulnerability in 
genocide memorials in Rwanda. The second case study examines fugitivity in Black political 
thought and the commemoration of fugitives from slavery in the United States. The third case 
study analyzes solidarity through a study of Australian memorials depicting colonial violence 
against Indigenous Australians, followed by a conclusion. Together, these case studies contribute 
to the literatures on memory and political theory by theorizing a political aesthetic of memorials 
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On August 24, 1955, a 14-year-old Black boy from Chicago who was visiting his family 
in Money, Mississippi walked into Bryant’s Grocery and Meat Market to buy candy with his 
friends. The White wife of the proprietor, Carolyn Bryant, claimed that the boy, Emmett Till, had 
wolf-whistled at her in the store (an accusation she later recanted). Bryant’s husband and his 
half-brother seized Till from his uncle’s house, where he was staying during his vacation. Three 
days later, Till’s body was found swollen and badly mutilated in the Tallahatchie River, an eye 
dislodged from its socket and his face unrecognizable. He had been stripped naked, beaten, and 
shot and his body weighed down by a cotton gin fan and left in the water to decompose. 
Emmett’s mother, Mamie Till-Mobley, insisted that her son’s funeral in Chicago have a 
glass-covered open casket so that the world could see the violence done to his body. Tens of 
thousands of people viewed Till’s body in Chicago, and every major Black newspaper and some 
mainstream national newspapers published pictures or descriptions (Pool 2015). The month after 
the murder, an all-white jury found Bryant and his half-brother not guilty. The next year, the two 
men publicly admitted in a magazine interview that they had committed the crime. Till’s murder 
and his mother’s decision to publicly display the body provoked outrage over the killing among 
liberals and helped strengthen the growing Civil Rights Movement. 
What remains of Till’s story in the physical environment of Mississippi today? Residents 
of the Mississippi Delta remain divided on whether markers of the Till murder should be 
preserved or razed. Bryant’s Grocery is now owned by descendants of one of the members of the 
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all-white, all-male jury that acquitted the murderers. The store stands roofless, rotting, and 
covered in vines. The cotton gin fan that was tied around Till’s neck with wire to sink his body is 
displayed in a small museum; visitors can visit the courthouse where the murderers were let off, 
the riverside where his body was found, or the privately owned barn where he was beaten 
(Burch, Shastri, and Chaffee 2019). Thanks to the Emmett Till Memorial Commission, the 
riverside and the courthouse have historical markers, but the sign at the river site in Glendora, 
Mississippi had to be replaced three times. The first was stolen and thrown into the river; the 
second and third were riddled with bullet holes; and the fourth and newest version is made of 
thick, bulletproof steel and weighs over 500 pounds (Ortiz 2019).  
In the aftermath of Till’s murder and the national response to his family’s grief, the visual 
and the aesthetic played a central role. What images of Till and the history that put him in that 
river were promulgated? What is the aesthetic remainder of Till’s story today? How do the 
community where he died and the national political community portray this story – as a tragedy 
that nevertheless catalyzed Civil Rights activism and reform? As a modern lynching? As a story 
from long-ago history, or as one that resonates today, through the bodies of Michael Brown, 
Sandra Bland, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd?  
What the landscape and images around us say about our history – especially histories of 
violence – is a profoundly political issue. Citizens of democratic and non-democratic nations 
alike grapple with how to represent histories of violence in their physical landscapes. Should 
commemorative projects gloss over or acknowledge past genocide, colonial violence, racial 
terror, and slavery? How should various victim groups be portrayed in the physical environment? 
Should commemoration aim to be politically instructive, and if so, what should it instruct? And 
how visceral should the depictions of violence be – should they show the public sanitized or 
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jarring images? These questions are hotly debated in a number of contexts where states and 
publics continue to grapple with painful histories and enduring oppression.  
 
The Political Aesthetic 
 
 
In both the immediate aftermath and the distant wake of violent conflict, states and civil 
societies grapple with questions about how to represent ideas about politics, history, and shared 
ideals in their physical landscapes through visual (and other sensory) depictions. Although 
theorists of material culture, geography, and urban planning have long grappled with 
memorialization (ex. J. Jacobs 1992; Grabow and Heskin 1973; Harvey 2010; Hayden 1994), 
normative political theorists and political philosophers have only recently turned to the political 
importance of the aesthetic of public and semi-public spaces. For example, political theorists and 
philosophers have conceptualized monuments in terms of political honors (Nili 2020) and respect 
(J. Schulz 2019). They have proposed a more inclusive conception of architecture and space 
(Grosz 2001), critically examined the institutional sanitization of public spaces purified of 
discomfort and uncertainty (Bickford 2000), analyzed sprawl as a moral issue of injustice 
(Williamson 2010), argued for contestation and ambiguity at memorial spaces (Johnston 2001; 
Stow 2007a; 2012), connected digital space to democratic engagement (Forestal 2017), and 
highlighted the importance of architecture and public space for politics (Bell and Zacka 2020).  
The “political aesthetic” (Waldron 2012) is the way our public and semi-public spaces 
look (or are perceived by the other senses) and how they reflect various political values, ideas, or 
narratives. Signs and symbols like monuments, statues, public buildings, ceremonies, uniforms, 
signs, and posters are all elements of the political aesthetic. It provides an alternative framework 
for questions about how states and civil societies can best reflect their ideals and priorities 
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beyond deliberation, institutions, and public opinion. When a state, a social movement, or a 
political group decides what to do about these physical markers of violence and injustice, it is 
engaging in commemoration and shaping its political aesthetic: what kinds of expression and 
speech will we value and promote in a just society? What kinds of symbols and markers? What 
kinds of public ceremonies, art installations, architectural structures, and landscapes? When it 
comes to the political aesthetic of commemoration, or what Dolores Hayden (1994, 467) calls 
“the power of place to nurture social memory,” these questions are often particularly contentious. 
My use of “aesthetic” in this dissertation refers not to a state of vapidity (as in a 
description of something as having lost its true meaning by being “reduced to the aesthetic”) or a 
value (as in one everyday use of the aesthetic as “beautiful” or “aesthetically pleasing”). Rather, 
I use “aesthetic” as a general term meaning the way things look or are perceived through sense 
perception, drawing on the Greek root aiesthētikos (relating to perception). I consider the 
aesthetic to be mostly but not entirely visual; people with visual impairment perceive in other 
ways than visual perception, and can experience a symbol’s aesthetic. For example, the design of 
a walkway in a public park can be aesthetically experienced by someone with visual impairment 
as beautiful or not, easy to use or not; an auditorium’s acoustics can be experienced by someone 
with visual impairment as functional or not, well-designed or not. The aesthetic assumes not only 
the intake of raw sensory data but also conscious or subconscious judgment by viewers about the 
meaning(s), value, beauty, and functionality of stimuli.  
Moreover, in this dissertation I theorize the aesthetic beyond a narrow application to art, 
using the concept of the aesthetic to cover a broader range of objects and surroundings in the 
built and natural environment. To the extent that memorials are art, many of the debates around 
aesthetics within the philosophy of art, art criticism and art history will apply. These debates 
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around how aesthetic judgments are made, whether they are Kantian evaluations of taste or 
socially embedded and dependent on human-constructed categories of analysis (Walton 1970), 
largely focus on art objects or objects singled out for their beauty. However, to the extent that 
memorials are less art pieces and more public markers or political symbols, then the debates 
about aesthetics in art will apply less. For the purposes of this dissertation, I am agnostic about 
the question of whether memorials are art or not. If W. E. B. Du Bois is right that “all Art is 
propaganda and ever must be,” the distinction between art and more didactic forms will not 
matter much anyway (Du Bois 1926). Or, as Chantal Mouffe puts it, “There is an aesthetic 
dimension in the political and there is a political dimension in art” (Mouffe 2008, 11). 
Because our quotidian environment is accessible to interpretation by all, the political 
aesthetic is an important point of entry for everyday citizens to engage in debate about political 
ideas. Perhaps because they are often meant to be permanent, monuments seem to have a 
particular power to express and naturalize certain values (J. Young 1992, 271). There has 
recently been widespread interest in the political aesthetic among citizens of the United States, 
South Africa, Europe, and elsewhere – as seen in efforts to take down or protect Confederate 
monuments, the #RhodesMustFall movement, and ongoing debates about memorials to 
Holocaust victims in Germany. Beyond removing or reconsidering existing elements of the 
political aesthetic, there has also been an explosion of new markers and memorials since the mid-
twentieth century, especially representations of historical mass violence. Some are marked: 
German artist Guenther Demnig installed Stolpersteine or “stumbling stones” in the sidewalks in 
front of the homes from which Jews were last taken before their deaths. Some, like massacre 
sites on Cambodian roadsides and fields, are unmarked, known only as sites of slaughter by 
survivors who still carry personal geographies of violence. Some markers are integrated into the 
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urban built environment, like the monuments on the U.S. National Mall, and some are integrated 
into the natural environment, like the site of the Little Bighorn Battle/Massacre in Montana. 
Some are in public spaces like government-owned land, public squares, government offices, and 
streets. Some are in semi-public spaces like university grounds, malls, or office building plazas.1 
This dissertation considers a variety of memorials and monuments that depict historical mass 
violence in a variety of physical contexts, including rural, isolated memorials and markers on 
bustling city streets; markers on both public and private land; and sites that have to be sought out 
to be viewed and others that might not be noticed by passers-by. 
While the growing study of civic education and transitional justice processes such as state 
apologies and truth commissions has raised important questions about the purpose and 
implications of how we treat the past (Buckley-Zistel 2006; Barta 2008; Chakravarti 2014), these 
inquiries have largely not focused on place and space. Meanwhile, when scholars do analyze the 
political aesthetic of commemorating violence, their methods lean toward the critical, the 
descriptive, and the ethnographic, leaving open the question of alternative solutions or political 
change (Meierhenrich 2009; Ndaliko 2018; Lynch 1972; McAllister 2001). The recent growth of 
“memory studies,” a field of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary scholarship about memory 
and commemoration, indicates increased interest in the depiction of historical violence (Roediger 
III and Wertsch 2008; Dutceac Segesten and Wüstenberg 2017). However, even studies of the 
commemoration of violence often neglect the political implications for public space and the 
physical landscape. Scholars of politics likewise often neglect aesthetic representations of 
 
1States often have more power to control the aesthetics of public space than the aesthetics of 
semi-public and private spaces, of course, but they do have some power to control the aesthetics 
of semi-public and private spaces (for example, anti-harassment laws against private employers 
whose workplace environments are hostile to the oppressed, like offices with no ramps or with 
break rooms plastered in swastikas).  
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memory and history. Perhaps this is because until fairly recently the study of memorials and their 
ilk has been regarded by scholars of politics as belonging to the cultural sphere or outside of 
politics (Brett et al. 2007, 2, cited in Meierhenrich 2011, 285).  
This dissertation brings together these disparate questions addressed by previous 
research. Namely, it focuses on the political aesthetic of commemoration of historical mass 
violence. Political societies shape the representation of their pasts in various ways, including 
civic education; public history; museums; civil religion; commemorative holidays; state-run and 
independent propaganda campaigns; and transitional justice mechanisms like truth commissions, 
state apologies, and international tribunals. Aesthetic representations of violent pasts can only do 
so much; memorials should not be expected to work against violence on their own, but rather as 
one part of the transitional justice toolkit (Sodaro 2018, 20). Therefore, the analysis of the 
political aesthetic of commemoration that I offer in this dissertation is best understood as one 






This dissertation takes a political theory approach and draws from multiple disciplines 
and the interdisciplinary field of memory studies. A political theory perspective can contribute to 
this discussion a focus on power and contestation, public activity, and the interactions between 
various political actors and groups. Here I am borrowing from Judith Butler (2000) and Ruth 
Grant (2002) to think about political theory as work whose lack of obligation to empiricism 
allows some distance for critical reflection as well as a focus on the meaning and significance of 
political actions, institutions, ideas, and movements. I understand, as Chantal Mouffe does, the 
“political” to be “the expression of a particular structure of power relations” (Mouffe 2008, 9). In 
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this sense, monuments to historical violence are always inevitably political. As a project of 
comparative political theory, I provide close readings of several case studies across multiple 
national contexts, in the hope that geographically, politically, and culturally diverse perspectives 
will allow for a more representative and theoretically rich analysis.  
By taking a political theory perspective but integrating rich interdisciplinary literatures of 
urban planning, architectural history, critical and cultural theory, history and public history, and 
museum studies and material culture, this dissertation brings diverse perspectives to several 
political questions. It is situated within the interdisciplinary field of memory studies, which 
emerged in response to the Holocaust and the genocides of the twentieth century and sought to 
provide insight about how societies collect and shape history and memory (Roediger III and 
Wertsch 2008; Dutceac Segesten and Wüstenberg 2017). These cross-disciplinary connections 
are crucial if we are to overcome the various impasses and omissions of our current dominant 
frameworks.  
A note on terminology and scope: in this dissertation, I use “violence” to refer to physical 
violence inflicted on bodies, and I focus on memorials2 to past mass violence. While visual 
representations of parts of history that are not about mass violence – such as statues of famous 
musicians, athletes, or local celebrities – are certainly part of a political aesthetic, I do not 
address them in this dissertation. I build on Dustin Howes’ definition of violence, which adapts 
Carl von Clausewitz’s definition of war to suggest a definition of violence as “the use of our 
body by another, who intends to submit or destroy our will for their purpose or purposes” 
(Howes 2009, 41). Thus, violence includes only the use of bodies as means to an end if that end 
 
2Additionally, for the sake of clarity (and because vernacular language often uses them 
interchangeably), I use “monuments” and “memorials” interchangeably. 
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is the subjection of the body of another: natural disasters are not violence since storms cannot 
intend to do anything; environmental degradation is only violence if it is purposefully used to 
force a population off its land or poison a group of people; surgery and pulling someone from a 
fire are not violence; stealing and destroying property are not violence; suicide is not violence; 
and nonviolent sources of injustice like employment discrimination or hate speech are not 
violence. Nor are nonviolent representations or misinterpretations, such as when scholars 
describe the display of bones as violent (Guyer 2009), call photographing corpses “soft murder” 
(Sontag 1977, 15), or speak of “doing violence to a text.” I worry that including such non-violent 
sources of injustice or misunderstanding in the category of violence might dilute the force of the 
idea of violence itself. Limiting the scope of “violence” to these parameters keeps the analysis of 
post-violence contexts more focused. The idea of a political aesthetic I propose is potentially 
relevant to all sorts of violence, including small-scale and interpersonal violence like domestic 
violence, but in this dissertation, I focus on mass violence – specifically genocide, colonial 
violence, and slavery – and throughout the project I use the term “violence” as shorthand for 
mass, not interpersonal, violence.  
Finally, a methodological note on the analysis of memorials. In this dissertation, I do not 
discuss what people “will think” when they see memorials or other elements of the political 
aesthetic. For one thing, it is very difficult to know how visitors interpret memorials and to 
measure their emotional impact (Friedrich and Johnston 2013). For another thing, different 
communities and individuals construct different interpretations of images and symbols (Ferguson 
2012), and no analysis of a memorial can account for all these possible readings. Ultimately 
“visitor responses… cannot be legislated, no matter how ‘serious’ the subject matter is” (Lisle 
2006, 845). Moreover, members of oppressed groups have often found ways to view and 
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consume the visual in ways that oppose and resist their oppression through the “critical 
spectatorship” of the “oppositional gaze” (hooks 1992). I want to resist strong prescriptions that 
argue for a single correct interpretation through which people should interpret memorials, on the 
one hand, and exhaustive description of all the frames through which people could interpret 
them, on the other. However, our inability to predict or control visitor interpretations need not 
preclude critical analysis and close reading. 
I instead subject the memorials in question to close textual reading, following Roland 
Barthes’ distinction between work and text (1984). Here, the work is passively consumed while 
the text is caught up in discourse; the work is taken at face value while the text is seen as 
symbolically meaningful; and the work is examined as a product of the author and her historical 
time while the text is examined as a network of connections to readings and interpretations. 
Barthes calls for a shift away from reading as deciphering one true meaning from the “Author-
God” (Barthes 1977b, 146). This does not mean that historical context is unimportant – merely 
that it is also useful to read texts such as monuments through careful analysis and interpretation 
of their outward aesthetic. Textual reading thus sees symbols such as memorials as texts that 
have something to say to their “readers.”  
Reading memorials as texts is not much different from the everyday practice of many 
political theorists. Against the “new historians’” emphasis on describing the historical context 
and creation of a text, I tend to agree with Terence Ball’s claim that “interpretation is both 
inescapable and necessary” in political theory writing; there is no “neutral standpoint or 
Archimedean point from which to interpret and appraise any text, classic or otherwise. All 
interpretation implies, and originates in, some vantage‐point or standpoint” (Ball 1995, 5, 9). 
Moreover, textual reading can open up possibilities for critical analysis that identify the racism, 
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sexism, or other oppressive meanings of a text even when its creation predates feminist or anti-
racist movements or its original authors did not intend such oppressive meanings (Britt 2000, 
424). And while all texts are open to differing interpretation, without a critical reading of texts 
we are left without the tools to distinguish between readings that prop up oppression and 
violence and readings that criticize and wrangle with histories of violence and oppression, 
including counter-narratives. As such, the textual approach taken in this dissertation follows the 
literary turn in political theory: the turn toward reading politics as a text and reading literature as 
political (Stow 2007b).  
To give a brief example of textual analysis, here is communication studies scholar Marita 
Sturken’s (1991, 126) interpretation of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial: 
 
There is little doubt that much of the memorial's power is due to the effect of the 
58,132 names inscribed on its walls. Unlike the singular narrative and totalizing 
image presented by realist sculptures like the Marine Corps Memorial and Hart's 
statue [of three veterans, added to the original memorial in 1984], images that 
exist as confirmations of official history, these names, by virtue of their 
multiplicity, situate the Vietnam Veterans Memorial within the multiple strands of 
cultural memory spawned by the individual names… This listing of names creates 
an expanse of cultural memory, one that could be seen as alternately subverting, 
rescripting, and contributing to the history of the Vietnam War as it is currently 
being written.  
 
Here, Sturken analyzes elements of the monument’s aesthetic and outlines what she sees this 
aesthetic is suggesting. She does not assert her reading as the only correct interpretation, but she 
also does not simply describe the memorial and refrain from interpretation, nor does she detail 
every historical and possible interpretation of the memorial by every audience, past and present. 
Sara Guyer articulates this approach to interpreting memorials as a way to “read them, that is, to 
take account of their assumptions and effects and to analyze how—and whether—they 
memorialize genocide” (Guyer 2009, 162). Subjective reading of memorials and architecture is a 
widespread practice in architecture criticism and design writing, where it is sometimes called 
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“design interpretation” (S. Davis and Bowring 2011). These examples show how textual analysis 
of memorials falls somewhere between handing down a singular interpretation as gospel and 
refraining from interpretation altogether in favor of documenting memorials’ histories. In the 
following chapters, I discuss memorials this way: without attempting to take a neutral viewpoint 
or dissect every possible interpretation, but rather by acknowledging and exploring the 
inevitability of interpretation. 
 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 
 
This dissertation proceeds as follows: the first chapter sets out the theoretical framework 
of the project, followed by three case studies and a conclusion. Chapter One reviews some of the 
major debates in scholarly and popular treatments of the political aesthetic of historical violence. 
It shows how we might develop a political imaginary beyond the narrow focus on either painful 
remembrance or harmful historical erasure, one that aims to avoid a summum malum of future 
mass violence. Three case studies follow, each of which analyzes and provides an example of 
one of this project’s three themes – bodily vulnerability, fugitivity, and solidarity. Additionally, 
each case study is descriptive, critical, and prescriptive. Each describes current aesthetic 
representations of historical violence and associated political themes and dilemmas, critiques the 
problems and failures that each set of representations face, and prescribes possible future 
aesthetic representations of historical violence. 
In Chapter Two, I explore how several memorials to the Rwandan Genocide exemplify 
an aesthetic of bodily vulnerability and I present a positive political account of this aesthetic. 
Chapter Three examines how representations of U.S. chattel slavery might benefit from insight 
into debates about fugitivity within the Black intellectual tradition. Chapter Four reads physical 
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representations of colonial violence toward Aboriginal peoples of Australia as illustrations of a 
particular vision of solidarity. Each of these themes – bodily vulnerability, fugitivity, and 
solidarity – presents one way that a political aesthetic of commemoration might work against a 
summum malum of future mass violence. 
I selected these three cases in order to represent different areas of the world (North 
America, Africa, and Australia) rather than focusing on conflicts and representations only in the 
Global North, as well as to represent different types of violent histories (genocide, slavery, and 
colonial violence).3 Finally, all three cases are about historical mass violence connected to 
ongoing oppression and injustice, rather than resolved conflicts that lie firmly in the past 
(Spinner-Halev 2012).  
In the conclusion, I articulate the implications of my theory for historians, public 
historians, scholars and practitioners of museum studies and material culture, and political 
theory. I also make a normative case for a political aesthetic of commemoration as a way to 
grapple with the problem of how to remember – and prevent – mass violence. In sum, the 
dissertation considers how we may come to terms with the past in a way that aims to secure 
ourselves a better future. As I argue in the next chapter, the stakes of this question are high, since 
the future we are trying to avoid is one of mass violence.  
  
 
3I have not chosen to study representations of wars such as the two World Wars in part because 
more has been said about these memorials (Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000; Doss 2008; 
Evans 2006; Savage 2009), but I think many of the insights about these case studies apply to war 







CHAPTER ONE: A POLITICAL AESTHETIC OF COMMEMORATION 
  
  
I have tried to keep memory alive… I have tried to fight those who would forget. 
Because if we forget, we are guilty, we are accomplices. 
— Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (1986)  
 
“Remember!” “Zechor!” To what purpose?... For our part, we must learn to forget! 
— Yehuda Elkana, “The Need to Forget” (1988) 
 
When atrocities such as genocide, slavery, and colonial violence occur, they create an 
abyss, a seemingly incomprehensible chasm that politics and history struggle to account for. The 
imperative to remember and to “never forget” atrocities is repeated to the point of 
meaninglessness in Global North memory politics. But what does remembering or forgetting 
actually mean on the scale of political collectives (from small towns to racial and ethnic groups 
to nations) and on the chronological scale of years, generations, or centuries? Whom are we 
talking about when we say it is important to keep memory alive? Which histories, narratives, 
facts, sites, artifacts, and victims? And who will be the custodians of memory – governments, 
cultural authorities, informal social networks, religious organizations, political organizations, 
businesses, individuals? In this dissertation, I explore how historical mass violence is 
remembered, documented, accounted for by collectives – and I offer ways of thinking through 







Remembering vs. Forgetting 
 
 
The Ancient Greeks saw grief and mourning as central to questions of democracy and 
public life (Loraux 1998; Stow 2017; Honig 2013), and the imperatives to remember is a 
prominent theme of the Hebrew Bible (Yerushalmi 1996). Within contemporary memory 
discourse, many influential frameworks of the cultural and political production of memory 
emerged in the twentieth century around the new understandings of atrocity, loss, and violence 
that came out of the World Wars, colonialism and independence, and the violent conflicts of the 
end of the century.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, in particular, many of the frameworks 
developed around commemorating historical mass violence centered around a key dichotomy: 
forgetting versus remembrance, or the conflict between “too much memory and too much 
forgetting” (Minow 1998, 118). In this paradigm, the problem is too much – or the wrong kind of 
– either remembering (painful reminders that cause harm in the present) or forgetting (erasing 
history in a way that might perpetuate injustice or violence).  
 
The Imperative to Remember and the Dangers of Forgetting 
 
Memory discourse developed after the Holocaust in wake of the imperative to “never 
again” allow future atrocities after Auschwitz and in dialogue with decolonization struggles in 
the mid-twentieth century (Rothberg 2009), which became the basis of a broader global 
conversation about memorializing violent histories. Conversations initiated by young Germans 
inquiring into their parents’ generation’s involvement often centered on this key dichotomy: 
harmful historical forgetting versus painful remembering (Zehfuss 2006). The debates that 
emerged in response to Auschwitz sparked the emergence of Holocaust studies, including studies 
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of the memorialization of the Holocaust in physical space (ex. J. Young 1994; 2002; Carrier 
2006; Beorn et al. 2009). 
One illustrative example of this narrative about remembrance versus forgetting in the 
postwar period is Theodor Adorno’s treatment of German denial a generation removed from the 
war. In his 1959 essay “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” Adorno rejects aufarbeiten 
(“working through the past” or “working to overcome the past,” as one might work through a 
stack of unpleasant paperwork), in favor of a painful but necessary reckoning, verarbeiten 
(‘working upon the past’) (Adorno 1998, 337–38). This stance, which influenced many scholarly 
and popular treatments of memory and mass violence, was influenced by but also departed from 
the paradigmatic Freudian approach to mourning, which had juxtaposed healthy mourning with 
pathological melancholia, or the inability to process grief and move on (Freud 1957). 
Adorno observes that in the postwar period, speaking frankly about the slaughter of the 
Jews is “something that psychologically has not been mastered, a wound” (Adorno 1998, 91). He 
calls the German response a conscious process of denial, “the fury of one who must first talk 
himself out of what everyone knows, before he can then talk others out of it as well” (Adorno 
1998, 92). Nazism had provided some substantial benefits to many Germans, including the 
existential benefit of “protection from the universal fear of falling through the mesh and 
disappearing” (Adorno 1998, 95). He worries that many remain reluctant to let go of the 
psychological comfort, community, and closure that Nazism offered.  
The result of this erasure of the realities of the war, for Adorno, is that fascism’s hatred 
continues to bubble under the surface. The problem is that Germans have yet to acknowledge the 
“collective narcissism” that Nazism enabled or experienced the panic of realizing their society’s 
role in perpetrating atrocities. Postwar Germany “construes reality itself as though the damage 
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never occurred.” (Adorno 1998, 96). Adorno also worries that this forgetting will cultivate anti-
democratic tendencies in a period when democracy was seen as one tenuous choice among many 
viable options. He describes the anti-democratic implications of erasure and of guilt – which 
elsewhere he notes can be incapacitating and self-reinforcing (Adorno 2000; 1983). 
As an alternative to the whitewashing of aufarbeiten, Adorno proposes a conscious 
process of verarbeiten (“working upon the past”). Germans should not downplay the atrocities to 
their children when they ask the “embarrassing questions” (Adorno 1998, 99–100). Verarbeiten 
would involve acknowledging the Germans’ complicity in the atrocities. This harder work of a 
nation’s self-analysis is a painful but necessary preventative to replicating the crimes of the past. 
Adorno famously argued that “[t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (Adorno 1983, 34), 
but he later clarified that “[p]erennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man 
has to scream,” although survivors may not in fact be able to express their horror (Adorno 1995, 
362–63). Perhaps this comment about the necessity of allowing survivors to express their 
suffering is a nod to survivors’ heightened difficulty in reckoning with the past. However, 
Adorno seems more concerned with the risks of misremembering or erasing history generations 
after Auschwitz than with protecting the generation of survivors from painful remembrance. 
For Adorno and many others in the postwar period, the danger that societies ought to 
avoid is in harmful erasure or forgetting. Verarbeiten involves necessary, though painful, 
remembering of Germans’ participation in the Nazi project, in contrast to forgetting, erasing, or 
effacing the difficult truth. The tension between this position, on the one hand, and Adorno’s 
conflictual feelings about the duty of representing Auschwitz with respect to survivors’ feelings, 
on the other, shows that even a thinker who sees remembering and forgetting in opposition can 
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acknowledge the need to attend to both. Adorno’s struggle in this regard demonstrates the 
difficulty of theorizing a dichotomy between remembering and forgetting.  
In many ways, this fear of forgetting violence or histories that should not be forgotten has 
been persistent, especially in Europe and North America. As Andreas Huyssen puts it: “Our 
secular culture today, obsessed with memory as it is, is also somehow in the grips of a fear, even 
a terror, of forgetting” (Huyssen 2003, 28). The explosion of vernacular memorials (Doss 2010; 
Meierhenrich 2011a), atrocity memorial museums (M. G. Simpson 1996; Sodaro 2018; Williams 
2007), and “dark tourism” (Friedrich and Johnston 2013; Lennon and Foley 2000) indicates the 
persistence of the postwar directive to “never forget.” 
 
The Imperative to Forget and the Dangers of Remembering 
 
On the other hand, thinkers and activists from a number of different approaches have 
voiced concerns about too much remembering. These diverse approaches include anti-porn 
feminism, critical race theory, democratic theory, popular nonfiction, Holocaust studies, and 
critical theory. These thinkers are worried about too much – or the wrong kind of – remembering 
for a number of various different reasons. Two approaches I highlight below emphasize either 
the expressive power of historical symbols to harm oppressed groups in the present or the 
tendency for too much remembering to support a harmful politics of victimhood. 
 First, several commentators from a diversity of methodological approaches emphasize the 
expressive power of contentious symbols and their potential to harm already-marginalized 
groups. Among critics of remembering are thinkers who, drawing on J.L. Austin’s conception of 
“speech-acts” (Austin, Urmson, and Sbisá 1962), argue that pornography, hate speech, and other 
types of potentially harmful utterances are not innocent speech, but rather a powerful means of 
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regulating and silencing the speech and conduct of the oppressed. The implication of this 
position is often a critique of symbols that serve as painful reminders of injustice or violence. For 
example, anti-porn advocates argue that the symbols, images and narratives perpetuated by 
pornography harm women through their expressive power (MacKinnon 1987; Langton 1993). 
Another example is political theorist Jeremy Waldron’s argument against hate speech, in which 
he opposes free-speech protection of hate speech because such expressions can degrade the 
dignity of some members of society. As Waldron describes hateful symbols in the physical 
environment, “something expressed becomes established as a visible or tangible feature of the 
environment – part of what people can see and touch in real space (or in virtual space) as they 
look around them” (Waldron 2012, 45).  
In a similar vein to Waldron’s critique, critical race theorists Jean Stefancic and Richard 
Delgado argue that Confederate monuments and flags are forms of hate speech that constitute 
painful reminders. The harm, they argue, to members of oppressed groups is that the racist 
symbol “is always there to remind members of the group it spotlights of its unsolicited message,” 
a painful reminder of past and continued oppression (Delgado and Stefancic 2004, 142, cited in 
Waldron 2012, 72). Similarly, political theorist Johannes Schulz argues that monuments that are 
degrading or alienating to social groups are objectionable on the basis of their failures of 
recognition and respect (J. Schulz 2019). The painful remembrance then engenders a hostile and 
therefore unequal environment for the oppressed in public spaces.  
In addition to speech-act theory, critical race theorists have also argued that certain forms 
of remembering are harmful forms of hate speech. The concern here is that if we represent 
histories of injustice incorrectly or too much, we will be exposing those who continue to be 
oppressed to unnecessarily painful reminders of their oppression. This argument, which has its 
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roots in standpoint theory and critical race theory, focuses on the lived experiences of the 
historically oppressed. For example, Mari Matsuda’s critical race/legal/feminist theory relies on 
a theoretical commitment to “outsider jurisprudence,” or judgment based on the unique 
standpoint of the oppressed outsiders in society (Matsuda 1996). In Matsuda’s view, racist 
speech should be narrowly banned if it is a “prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading” message of 
racial inferiority directed against a historically oppressed group (Matsuda 1989, 2357). Matsuda 
includes swastikas, Holocaust denial and other racist signs with historical messages of 
persecution. The danger here is that degrading symbols continue to oppress marginalized groups 
and perpetuate harmful forms of remembering the past. 
The second major approach to arguments for forgetting and against certain forms of 
remembering is grounded in a skepticism about the politics of victimhood. One such argument 
comes from the journalist David Rieff, whose book In Praise of Forgetting posits that selective 
forgetting or historical erasure is sometimes preferable to preserving historical memory (Rieff 
2016). Using examples from late twentieth century genocides as a clear indication that the world 
did not learn “never again” from the Holocaust, he argues that collective remembrance has often 
been conducive to violence rather than preventing it. Rieff is concerned with the negative 
impacts of painful remembrance not only for the oppressed but for entire societies, as 
commemoration can reopen old wounds and cause a renewed outbreak of violence. He argues for 
strategic forgetting, warning that painful remembrance and warped versions of history can 
actually provoke more violence. As Rieff points out, “it is actually quite easy for nations or 
groups to ‘revise’ and ‘rewrite’ their collective memories” for the worse (Rieff 2016, 22). Of 
course, this also means that it is possible for nations and societies to rewrite them for the better; 
Rieff’s thesis only really rebukes the claims of “those who continue to believe that remembrance 
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is always positive” (Rieff 2016, 24, emphasis added). However, his argument against 
remembrance qua remembrance is ultimately that it is ineffective – that all human lives and 
events are doomed to the dustbin of history, anyway.  
Likewise, the Holocaust survivor and historian Yehuda Elkana made a similar claim 
about the politics of victimhood in Israel, when he urged an Israel that had built a national 
identity around the Holocaust to “displace the Holocaust from being the central axis of our 
national experience” or risk a violent politics of victimhood and a lack of meaningful national 
politics (Elkana 1988). 
Another example of an argument in favor of certain forms of forgetting from the point of 
view of the politics of victimhood comes from political theorist Wendy Brown. In her reading of 
the explosion of identity politics in the 1990s, Brown argues for a certain amount of forgetting 
when it comes to identity politics, identity groups, and the politics of victimhood. Troubled by 
what she sees as a “politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms 
it” (1995, 74), Brown proposes Nietzsche's idea of forgetting as an antidote to ressentiment (“the 
moralizing revenge of the powerless” (1995, 66)). The reification of identity that memory 
cultivates is in conflict with “pursuit of an emancipatory democratic project,” and so perhaps 
some forgetting is called for (Brown 1995, 55). Or, she muses, perhaps asking for forgetting is 
too much to ask of marginalized identities; maybe all is needed is for their pain to be heard and 
released.  
Ultimately, arguments for avoiding painful remembrance want to preserve the emotional, 
political, and physical safety of oppressed people and/or the integrity of the public (usually a 
democratic public). What this means is often an argument for removing contentious symbols 
from the public sphere – a solution that opponents argue whitewashes history of its unpleasant 
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chapters (as in ancient Greece, where whitewashing was a literal erasing of the previous writing 
on the wall so that it could be written over again). These methodologically and substantively 
diverse thinkers differ in their calls for forgetting, but their arguments in effect reinforce the idea 
that remembering and forgetting are in some way opposed. I turn to a contemporary example of 
these debates about remembering and forgetting before showing how we might expand our 
political imaginary beyond these frameworks. 
 
Forgetting vs. Remembering in Confederate Monuments Discourse 
 
The dichotomy between remembering and forgetting that became central in the postwar 
period lives on in certain contemporary discussions of how atrocities should be commemorated. 
Similar fears of sweeping history under the rug or failing to (correctly or sufficiently) remember 
the past have reappeared in contemporary conversations about Confederate monuments and other 
politically contentious symbols in the United States, South Africa, the former USSR, and 
elsewhere.  
Debates over Confederate monuments in the U.S., for example, illustrate the persistence 
of the remembering-forgetting dichotomy. Many critics of Confederate statues in public spaces 
argue that monuments should be removed as painful reminders of historical injustice, while 
monuments’ defenders often warn of the high cost of historical erasure. For example, former 
New Orleans Mayor Landrieu’s 2017 speech marking the removal of several monuments to 
Confederate leaders describes Black residents’ experiences of the monuments as reminders of 
racial injustice and responds to critiques by those who worry tearing down the monuments would 
erase history (Landrieu 2017). Anti-memorial organizers in New Orleans also highlighted the 
detrimental psychological and political effects of the statues’ painful reminders of racist 
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oppression. Their statement read: “These memorials only serve as constant reminders of the past 
and present domination of black people by the rich white ruling class. They are insulting to 
anyone with a sense of history and who supports progress and democracy” (“Open Letter to the 
Residents of New Orleans” 2017). Opponents argue either that monuments should be removed 
but not destroyed so as to avoid erasing historical “facts that should be preserved” (Hartley 2021) 
that monuments should be preserved to avoid the high cost of forgetting or erasing Southern 
“heritage” and the sacrifices of  soldiers who died for the Lost Cause (Litten 2017; Jones 2015, 
201). Although other arguments, including about statues’ implicit or explicit endorsement by 
governments that allow them to stand on public land, also surface in these debates over 
contentious symbols, the ghosts of the remembering-forgetting dichotomy still haunt 
contemporary debates about Confederate monuments. 
 
New Directions: Beyond Remembering vs. Forgetting 
 
 
Although, as I have shown, some recent work continues in the remembrance-forgetting 
tradition, new debates around commemoration and memory have also circulated since the 
postwar years. Drawing on the work of Maurice Halbwachs on collective memory (1980), Pierre 
Nora on spaces of memory (1989), and James Young (1992) on counter-memory, among others, 
scholars have moved beyond an initial focus on remembering and forgetting to explore how 
commemoration, especially through the political aesthetic, works at different levels to prop up or 




The Politics of Memory 
 
 Some of this research emerged out of an acknowledgement that the binary between 
remembrance and forgetting may not be so binary after all – that remembering or remembrance 
always encompasses some selective forgetting. This scholarship has emphasized how the past is 
seen through the biases and frameworks of the present so that memorialization and 
commemoration are forms of history-creating, which must inevitably include some narratives 
and omit others. As such, it has dismissed the myth that commemorating violence could ever be 
devoid of politics (Johnston 2007, 140), that “the inclusion of a perspective considered overtly 
political degrades the purity of the sacrifice” made by the dead (Williams 2007, 5). Having 
acknowledged that memory is inevitably political, these thinkers have turned instead to the study 
of the politics of memory. 
For example, several thinkers theorizing the state and the nation have picked up on the 
importance of selective forgetting in the creation of a national myth. Benedict Anderson’s theory 
of the social construction of nations argues that nationality requires certain histories of violence 
to be “remembered/forgotten” (Anderson 2006, 206). In response to September 11 and the Wars 
on Terror, Judith Butler (2004a; 2010) points out that who gets mourned (and how) can create a 
hierarchy of grief (Zehfuss 2009). Commemoration often plays an important role in shaping 
national identities, and vice versa (Bartelson 2006; McDonald 2010). Sheldon Wolin’s critique 
of social contract theory shows how the liberal state requires selective forgetting about power 
dynamics surrounding identities such as race and gender in exchange for a fiction of equality 
(Wolin 1989). 
And in the particular case of the political aesthetic, James Young’s analysis of Holocaust 
memorials in Europe, the United States, and Israel shows that monuments, while ostensibly 
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setting history in stone for the purpose of remembrance, also contribute to collective amnesia 
because of the narratives and stories they ignore, eclipse, or minimize (J. Young 1994). As 
Rebecca Jinks (Jinks 2014, 433–34) puts it: 
 
[M]emorialization can be seen as an intervention into memory (and thus the 
present), since memorialization tends to involve decisive statements about what 
should be remembered (and what ‘forgotten’), who the victims were (and were 
not) and on whose behalf they are remembered (the nation, a local community, 
‘humanity’) – and in this sense they often tend, and intend, to be normative. 
 
As such, many of these writers have problematized earlier paradigms’ focus on capturing 
the unbiased or non-political historical truth. These thinkers have argued that history is always 
shaped by the narratives and biases of the present, the inevitable “accidental and deliberate 
silences and omissions” (Savoy 2015, 111). They have argued that representation of the past is 
not really about “remembering” the facts of history but rather about emphasizing certain 
important elements (Sontag 2003, 108). In response to a common impulse to avoid 
contaminating mourning with politics, these commentators have pushed back, arguing that 
commemorating violent history is inevitably political (Stow 2017) because the “purity in relation 
to the dead” that this impulse seeks is a myth (Honig 2013, 23). Rather, we ought to recognize 
“the politicality of lamentation all the way down” (Honig 2013, 19). These thinkers have 
recognized that representing contentious or violent history involves balancing competing 
considerations of the public’s desire for a confrontation with moral certainty and historians’ 
desire to get the complex facts right (Berlin 2004). Additionally, such representation will also 
require balancing competing considerations of “authorized public memory, memories reproduced 
by recognized ‘authorities’; social memory, memories that emerge and are preserved 
spontaneously among a group of people; and social myth, memories of events that did not occur” 
(Delle 2008, 65). 
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As such, many scholars of memory and historical violence have come to agree, in one 
way or another, that the processes that are variously called  “public memory” (Bodnar 1992), 
“collective memory” (Halbwachs 1980), and “public mourning” (Stow 2010) are really a series 
of considerations not about whether to remember the full historical truth or whether to remember 
rather than forget, but rather about what and how to remember. That is, the politics of memory 
are all about what will be remembered or forgotten, included or obscured, and valued or 
undermined. As mourning and memorializing often implicitly or explicitly conveys honor and 
worth (Butler 2010; Nili 2020), these are important questions for politics. 
 
The Promise of Return: Agonism, Ambivalence, and Counter-Memorialization 
 
Another group of scholars has turned away from the frameworks of remembering and 
forgetting and toward frameworks of ambiguity, agonistic politics, and resistance to closure – 
which build on insights from the agonisms of Bonnie Honig4 and Chantal Mouffe, among others. 
Honig’s Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, published in 1993, helped to usher in 
the “agonistic turn” in political theory (Maxwell et al. 2019). There, Honig argues that most 
political theorists are “hostile to the disruption of politics” and assume that the task of political 
theory is to “get politics right, over, and done with” (Honig 1993, 2). Against these assumptions, 
Honig takes up Nietzsche and Arendt as thinkers of disruption that can facilitate “a kind of 
 
4Although many theorists of commemoration and memorialization have drawn on Honig’s 
agonism, it should be noted that Honig argues against too much of a focus on the politics of 
mourning and for renewed attention the politics of natality instead (Honig 2013). See McIvor 
(2016, 64) for a rebuttal to Honig’s turn away from the politics of mourning: “Honig has shifted 
away from this politics of mourning because she is anxious of the postpolitical or ethical 
displacements inherent to the ‘bad script’ of lamentation. However, in counseling a decentering 
of mourning in the interests of a broader, natal agonism, Honig may be too hastily quitting the 
politically generative territory of grief.” 
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transvaluation of values, one that might embolden citizens for the ruptures, the genuinely 
discomforting pleasures and uncertainties, of democratic political action” (Honig 1993, 4). 
Similarly, Mouffe argues for “the creation of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere of 
contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be conducted” (Mouffe 2005, 3). 
Regarding art and public spaces in particular, Mouffe posits that “artistic practices can play a 
role in the struggle against capitalist domination” by “undermin[ing] the imaginary environment 
necessary for its reproduction” (Mouffe 2008, 7). Such critical or disruptive art includes art from 
marginal perspectives, art that questions political reality or its own production, and art that 
explores utopian possibilities (Mouffe 2008, 12–13). Thus, agonistic art and public space can 
resist the closure that states often impose upon ambiguous symbols and signs, which they may 
see as a threat to state hegemony. 
When it comes to memory of the dead, as Jacques Derrida puts it in his remembrance of his 
friend Roland Barthes, there is something essentially incomplete about mourning, something that 
resists closure (Derrida 2001, 34–35):  
I must leave these thoughts for Roland Barthes fragmentary… I value them for 
their incompleteness even more than for their fragmentation, more for their 
pronounced incompleteness, for their punctuated yet open interruption, without 
even the authoritative edge of an aphorism. These little stones, thoughtfully 
placed, only one at a time, on the edge of a name as the promise of return. 
 
Although Derrida speaks specifically of the Jewish mourning practice of placing stones on 
graves, the incompleteness and resistance to closure that mourning often produces speaks to 
experiences beyond the Jewish tradition. What can we learn for politics by thinking through the 
incompleteness and fragmentation of commemorating the dead? 
Drawing on Honig and Mouffe as well as a variety of other intellectual traditions 
(including the Black American literary and aesthetic tradition, Indigenous North American 
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thinkers, and continental philosophers and historians), a diverse group of writers has placed 
agonism and ambivalence at the center of commemoration. Within democratic theory, David 
McIvor (2016, 64) argues that publics ought to embrace disunity, “democratic anger,” and 
ambivalence in the process of mourning. Along with the lives lost to violence, he argues that we 
must also acknowledge other losses: losses “of absolute moral certainty, of convenient 
scapegoats, of an omnipotent ‘killing rage’” (McIvor 2016, 56). Likewise, Simon Stow (2007a; 
2010; 2017) calls into question romantic narratives of patriotism within public mourning and 
highlights instead the agonistic aspects of African American forms of mourning. Differentiating 
“romantic” public mourning (focused on a politics of consensus, closure, and unity) from 
“tragic” public mourning (“pluralistic, critical, and self-consciously political”), he argues for the 
latter (Stow 2010, 682). What is lost in feelings of certainty and closure may be gained in 
distributing commemoration more evenly or fairly, in doing more justice to the lives led and lost, 
or in resisting narrative capture by institutions or agents who might do harm to victim groups or 
the polity.  
Part of the project of locating the tragic and the agonistic in commemoration might be 
about locating in the physical and intellectual landscape the ambivalence and need for continued 
return that is already present. As Lauret Savoy puts it: “Celebratory lessons and stories that don’t 
face ambiguity and complexity might seem to exempt us from needing to look more closely” 
(Savoy 2015, 110). And as Joseph Winters shows, the Black literary and aesthetic tradition 
already contains rich theoretical and political resources for embracing loss and tragedy, thus 
gesturing toward a “melancholic hope,” which, instead of “triumphant, overconfident narratives, 
tropes, and images, suggests that a better, less pernicious world depends partly on our heightened 
capacity to remember, contemplate, and be unsettled by race-inflected violence and suffering” 
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(Winters 2016, 16). Further, this unsettling that leaves some questions unanswered can undo 
entrenched narratives, opening up “spaces for contestation, tarrying, revision, and 
reimagination.” This indeterminacy does not require a retreat from politics or imagining 
otherwise, but rather enables a commitment to encountering and grappling with violence 
(Winters 2016, 244). 
How are we to attain this more tragic sensibility of commemoration? Perhaps through 
discursive resistance: Maja Zehfuss urges resistance against the creation by the state of tragic 
narratives around soldiers’ deaths, which can erase the violence inherent to their deaths (Zehfuss 
2009). Perhaps by thinking through trauma: Jenny Edkins suggests that a specific framework 
might help us resist narratives of closure: trauma and “trauma time” (Edkins 2006). Or perhaps 
through rhetorical strategies of irony and satire: building on Native American political theorist 
Vine Deloria Jr.’s writings, David Myer Temin and Adam Dahl argue for a satirical and ironic 
sensibility, which can “loosen the grip of” narratives of transcendence (Temin and Dahl 2017, 
911). 
 When it comes to memorials and the political aesthetic of commemoration, there has 
been a similar movement towards the agonistic, the tragic, and the resistant. James Young’s  
theory of the counter-monument, memorials that challenge traditional memorial forms and 
explore the tension between “the necessity of memory and their incapacity to recall events they 
never experienced” (1992, 273), has influenced many later accounts. These include explorations 
of counter-monuments as counter-narratives that resist state power (Auchter 2013) and of 
“guerrilla memorialization” that intervenes in dominant narratives to commemorate neglected 
histories and “create new multiple possibilities” (Rice 2011a, 15; 2011b). In a similar vein, 
scholars drawing on the Pierre Nora’s concept of lieux de mémoire (sites of memory) have 
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turned to vernacular memorials and informal commemorative spaces (Doss 2010), showing how 
they present alternatives to official sites narrated by the state or other hegemonic powers 
(Meierhenrich 2011a).  
Meanwhile, other scholars have explored how certain memorials and the politics around 
them seek to produce closure and resist disagreement while other memorials and politics resist 
closure. These include explorations of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C. and the more patriotic monuments on the Mall  (Johnston 2001); memorials to 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and September 11 in Manhattan (Stow 2012; 2017); and the 
Cenotaph war memorial in London and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (Edkins 2003).  
These thinkers largely anticipate one problem with ambiguity, which, as Barthes notes, is 
the impulse to resolve uncertainty around troubling signs and images in a way that consolidates 
power. Symbols are often “bound up with an uncertainty (an anxiety) concerning the meaning of 
objects or attitudes. Hence in every society various techniques are developed [that are] intended 
to fix the floating chain of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of uncertain signs” 
(Barthes 1977a, 39, cited in Talal Asad 2007, 30). As such, openness to contestation requires an 
ongoing and iterative process of disclosure in order for it to successfully resist capture and stay 
open to critique, counter-narratives, and the activity of politics.  
 
The Work of Mourning 
 
 
What is the point of memorialization and commemoration? In this dissertation, I am 
interested in what Derrida calls the “work of mourning.” This approach acknowledges that is no 
pure form of remembrance, no pure communication of mourning between the dead and the 
mourner: “This is of course a supplementary fiction, for it is always the dead in me, always the 
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others standing around the coffin whom I call out to” (Derrida 2001, 51–52). Though he 
struggles with the impulse not to instrumentalize the dead, Derrida also acknowledges that there 
is no version of mourning the dead that isn’t really for and about the living. Drawing on this 
insight and the insights of the scholarship discussed above that recognizes the complexity of 
memory as selective forgetting and argues for a more open, pluralistic form of commemoration, I 
explore what work, exactly, mourning can do. 
In taking a prescriptive approach (along with the descriptive and critical approach in each 
case study), I follow in the footsteps of the many commentators who make normative claims 
about what (and how) memorials or commemoration more broadly should do, say, or aim to 
accomplish (ex. McIvor 2016; Stow 2017; Johnston 2007). And even those commentators whose 
focus is on critique more than prescription nevertheless often say that representations of the past 
ought to have some political goal or another, whether that be “the right kind of political 
response” (Rice 2011b, 253), “re-pairing toward truth and reconciliation” (Savoy 2015, 113–14), 
or “the possibility of a better world” (Winters 2016).5 More broadly, this approach also follows 
the intuition that individuals, institutions, and collectives in the present have some sort of 
responsibility to address past injustices and their legacies in the present (I. M. Young 2011; 
Thompson 2006; Poole 2008; Spinner-Halev 2007).  
My central claim is that the work of mourning – here, what a political aesthetic of 
commemoration can do for and as politics – ought to be aiming towards a better political world. 
In many democracies, this means renewing or maintaining democratic political activity or 
 
5Not to mention the stated political goals of many memorials themselves, which include 
“prompting community-wide reconciliation” and “recover[ing] from mass violence” (Equal 
Justice Initiative 2019), “open[ing] up space for discussion” (Berlin.De 2020), and “spread[ing] 
the message of ‘No More Hiroshimas’” (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 2021). 
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preventing democratic backsliding, and indeed, important previous work has focused on how 
commemoration and memorials can work towards cultivating healthy democratic politics 
through openness to disagreement and pluralism, as I have discussed (Johnston 2015; McIvor 
2016; Stow 2017). However, memorials and commemoration also exist outside democracies, and 
I am interested in what they can do for politics in a broader variety of national, cultural, and 
political contexts. As such, this dissertation sets as the political aesthetic of commemoration’s 
goal a very narrow, perhaps modest benchmark: the prevention of future mass violence.  
I suggest that we can draw upon a political aesthetic of commemoration as a resource for 
cultivating an aversion toward future violence: by realizing our common bodily vulnerability, 
learning from those who fled violence and subjugation, and reflecting on the possibilities for 
solidarity, we can avoid some of the conditions that precede and enable violence and learn what 
not to do next time.  
 
The Summum Malum of Future Mass Violence 
 
Since every commemorative effort – and especially the commemoration of violent 
histories – is already political, the question is in which political projects the aesthetic should be 
enlisted. What vision for a better future might we aim for a political aesthetic of commemoration 
to work toward? One appealing possibility is the avoidance of future mass violence, a summum 
malum in the tradition of Hobbes and following Judith Shklar (1989). In this dissertation, I focus 
on this “worst end” of future mass violence for three reasons. First, as I have noted, I am 
interested in the politics of memory in a broader variety of political contexts than democracies 
because I think memorials can do political work even in non-ideal contexts. (Not to mention the 
open question of whether the contemporary United States, for example, is even a democracy.) 
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This approach leaves different polities open to pursuing a variety of other political goals – racial 
reparations, transitional justice, political reconciliation, economic justice, etc. – depending on 
context. 
Second, it seems appropriate that memorials to past mass violence should be working to 
cultivate an aversion to future mass violence. Such memorials may have other political goals – 
like promoting an open society, democratic principles, or justice, and I am certainly not opposed 
to those political goals. On the contrary, I point towards many of them in the chapters that 
follow. However, such memorials are perhaps best positioned to speak to the mass violence, 
which is the subject they are commemorating.  
Finally, working against a summum malum of violence is a prerequisite to a summum 
bonum of deep reconciliation, equality, or social justice. That is, although a society can certainly 
pursue unjust politics in a period of peace, it is very difficult to attain reconciliation, equality, or 
justice if mass violence is occurring in the short term, and mass violence is a serious impediment 
to these goals in the long term. If monuments cannot work against mass violence, they surely 
cannot work for more ambitious political goals like equality or reconciliation. Further, mass 
violence like genocide, slavery, and colonial violence is hardly a relic of the past: in this 
dissertation’s case countries alone, Indigenous Australian populations face health and ecological 
crises, the U.S. maintains a system of forced penal labor in a racist prison system that descended 
from nineteenth century slavery, and the Rwandan government has been credibly accused of 





The Political Aesthetic and the Work of Mourning 
  
Like all material artifacts, monuments represent a “making sentient of the external world” 
(Scarry 1985, 281). That is, memorials and other commemorative efforts reflect the social and 
political priorities of the regime or groups that create them – from lionizing military heroes to 
atoning for genocidal complicity. But they also help create and reinforce those priorities by 
representing what is important about a society’s past, what deserves mourning and what deserves 
celebration, and how a society thinks historical violence is best portrayed. 
Memorials to historical mass violence are thus in a unique position to “offer a concrete 
instance for thinking about extreme conditions and moral choices… and also speak to our human 
fascination with danger, mortality, and loss” (Williams 2007, 142). They cultivate and re-
inscribe the historical narratives and political values of a society by telling its members a story 
about themselves. In particular, they speak to periods of violence that are often central or even 
foundational to those societies’ histories.  
In the case studies that follow, I explore possibilities for such an anti-violence political 
aesthetic by analyzing representations of historical violence: Rwanda’s commemoration of the 
1994 genocide, the United States’ commemoration of chattel slavery, and Australia’s 
commemoration of colonial violence towards Indigenous peoples. Learning from the successes 
and failures of these approaches, I offer three potential themes constituting possibilities for a 
political aesthetic that promotes a political imaginary that aims to work against future 
occurrences of mass violence: bodily vulnerability, fugitivity, and solidarity.  
Asking memorials to work toward any political goal might seem like asking too much, 
and as I noted in the introduction, I am not suggesting an aesthetic of commemoration can be 
expected to do this alone. They might not be able to do it at all; whether the themes and ideas of 
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the political aesthetic I analyze in this dissertation “work” or not is an empirical question that I 
cannot answer here. But as a project of normative political theory, this dissertation aims to 
provide some new conceptual tools for thinking about memorialization, tools that might expand 
the imagination of the politically possible. It might be hard to see the utility of opening up 
imaginative possibilities that seem like impossibilities in the present, but marginalized people 
who have had political imaginaries foreclosed to them know the importance of such projects 
despite the barriers of what seems to be possible. As Judith Butler puts it, “To stay within the 
framework of Realpolitik is, I think, to accept a closing down of horizons, a way to seem ‘cool’ 
and skeptical at the expense of radical hope and aspiration. Sometimes you have to imagine in a 
radical way that makes you seem a little crazy, that puts you in an embarrassing light, in order to 
open up a possibility that others have already closed down with their knowing realism” (Butler 








CHAPTER TWO: A POLITICAL AESTHETIC OF BODILY VULNERABILITY IN 
RWANDA'S GENOCIDE MEMORIALS 
 
 
“The dead are witnesses to mortality. They hear us and we speak to them even if we know that 
they, like all base matter, are deaf and dumb… We address bones. We live with the dead” 
(Laqueur 2015, 4).  
 
In the aftermath of mass violence such as genocide, how can we address the dead? The 
Nazis disposed of the camps’ dead by incinerating the bodies, while the Khmer Rouge buried its 
victims in mass graves and Argentine forces during the Dirty War buried the disappeared by 
flinging them into bodies of water and burying them, unmarked, in cemeteries. The identification 
and reburial of remains by families has been an important part of the process of accounting for 
the past in many post-conflict situations. The bodies of the dead, while sometimes seen as 
disgusting, jarring, haunting, or sacred, are also political. As Thomas Laqueur notes, most of us 
do not agree with Diogenes the Cynic’s assessment that, since the dead are like any other 
decaying object, we might as well throw corpses outside the city to be stripped by wild animals. 
But what role should the dead – whether actual human remains or just depictions of bodies or 
artifacts of violence – play in depicting their own demise? If we are concerned with depicting 
past mass violence and preventing future mass violence, it is hard to avoid the fact that violence 
happens to bodies. But many observers are wary of depicting bodies, seeing this as grotesque, 
disrespectful, or unnecessarily politicizing of victims. How might we negotiate between these 
differing accounts of the presentation of bodies and the violence done to them? 
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In this chapter, I take up the case of Rwandan genocide memorials that display violence 
inflicted on bodies as a way to negotiate between differing accounts of bodily vulnerability and 
its depiction in public commemoration. I detail the most compelling critiques of depicting bodily 
vulnerability before showing how this aesthetic is separable from its repressive political context 
and providing a positive account of such an aesthetic in the case that it is properly 
contextualized. This chapter is the first of three case studies to take up the question of the 
political aesthetic by focusing on a particular aesthetic theme – bodily vulnerability – and 
interrogating the ways that that aesthetic might be used to work against the summum malum of 
future mass violence. It focuses on the interplay of the political aesthetic of bodily vulnerability 
and the narrative framing of that aesthetic, exploring how an aesthetic of commemoration can 
employ concepts that meaningfully convey the horror of violence while working toward a 
political vision that works against future violence by enabling us to see others’ bodies as non-
disposable. Because the dynamics of genocide, enslavement, settler-colonialism, and other forms 
of mass violence are rooted in a political dynamic in which certain lives and bodies are seen as 
disposable, how might memorials that depict the violence done to past bodies work against this 
politics of disposability and violence?  
The chapter proceeds as follows. It gives a brief overview of the Rwandan post-genocide 
political moment and analyzes three memorials to the Rwandan Genocide, all of which display 
bodily remains or other visualizations of violence. It then considers critical accounts of 
depictions of bodies and bodily violence from Susan Sontag and several scholars commenting on 
Rwandan memorials. Finally, it expands Judith Butler’s analysis of the precariousness of the 
body and political mourning to explore the merits of an aesthetic that work against future mass 
violence by awakening the political imagination to the interdependence and non-disposability of 
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others. The Rwandan memorials depict the vulnerability and fragility of victims’ bodies in a way 
that I argue is effective in communicating the horror of genocide. However, they are being 
enlisted in the exclusionary government-sanctioned narrative of the genocide, in which Tutsis 
were the only victims and Hutus the only killers. I detail how a reframed political aesthetic of 
bodily vulnerability that is more open to nuance and inclusive of multiple victim groups might 
work against mass violence in the future by cultivating in the present a politics in which others 
are seen as disposable. 
 
Rwanda’s Commemorative Environment 
  
 In 1994, decades of political and ethnic manipulation by Belgian colonial forces, turmoil 
in national and regional politics, and fearmongering cumulated in genocide in Rwanda. In one 
hundred violent days, between 800,000 and a million people were killed. Most of the victims 
belonged to the Tutsi minority group or were moderate Hutus, and most of the killers were Hutu. 
The Hutu-led government planned the genocide, buying weapons and distributing propaganda 
that vilified Tutsis and particularly the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the rebel army made up 
of Tutsi refugees who had fled from persecution in Rwanda to Uganda. Pastors killed members 
of their congregation; neighbors killed neighbors; husbands killed wives. Most Rwandans likely 
have at least one relative or acquaintance who has been imprisoned for genocide-related crimes 
(Tertsakian 2011). 
 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the party that evolved from the RPA once it toppled 
the genocidal government and ended the genocide, gained control during the tumultuous 
transitional period and began a program of economic development (Abbott, Sapsford, and 
Rwirahira 2015). The RPF still governs by what is effectively one-party rule. The genocide 
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functions as the regime’s raison d’état (Ibreck 2012), with its continued effects acting as a 
narrative around which political elites and citizens mobilize to unify “One Rwanda” (Buckley-
Zistel 2006). Citizens have a sophisticated understanding of this narrative of unity and 
consensus, sometimes adding nuance to it (Benda and Pells 2020); sometimes reinforcing it 
(Bentrovato and Buhigiro 2020); and sometimes conforming to it out of fear, to assert their 
autonomy, to manage the inexplicability of the violence, or to create the very unity and peace 
that the official narrative claims is already in place (Eramian 2017). President Paul Kagame 
enjoys international support despite using a referendum to extend his term limits via 
constitutional amendment and Rwanda’s intervention into conflicts in the neighboring DRC. The 
regime has drawn criticism for failing to adopt liberal democratic governance, suppressing civil 
society, intimidating or assassinating opposition politicians and activists, and tampering with 
election results (Longman 2011). These crackdowns have allowed the regime to frame itself as a 
“state-as-parent” (Benda and Pells 2020) and a “custodian of security” whose absence would 
mean the end of the post-genocide peace (Buckley-Zistel 2006, 144). 
 There has been a proliferation of critiques by foreigners of the Rwandan government and 
its use or abuse of the country’s history of violence, especially since around 2000, when 
outsiders’ original optimism began to decline. On top of strong social norms against discussing 
ethnicity (Longman 2011), in the decade following the genocide the RPF-led regime began 
attempting to ‘legislate ethnic identities out of existence’ (Lemarchand 2008, 66) through vague 
legal restrictions on ‘genocide ideology’, paradoxically perpetuating ethnic divisionism and 
inhibiting reconciliation because ethnic tensions may remain under the calm surface of a 
supposedly post-ethnic society (Buckley-Zistel 2006). Legal restrictions on “genocide ideology” 
(Republic of Rwanda 2003; 2015; 2008) rely on vague definitions that give the state the broad 
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ability to punish dissent (Waldorf 2011), degrade the quality of political discourse, create a 
culture of mistrust and fear around commemoration, decrease the legitimacy of the implicitly 
Tutsi-identified RPF regime (Waldorf 2011), and impair history education in Rwandan 
secondary schools (Freedman et al. 2018). 
 Despite restrictions on discussion of ethnicity, since the early 2000s the government has 
ethnicized the genocide. The broad program of commemoration and memorial-building, which 
was started by civilians and the churches and taken up by the Rwandan government (Giblin 
2017), initially sought to memorialize both Tutsi and Hutu dead (Vidal 2004). However, it was 
eventually replaced by a narrative that labels 1994 a “Genocide against the Tutsi”, language 
added to the constitution in 2003 (as the “1994 Tutsi genocide”) and incorporated into the Kigali 
Genocide Memorial Centre (Longman 2017; Waldorf 2011), ingando (civic education camps for 
returning refugees and released prisoners), and other reconciliation programs run by the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission (J. N. Clark 2010). Major discrepancies exist between this 
official narrative of the genocide, whose “language of victimization” (Lisle 2006, 853) 
emphasizes mass Hutu participation and total Tutsi victimhood (Benda 2018), and the far more 
complex and nuanced events of the genocide. The latter account includes the RPF’s massacres of 
Hutu civilians during the genocide; the ensuing refugee crisis and massacres of Hutu refugees 
who had fled from Rwanda to then-Zaire; and the génocidaires’ killing of Hutus for their 
political positions, for rescuing Tutsis, or for being related to Tutsis (Des Forges 1999; Longman 
2017; Straus 2007; Hölscher, Kanamugire, and Udah 2020; Lemarchand 1998). Some grassroots 
and grassroots-state hybrid efforts attempt to provide nuance and include Hutu stories (Benda 
2017, 11). However, the commemorative efforts sponsored by the state, including the frames 
around the major memorial sites, overwhelmingly support the ‘Genocide against the Tutsi’ 
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narrative through plaques and displays that place the blame solely on colonists and genocide 
ideology (Sodaro 2018) and obscure non-Tutsi victims and non-Hutu perpetrators. Problems with 
the ‘Genocide against the Tutsi’ narrative include that it gives Tutsis as near-exclusive right to 
victimhood, enabling ‘an avoidance of blame’ (Williams 2007, 133); refuses to recognize crimes 
perpetrated by current political leaders during the genocide; emphasizes the heroism of the RPF; 
centers the genocide in Rwandan history at the expense of a longer historical timeframe 
(Longman 2017); and promotes the post-ethnic ‘One Rwanda’ that obscures underlying ethnic 
identities. 
 It is important to note that problematic framings of past genocide and historical violence 
are by no means restricted to the Rwandan case – and to acknowledge the role that European, 
especially Belgian, colonialism played in developing the political dynamics that led to ethnic 
violence and post-genocide power dynamics. Indeed, the problems of a politics of victimhood 
and the exclusion of certain victim groups are widespread in the Global North, from 9/11 
memorials to the Israeli state’s justification of illegal settlements. However, the Rwandan 
memorials I discuss below are unique in their particular depictions of the aesthetic of bodily 
vulnerability, so it is critiques of these particular memorials that I address in this chapter.  
 I focus here on three of the country’s six national genocide memorials: the Kigali, 
Nyamata, and Murambi Genocide Memorials.6 These monuments are case studies in the political 
 
6Aside from the six national genocide memorials, there are hundreds of more informal and local 
memorials erected by communities. As Jens Meierhenrich documents, these “underprivileged” 
sites – many of them unmarked places where atrocities occurred that exist as lieux de mémoire 
(Pierre Nora’s (1989) term for salient memory sites) only in the minds of witnesses – contrast 
with the official, government-created sites. Underprivileged memorials display human remains 
far less often and less conspicuously (Meierhenrich 2011b, 290). I analyze these Rwandan 
genocide memorials because of their specific use of bodily remains and other depictions of 
bodily violence, which is fairly unique among the world’s genocide memorials. I chose these 
particular sites because I (a Western visitor) have visited them, in 2008 and 2012, and because 
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aesthetic of bodily vulnerability within commemorations of violent histories, and they point to 
successes, failures, and possibilities of this aesthetic.  
 The Kigali Genocide Memorial was opened in 2004 by the capital city and national 
governments, a body of Rwandan civilian consultants, and the British nonprofit Aegis Trust, 
creators of a Holocaust memorial museum in Nottinghamshire, United Kingdom (Sodaro 2018).  
It is the country’s main genocide memorial site, and it hosts Rwandans and foreign visitors alike, 
during both regular visiting hours and commemorative events during the annual period of 
mourning (Ibreck 2013). The memorial has played an important role in the production of the 
Rwandan genocide as a “global injustice memory” alongside the Holocaust and other twentieth 
century atrocities (Olesen 2012), conforming to transnational narratives of genocide modeled on 
themes familiar from Holocaust memorialization (Ibreck 2013). Visitors walk in to a courtyard 
with a fountain surrounding an eternal flame burning for genocide victims. Inside the museum, 
photographs, videos, and informational signs detail pre-colonial history; colonization and the 
ethnicization of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa groups; decades of ethnic conflict; the 1994 genocide; 
and its aftermath. The museum conforms to the “Genocide against the Tutsi” narrative; for 
example, a video displays a survivor suggesting that only five percent of Hutus were innocent 
(Doughty 2008, 198, cited in King 2010, 299). There is a room of photographs of child victims 
labelled with their names and biographical details (example: Francine Murengezi Ingabire, 12. 
Favourite food: eggs and chips. Cause of death: hacked by machete). Another room is filled with 
hundreds of family photographs of victims pinned to wires. Outside, a wall with names of the 
 
they are the subject of so many scholarly critiques, documented in this chapter. These highly 
documented sites are no more worthy of analysis than lieux de mémoire or lesser-known 
Rwandan memorials, but the previous scholarship on these sites provides a debate in which the 
ideas I discuss here about the political aesthetic of vulnerability can intervene. 
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dead stands near the mass graves containing at least 250,000 bodies, with window-ceilings 
visitors can peer through or even stand on. There are graphic photographs, bones, skulls, dirtied 
weapons, and piles of victims’ belongings under glass cases. 
At Nyamata, in a Catholic Church where Tutsis gathered to hide from génocidaires, 
bodies of victims are interred in a crypt, while their bloodied clothes lie on the church pews, 
standing in for the bodies that once wore them in what François Debrix calls the 
“fusion/confusion of the human and non-human” remains (Debrix 2017, 126). Visitors walk 
among the pews, with no glass or sanitized images between the viewer and the artifacts of the 
massacre. The smells and sight of bloodied clothing that victims were wearing as they were 
slaughtered arrests visitors immediately as they walk into the church. Sun and fresh air outside 
contrast with stuffiness and darkness inside; light streams through the bullet holes in the ceiling 
and through the holes that attackers made so they could throw grenades inside. The altar cloth is 
stained with blood; the church that the victims thought would be their sanctuary was instead the 
site of their massacre. In the basement of the church is a crypt; visitors can see down into the 
mass grave that contains over 45,000 bodies of those who were killed in the church and the 
nearby region. Banners and garlands in purple, the color of genocide commemoration, decorate 
the walls behind a Virgin Mary statue. The Church handed the site over in 1997 to the 
government (“Nyamata Memorial” 2015), which has retained control, with American 
preservationists consulting on the conservation of the site and its artifacts (R. Mason 2019). 
In Murambi, an unfinished technical school stands on a hill in the countryside near the 
university town of Butare. Tutsis and moderate Hutus flocked to the school as a place of 
sanctuary during the genocide, but as many as tens of thousands were killed nearby. The campus 
never became a school; instead, starting on the second anniversary of the genocide, the mass 
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graves surrounding the building were exhumed and the bodies of thousands of victims were laid 
out in the classrooms (Meierhenrich 2010). The Rwandan Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture 
(the Rwandan agency then responsible for genocide memorialization) and the Aegis Trust took 
over the site and constructed exhibits and began conservation of the site around the tenth 
anniversary of the genocide (Ibreck 2013). Those remains that were not claimed by relatives fill 
dozens of classrooms; these bodies, preserved with lye, are displayed on pallets, not behind 
glass. The bodies are mummified; visitors can see the twisted limbs and anguished facial 
expressions. There are adult-sized and child-sized bodies. The exhibits include placards 
displaying information critical of the French intervention during the genocide; these replaced 
exhibits depicting the plight of Hutu refugees, and they originally appeared around the time of 
President Kagame’s denunciation of the French following French-issued arrest warrants for RPF 
affiliates. These placards, which provide what little historical context there is at the site, describe 
French troops raping Rwandan women and building a volleyball court over mass graves (Giblin 
2017).  
 All three memorials are currently run by the Rwandan government’s commemorative 
agency, the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG) (“Organizational 
Structure” 2020), and the Kigali and Murambi sites are managed in partnership with the Aegis 
trust (Jinks 2014). The Catholic Church and local survivors played a role in the creation of many 
sites, organizing efforts by civilians in the immediate aftermath of the genocide to turn massacre 
sites into memorials by preserving bodies and artifacts and building mass graves before the 
Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture took these sites over. Additionally, foreign state and 
nonstate donors from the U.K., U.S., Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and the 
U.N. provided substantial funding for several memorial sites, including at Kigali and Murambi, 
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with the aim to promote reconciliation within Rwanda and express regret for the international 
community’s failure to intervene to stop the violence (Ibreck 2013). The audience for these 
memorials is both Rwandan (school trips of children born post-genocide, domestic tourism, and 
victim pilgrimages) and non-Rwandan (foreign dignitaries, business travelers, and tourists 
engaging in “dark tourism” (Lennon and Foley 2000) or “thanotourism” (Friedrich and Johnston 
2013)). The monuments remain an important part of Rwanda’s commemorative project despite 
the fact that, starting in 2011, national annual commemoration ceremonies have generally moved 
away from bodies and burials and toward more sanitized language about healing, reconciliation, 
and resurrection (Korman 2015). 
Sights and smells at these memorials graphically convey the reality of the 1994 violence 
and the vulnerability of bodies – purposely, in an effort to rebut genocide denial (Eltringham 
2014) and to symbolize the genocide to domestic and international audiences (Korman 2015). 
They exemplify the aesthetic of bodily vulnerability, or depictions of bodies as subject to pain 
and visceral violence at the hands of others. Critics point out the monuments’ use of bodily 
remains to exclude and marginalize those whose stories do not fit in with the regime’s political 
agenda. However, I will argue, the aesthetic of bodily vulnerability and the way that aesthetic has 
been enlisted in a politics of exclusion are separable. The aesthetic of vulnerability can be 
mobilized by different narratives but is also itself affectively powerful, regardless of its political 
context. Below, I detail Susan Sontag’s influential critique of depictions of violence and show 




Negative Accounts of Bodily Pain and Vulnerability 
 
Political thinkers have long been wary of the power of human remains and depictions of 
bodily violence, as early as Plato’s parable about Leonitus, whose appetitive element of his soul 
urges him to look at the gruesome sight of a pile of criminals’ corpses (Plato 1992). I examine 
(Global North) critics who question the safety and utility of depictions of bodily vulnerability to 
violence and I show how this negative account is reflected in contemporary (mostly Global 
North) criticisms of the Rwandan memorials. The major concern of the negative account is that 
depictions of bodily vulnerability violence will inevitably present an incomplete and potentially 
dangerous narrative. I describe these claims below before offering a positive account of 
depictions of bodily vulnerability and violence. 
One prominent line of critique, advanced by philosopher and critic Susan Sontag,7 argues 
that pain and bodily violence are difficult if not impossible to depict in a way that is helpful to 
the victims of violence. Writing about viewing photographs of bodily violence like grisly images 
of bombing or lynching victims, Sontag counters the idea that such images will inherently 
convey the same meaning to all viewers – let alone an anti-violence message. One danger, she 
argues, is that violent images will promote complicity in the viewer. ‘If one feels that there is 
nothing “we” can do – but who is that “we”? – and nothing “they” can do either – and who are 
“they”? – then one starts to get bored, cynical, apathetic’ (Sontag 2003, 129). Another danger, 
 
7Similarly, literary theorist Elaine Scarry argues that while pain exposes the person in pain to 
others, it does not open up the possibility of solidarity or fellow-feeling; instead, pain isolates us 
from others, providing ‘all the solitude of absolute privacy with none of its safety, all the self-
exposure of the utterly public with none of its possibility for camaraderie or shared experience’ 
(Scarry 1985, 53). 
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she argues, is that violent images of bodies will not ‘actually teach us anything’ but rather ‘just 
confirm what we already know (or want to know)’ (Sontag 2002). 
Yet another problem with viewing images of bodily vulnerability and violence, Sontag 
argues, is that such images can be nefariously manipulated by their framing and require visitors 
to critically engage with them, which does not always happen. Because ‘No moral charge 
attaches to the representation of these cruelties’, images can ‘explained or falsified by their 
captions. During the fighting between Serbs and Croats… the same photographs of children 
killed in the shelling of a village were passed around at both Serb and Croat propaganda 
briefings. Alter the caption: alter the use of these deaths’ (Sontag 2002). Thus, viewing images 
has to be accompanied by critical self-reflection in which viewers become ‘participant witnesses 
who, by looking… become aware of their own involvement in the scenes depicted’ and their 
responsibility as global spectators (Möller and Sontag 2010, 131) to alleviate or prevent further 
pain (Sontag 2003, 150). Sontag argues that simply viewing graphic, violent images is not 
enough for this task of critical reflection because many people can avoid absorbing or even 
viewing upsetting images (Sontag 2002; 2003). Thus, Sontag leaves open the possibility for the 
effective communication of bodily pain and vulnerability, but she also worries they will lead to 
complicity, they are easily manipulated, and they require critical reflection that is rarely 
exercised. 
 Many critics of Rwandan memorials apply the general principles found in Sontag’s 
critiques to the specific case of these memorials, taking issue with the sites’ depictions of bodily 
violence and vulnerability but also connecting this critique to a charge that the memorials 
harmfully exclude those whose victimization does not fit into the state’s official narrative. These 
reflect the critiques of Rwandan politics in general, and I argue they are misdirected: in their 
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criticism of the memorials, they lump together the aesthetic of bodily vulnerability with the 
exclusionary genocide narrative, but there is no intrinsic connection between the sites’ aesthetic 
of vulnerability and their enlistment in this narrative.  
 Problems with the “Genocide against the Tutsi” narrative include that it gives Tutsis as 
near-exclusive right to victimhood, enabling “an avoidance of blame” (Williams 2007, 133); 
refuses to recognize crimes perpetrated by current political leaders during the genocide; 
emphasizes the heroism of the RPF; centers the genocide in Rwandan history at the expense of a 
longer historical timeframe (Longman 2017); and promotes the post-ethnic “One Rwanda” that 
obscures underlying ethnic identities, paradoxically increasing ethnic tensions remaining under 
the surface (Buckley-Zistel 2006; Chakravarti 2013) while inhibiting long-term reconciliation 
(Vidal 2004; King 2010). Memorials such as the Kigali, Murambi, and Nyamata sites are 
enlisted in this exclusionary political narrative through plaques and displays that place the blame 
solely on colonists and genocide ideology (Sodaro 2018) and obscure non-Tutsi victims and non-
Hutu perpetrators.  
Several critics have argued that depictions of bodily vulnerability cause, aid, create, have 
been used to promote, or are constitutive of the exclusionary narrative propagated by the current 
regime. For example, Sara Guyer argues that “the traumatic silence that they [the Rwandan 
memorials’ bodies] generate can be difficult to distinguish from the enforced silence that the 
regime demands and indeed operates as a supplement to it” (Guyer 2009, 162, emphasis added). 
Laura Major causally links the memorials’ bodily remains to exclusionary commemoration: “The 
affective ability of human bones to demand attention, and the sense of ongoing and disruptive 
presence that they exude, has become the means through which a collective, politically 
amenable, identity is being consolidated” (Major 2015, 177–78, emphasis added). John Giblin 
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argues that “the post-genocide Rwandan government’s approach to its architectural heritage can 
also be understood as a form of ‘past mastering’… post-conflict actors have taken control of the 
re-telling of divisive events by turning physical remains into objects of evidence with the 
intention of promoting their own causes” (Giblin 2017, 117, emphasis added). Jens Meierhenrich 
(2011b, 288–89, emphasis added) also links visceral displays of bodies to tyranny: 
[T]he Nyamata memorial, and lieux de mémoire like it, can be said to service privileged 
memory, that is, memory that is officially sanctioned because it is in accordance with the 
post-genocidal raison d’état… By appealing to emotions rather than reason, Rwanda’s 
national memorials keep observers at bay. It is indeed difficult to formulate critical 
questions about the legitimacy of the post-genocidal regime when one is face to face – 
both literally and figuratively – with the legacies of the genocidal regime that preceded it. 
By remembering the past in a very particular, macabre manner, these memorials facilitate 
a forgetting of the present. 
 
Timothy Longman (2017, 5, emphasis added) argues that the depictions of bodies and violence 
have been used to prop up the state’s exclusionary political project: 
The use of bodies to manufacture a scene of horror and provoke a reaction seemed to 
contradict the intent of remembering the genocide and honoring the dead… This 
massacre site [Murambi] and this commemoration, I realized, allowed the government 
installed by the RPF to promote a crucial political message: the genocide was so horrible 
that it justified any actions that the new government had to take to maintain security. The 
bodies of genocide victims were being used to make a political point. 
 
Claudine Vidal writes that these depictions of bodily violence contribute to constructing further 
violence: “[c]ommemorative ceremonies in Rwanda, far from euphemizing the violence internal 
to the commemorative process, have externalized it and explicitly constructed it… an extreme 
symbolic violence… such violence must be linked to the forced memorization work committed 
by those in power” (2004, 590; my translation, emphasis added). 
Each of these scholars criticize the Rwandan memorials’ use of bodies and depictions of 
violence on the grounds that these depictions are themselves the cause of, or are intrinsically 
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linked to, the regime’s exclusionary narrative about the genocide.8 Indeed, many of these 
critiques discount the possibility that the memorials could depict the bodily vulnerability of 
victims separately from the official exclusionary narrative of the genocide. However, there is no 
reason the Murambi, Nyamata, and Kigali memorials cannot be reframed within a more inclusive 
politics of commemoration that would allow rather than foreclose discussion and debate,9 
include more Hutu victims and rescuers, and acknowledge the violence perpetrated by the RPA 
and the post-genocide regime. As Susan Cook puts it in her account of Murambi, “The physical 
remains themselves do not ‘tell the story’” (Cook 2004, 290). Rather, signage, tour guides, and 
framing of the remains tell the story. The separability of depictions of bodily vulnerability from 
their problematic context leaves open the possibility for such depictions to shape alternative 
 
8It should be noted that there are other grounds for critique of these memorials’ use of bodies, 
including the desubjectification or de-individualization of the dead by the presentation of bodies 
or bloodied clothes as piled together (Bolin 2012; Guyer 2009). The concern here is that 
aesthetic representations of bodies might replicate the effects of what François Debrix (2017, 6) 
identifies as horror (the paralyzing attack on “unity, individuality, integrity, and identity… of the 
human and its alleged singularity”). One response to this critique might come from those who 
see conventions of naming and individualizing the dead as a way that state power is exerted over 
bodies (Auchter 2013, 309). Another response is that an aesthetic of bodily vulnerability is just 
as separable from de-individualization as it is separable from exclusion. For example, we could 
still depict violence and vulnerability alongside details about individuals, like the plaques about 
children in the Kigali museum. Indeed, naming practices in art can disrupt practices of inequality 
that name the dead (and living) whose lives are valued while only giving counts of the dead (and 
living) whose lives are not valued (Lloyd 2019).  
 
9For a discussion of collective commemoration that encourages rather than forecloses 
deliberation and debate, see Simon Stow’s framework of “romantic” public mourning 
(consensus, sentiment, death, and unity and thus can silence minority or dissenting voices) versus 
“tragic” public mourning (“pluralistic, critical, and self-consciously political,” allowing for 
agonistic politics and irreconcilable disagreement) (Stow 2010, 682). James Scott’s invocation of 
monuments’ openness to play, interaction, and participation makes similar points about openness 
and contention versus fixedness and closedness (Scott 2012, 61–63), as does Steven Johnston’s 
(2015) argument for a tragic democratic sensibility of commemoration. 
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political imaginaries rather than to merely prop up a repressive narrative. In the next section, I 
develop an account of these possibilities. 
 
A Positive Account of Bodily Vulnerability 
 
As I have shown, critiques of the aesthetic of bodily vulnerability abound. However, critics 
often fall short of proposing an alternative solution.10 Moving beyond critique, is there anything 
worth salvaging in a political aesthetic that depicts bodies as vulnerable to the violence of 
others? I argue that there is – that the aesthetic of bodily vulnerability might be enlisted in a 
political project that is opposed to brutality toward bodies. By inviting a reading of the Rwandan 
memorials’ depictions of bodily vulnerability in a way that highlights their successes while 
acknowledging their failures, we can imagine a political aesthetic that considers bodies and 
bodily harm as a way to see others’ bodies as non-disposable and work against future mass 
violence. To do so, I draw on Judith Butler’s claims about ontological precariousness and 
vulnerability in order to rehabilitate the aesthetic of bodily vulnerability.  
For Butler, the political power of mourning is that it can include or exclude categories of 
bodies and people as worthy of mourning. Although all lives and bodies should be mourned and 
respected, such respect is not equally distributed, creating a hierarchy of exclusion (Butler 2010), 
or what Talal Asad calls “two categories of human being: torturables and nontorturables” (Asad 
 
10For example, Jens Meierhenrich laments the loss of spontaneous and locally created memorials 
but recognizes that development and generational turnover will inevitably erase these sites’ 
salience (Meierhenrich 2011b). Chérie Rivers Ndaliko says, “commemoration calibrated to a real 
or imagined West suffocates African laughter along with African lives. This is not to say I have 
an alternative; I most certainly do not” (Ndaliko 2018, 277). And Annalisa Bolin argues Western 
tourists “can be seen, through their inadvertent erasure of victims’ individuality, as participating 
in the same genocidal logic as 1994’s génocidaires” (Bolin 2012, 201), but she does not offer an 
alternative to this “genocidal logic.” 
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2007, 32). While grief is sometimes construed as privatizing, Butler argues, it has great potential 
for building solidarity and community because it reminds us of our bodies’ vulnerability, 
interdependence, and relationality. Vulnerability is an inevitable ontological condition: “we all 
live with this particular vulnerability, a vulnerability to the other that is part of bodily life, a 
vulnerability to a sudden address from elsewhere that we cannot preempt” (Butler 2004b, 29). 
Butler simultaneously makes an ontological claim about a human condition of mutual 
vulnerability, or “precariousness,” and critiques the additional strain felt by groups who are 
“exposed to injury, violence, and death,” or “precarity” (Butler 2010, 25). For this reason, her 
critical theory that interrogates unequal precarity is often mistaken for an ideal theory that 
uncritically naturalizes precariousness (Kramer 2015).11 
Butler points to the ways that, rather than ignore or try to fulfill “an institutionalized 
fantasy of mastery” over our vulnerability, we can harness it (Butler 2004b, 29):  
Mindfulness of this vulnerability can become the basis of claims for non-military 
political solutions… We cannot, however, will away this vulnerability. We must 
attend to it, even abide by it, as we begin to think about what politics might be 
implied by staying with the thought of corporeal vulnerability itself, a situation in 
which we can be vanquished or lose others. Is there something to be learned about 
 
11For the debates around Butler’s ontological and critical claims about precarity and 
precariousness, see Bonnie Honig’s argument against Butler’s “mortalist humanism” (Honig 
2013). Scholars have also argued that basing a more just or equal distribution of safety on an 
ontology of vulnerability obscures differential experiences of vulnerability (Cole 2016) such as 
racial and colonial injury (Michel 2016), disempowers or overlooks certain types of political 
action (Honig 2013, 24; 2019), or requires further politicization (Shulman 2011a; 2011b; 
Murphy 2012) or historical contextualization (Lloyd 2008). However, others point out that many 
of these critics’ positioning of Butler’s ontology or ethics as outside politics is overstated 
(Kramer 2015) and that attending to mourning, especially if divorced from the melancholic and 
grounded in the political, need not preclude working through internal ambivalence and 
contradiction (McIvor 2016; 2012). Butler herself anticipates these critiques by claiming that 
“the ontology and the epistemology of the human are organized by politics” (Kramer 2015, 30) 
and by arguing for “the intellectual projects of critique, of questioning, of coming to understand 
the difficulties and demands of cultural translation and dissent, and to create a sense of the public 
in which oppositional voices are not feared, degraded or dismissed” (Butler 2004b, 151). 
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the geopolitical distribution of corporeal vulnerability from our own brief and 
devastating exposure to this condition?  
 
That “something to be learned” is a lesson about accountability to others, and ultimately 
an effort to ward off the kinds of violence we have already experienced, a rebuttal to 
concerns like Sontag’s about cheap sentimentality and apathy (Butler 2004b, 30): 
If we stay with the sense of loss, are we left feeling only passive and 
powerless, as some might fear? Or are we, rather, returned to a sense of 
human vulnerability, to our collective responsibility for the physical lives 
of one another? Could the experience of a dislocation of First World safety 
not condition the insight into the radically inequitable ways that corporeal 
vulnerability is distributed globally? … From where might a principle 
emerge by which we vow to protect others from the kinds of violence we 
have suffered, if not from an apprehension of a common human 
vulnerability?  
 
What might it mean, in the wake of mass violence, for us to “stay with” the thought of 
corporeal vulnerability? It would mean attending to the ways that our own experiences of 
witnessing violence and bodily vulnerability or its representation (in Butler’s example, the 9/11 
attacks) can prompt a political obligation to “vow to protect others” from violence as well. 
Witnessing violence and its aftermath permits a thoughtful engagement with that violence and 
the bodies it hurts, which, properly framed, can guide us toward a politics that works against 
future mass violence by resisting a view of the body of the other as disposable. The rupture that 
mass violence creates, then, can also serve as an opportunity to think critically about the 
condition of bodily vulnerability, our mutual vulnerability to violence at the hands of others, and 
the possibilities for resisting such violence. The imaginary of mastery, the disposability of 
certain bodies and lives, and the reduced attention to the mourning of those lives deemed 
disposable contribute to a politics of fascism, violence, and genocide. 
Bodily vulnerability, the destructibility of our bodies, implies a kind of interdependence. 
That is, because vulnerability implies a (shared but not equal) “common physicality and risk” 
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(Butler 2005, 100), we all depend on each other not to hurt each other. Witnessing, experiencing, 
or attending to violence inflicted on bodies can uncover our potential vulnerability to violence at 
the hands of others. As Dustin Howes writes, “Only hermits or hermetically sealed bodies can 
dream of being invulnerable. Physically being with one another is full of horrific possibilities” 
(Howes 2009, 33). Considering the vulnerability of others’ bodies through the aesthetic of 
vulnerability can equip us to “critically evaluate and oppose the conditions under which certain 
human lives are more vulnerable than others” (Butler 2004b, 30). Witnessing violence or its 
remnants (like, in Butler’s example, the 9/11 attacks or the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide) 
can communicate this ontological condition of interdependence while also allowing room for 
critical inquiry into the unequal ramifications of this interdependence for different groups of 
people. This interdependence may cultivate opposition to the politics of violent forms of power: 
we begin to realize our bodies are like others’ in their destructibility, and this common ground 
can be a basis for acknowledging and politically or ethically supporting others (Rorty 1989; 
Hooker 2009). Acknowledging our interdependence can equip us to “let each other live by doing 
less psychic or physical violence to each other” (Rushing 2010, 298).  
This is not to say a totally equal distribution of vulnerability is possible, only that a political 
aesthetic of vulnerability, such as depictions of the violence that humans can inflict upon each 
other, can remind viewers of their bodies’ existing vulnerability as interdependence. Within a 
narrative framing of past violence as an unequal distribution of pain and suffering and of the 
current need for a more equal distribution of mourning, an aesthetic of bodily vulnerability may 
also work to cultivate a political imagination of non-disposability as we come to see each other 
as mutually dependent and constitutively vulnerable. 
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An aesthetic of bodily vulnerability can go beyond conveying our basic interdependence on 
each other not to inflict harm. By emphasizing the ties of mutual dependence and shared 
ontological vulnerability, such an engagement may also lead us to “a relationality that is 
composed neither exclusively of myself nor you, but is to be conceived as the tie by which those 
terms are differentiated and related” (Butler 2004b, 22). That is, the aesthetic of bodily 
vulnerability may work against a vision of the self as independently constituted by emphasizing 
the ties to others through shared vulnerability and by emphasizing the interdependence of 
vulnerability to violence. In contrast to the liberal, sovereign subject, the relational subject resists 
the impulse toward the violence of mastery in favor of an selfhood that is grounded in others, in 
its own contingency, and in internal ambivalence (Rushing 2010). Memory work around 
violence, in particular, can reveal this “radical relationality” (Edkins 2006, 115) that resists 
violence and mastery. Butler articulates how a bonded relationality can work against seeing 
others’ bodies as disposable (Butler and Gessen 2020): 
If I think of myself not just as this bounded individual but as fundamentally 
related to others, then I locate this self in those relations… If the self I’m trying to 
defend is also in some sense related to the person I’m tempted to kill, I have to 
make sure not to do violence to that relation, because that’s also me. One could go 
further: I’m also attacking myself by attacking that person, since I am breaking a 
social bond that we have between us.  
 
If we see the bodies of others within such a framework of interdependence and relationality, it 
may become harder to see others’ bodies and lives as disposable because we are mutually 
dependent and even mutually constitutive of others. That is, a political obligation not to inflict 
violence on the other or to see the body of the other as disposable may arise out of a view of 
bodies as mutually vulnerable and relational, a view that can be facilitated by a political aesthetic 
of bodily vulnerability in memorials and elsewhere. Because mass violence and debasing forms 
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of power are rooted in a political vision in which some bodies and lives are seen as disposable, 
an orientation of non-disposability may work against the politics of mass violence.  
Positioned within a political narrative that avoids a politics of victimhood and tells a nuanced 
version of history, an aesthetic of bodily vulnerability such as the representations at the Rwandan 
memorials can remind us that all life is subject to the violence of another. If we are reminded of 
the very embodiment of violence, the price it enacts on others’ bodies, it becomes not only more 
difficult to abstract away, excuse, or downplay historical violence but also more difficult to see 
others as disposable or to act upon the politics of mass violence. This is because the aesthetic of 
bodily vulnerability can convey the visceral immediacy of bodily harm, our bodies’ mutual 
dependence when it comes to violence, and our relational subjectivity. Dwelling in these visceral 
realities, in the context of distributing mourning even to marginalized groups through an 
aesthetic of bodily vulnerability, opens up the imagination to our mutual vulnerability; reflecting 
on our mutual vulnerability opens up the imagination to interdependence and relationality; 
attending to our interdependence and relationality opens up the imagination to a politics in which 
we do not see others as disposable, a politics that aims to work against the summum malum of 
future mass violence. 
Statistics and death tolls often reduce the physical reality of bodies because death in large 
quantities is cognitively and emotionally incomprehensible. In contrast, an aesthetic of violence 
and vulnerability makes it difficult to ignore the plight of victims; at Murambi and Nyamata, 
nothing stands between the visitor and the human remains. Rather than holding viewers at arm’s 
length, they purposefully evoke the visceral, the affective, and the emotional. Once you have 
seen the bloodstain where children were smashed to death against a church wall, it is difficult to 
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unsee it. The immediacy of bloodied clothing, bullet holes in walls, dirtied weapons of genocide, 
and preserved corpses mirrors the immediacy of our own vulnerability and that of others.  
And an aesthetic of vulnerability is not only separable from a politics of exclusion; it is 
compatible with a politics that acknowledges rather than sidelines the suffering of groups like 
Hutu refugees, Hutu rescuers, and Twa victims.12 Framed properly, an aesthetic of bodily 
vulnerability can orient us toward a politics that embraces ambiguity, the critical thinking Sontag 
encourages, and ideas about the non-disposability of plural others. Although the horror of bodily 
vulnerability does not have a normative orientation of its own, it is (on its own terms) affectively 
powerful (Asad 2007, 80–81), jarring, and upsetting. However, as Elizabeth Dauphinée puts it, 
‘Images do not speak for themselves – they are made to speak for, by and about us’ (2007, 153). 
Therefore, narrative framing around depictions of pain and bodily vulnerability are crucial: a 
corpse depicted on a lynching postcard, for example, is framed as a pornographic spectacle 
subject to the carnival of Jim Crow (A. Y. Davis 2005), whereas a corpse depicted in an open 
casket at a funeral is framed as an entity worthy of respect and mourning. Images that glorify 
violence, such as photographs of prisoners’ bodies at Abu Ghraib, can fetishize bodily pain and 
torture when they are over-circulated to the point of objectification, even if that circulation is 
intended to work against the politics of torture (Dauphinée 2007; A. Y. Davis 2005). Just as 
journalists can use the same images of bodily pain or violence to support very different 
 
12Further, the use of bodily remains in genocide memorials can sometimes work to include 
female victims of sexual violence, a group whose stories are often undermined in genocide 
commemoration (A. Dworkin 1994). In Nicole Fox’s study of Rwandan genocide memorials, an 
anonymous Rwandan memorial that displays weapons and bloodstains draws on “the physicality 
of the site” and of these graphic reminders of violence to invoke discussions of gender-based 
violence (Fox 2019, 137). Meanwhile, at another anonymous site, where remains and artifacts 
are not on display, stories of women’s exposure to gender-based violence are marginalized. Fox 
posits that physical evidence of genocidal violence on display (such as bones and weapons) helps 
sites and tour guides resist the marginalization of narratives about sexual violence. 
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narratives about an event, so can those in a position to frame memorial depictions. Although we 
can never completely regulate or even predict how images are taken up by the public (Lisle 
2006), the framing around an image “functions not only as a boundary to the image, but as 
structuring the image itself,” so that the question is not what the image shows, “but also how it 
shows what it shows” (Butler 2010, 71). In the Rwandan case, the current framing leaves no 
room for a nuanced history, instead promoting the “Genocide against the Tutsi” narrative at the 
expense of other victims and thoughtful political deliberation. Without leaving room for working 
through contentious politics and marginalized histories, “practices of public mourning may 
merely serve to reinforce a cognitive and nationalistic dogmatism rather than providing an 
occasion to acknowledge corporeal vulnerability and ethico-political interconnection” (McIvor 
2012, 428). In order to leave room for these contentious politics, depictions drawing on an 
aesthetic of vulnerability must incorporate counternarratives, marginalized voices, opportunities 
for the kind of critical thinking Sontag urges, and a vision of vulnerability as highlighting, not 
exploiting, our interdependence.  
While such depictions can be, and in Rwanda, are, framed in such a way that they justify a 
politics of exclusion, they are at least powerful representations of the vulnerability of our own 
bodies to others and of the horror of violence. As Talal Asad notes, states often seek “to 
eliminate uncertainty in signs, at other times to create it” in order to consolidate their power or 
perpetrate violence, and the cultivated uncertainty or consolidated narrative of symbols can often 
“allow state power to penetrate the density of ordinary life” (Asad 2007, 31, 30). While this 
seems to be the case in contemporary Rwandan politics, an exclusionary narrative framing of 
historical violence that remains “trapped in a form of silence where the past continues to haunt” 
(Hölscher, Kanamugire, and Udah 2020) is not inevitable. If framed, instead, by an inclusive 
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politics of commemoration in Rwanda, such an aesthetic offers itself up as one powerful tool 
among many that could work toward a peaceful and inclusive politics based on the non-
disposability of human bodies and life. And indeed, the simplistic accounts of the Rwandan 
state’s narrative strategy at the memorials fail to account for the nuance and contestation over 
meanings that is already playing out within the constraints of the unity message; a “negative 
reading of state-sponsored events in state-monitored spaces hinders a more positive view of these as 
sites of political transformative learning and political contestation” (Benda 2017). 
How can we avoid exploiting or marginalizing groups of people in the present by depicting 
past violence? One way is to avoid historical simplification and to provide narratives that leave 
room for political contestation rather than propping up authoritarian politics or refusing to 
recognize the victimhood of certain groups. In Rwanda, this might involve framing the 
memorials (by using signs and placards and changing some of the problematic assertions in the 
Kigali museum) in such a way that recognizes the victims whose victimhood does not fit into the 
current narrative.  
The ethnicization of the monuments, including the labelling of the genocide as ‘against the 
Tutsi’ (depicting Tutsi victims’ bodies as the only bodies that matter), only serves to retrench a 
politics of victimhood and exclusion. But if the memorials can be reframed to employ the 
aesthetic of bodily vulnerability toward an inclusive and open politics, then they could generate 
imaginative possibilities in which others are not seen as disposable. This might include 
acknowledging other victim groups (the millions of displaced Hutus and the thousands of Hutu 
refugees who died as a result of the refugee crisis; Hutu rescuers; victims of different ethnic 
categories who were killed by the RPA as it advanced toward Kigali; Twa genocide victims; 
victims of Rwanda’s military interventions into the DRC; and Hutu moderates who were 
punished for helping Tutsis). The Murambi site’s signage, which focuses on placing blame on 
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French troops for the genocide in general and the Murambi massacre in particular, could be 
reworked tell a more holistic story of the genocide. The narrative around victims and perpetrators 
in all signage and online materials could avoid ethnicized national guilt and a repressive politics 
of victimhood. Instead, they could tell a nuanced history that recognizes the role of colonial 
powers in entrenching ethnic divides and avoids essentializing narratives about the precolonial 
origins of ethnic identity. They could also acknowledge the long, complicated twentieth century 
history of ethnic violence in the Great Lakes region Tutsi victims of the 1994 genocide need not 
be ignored or undermined, but language including other victims and avoiding depictions of the 
RPA as martyrs would allow for a more open and accurate narrative. Attending to bodily 
vulnerability can ask us to imagine our common precariousness without erasing all politically 
meaningful differences and identities; thinking through one shared vulnerability – to death and 
pain – does not preclude us from maintaining other differences. These measures toward a more 
inclusive genocide narrative would open the door for responsibility-taking, social repair, and 
reconciliation while preserving the aesthetic of bodily vulnerability.  
We should proceed with caution, as Sontag (2003) reminds us. These images might feed our 
appetites for the gruesome, and there is a reason viewing gruesome images of hurt bodies is 
taboo in many societies, considered prurient or even pornographic. But these memorials are 
physical sites that individuals visit in person, not a proliferation of images of mangled bodies all 
around our physical environment. Moreover, we are often fascinated by the visceral whether we 
admit it or not; when we see gruesome images, “[a]n unconscious knowledge whispers to the 
child what is repressed by civilized education; this is what matters, says the whispering voice” 
(Adorno 2004, 336). That whispering voice may be accompanied by a “thrill of revulsion” 
among those “who themselves are in no danger,” but they may also provide “moments of 
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identification and reflection, moments of rejection and denial, and moments to be inquisitive 
about the dreadful fates of others” (Taylor 1998, 7). Just as an ontology of vulnerability is based 
upon recognizing the already-present precarity of life, an aesthetic of vulnerability is based upon 
recognizing a fascination that is often already present. It is precisely for these reasons that such 
powerful images require context and narration (in the form of signage and explanation at the 
sites themselves and in the broader politics of commemoration). Context can reorient depictions’ 
meaning and purpose, just as the same video clip might mean very different things in the context 
of an instructional medical school recording of a surgery versus in the context of a gruesome 
horror film. And yet the political aesthetic has its own political power to evoke disgust and 
horror, a power that can be used for divergent political goals, depending on the framing. 
Scholars attentive to the problem of necropolitics (Mbembe 2019) have pointed out how the 
state often uses and reproduces the (male, cis) Black body as a dead body; how racial politics has 
readily rallied around this version of the slain Black body (Threadcraft 2017); and how images of 
dead foreigners are used to support a distinction between the foreign other and the Western 
subject (Taylor 1998). Indeed Butler herself, in her reading of the Rodney King trial, warns that 
the visual field is “itself a racial formation” at risk of reproducing a politics of victimhood in 
which the hegemonic group claims as its own the vulnerability of the actual victim (Butler 1993, 
17). It is important that any attempts to bring to the forefront a political aesthetic of bodily 
vulnerability are attentive to the problems surrounding the use and depiction of bodies 
(especially Black and Brown bodies), including questions such as: which bodies are being 
depicted? What do these depictions mean in the context of the aesthetic norms and culture of the 
community? Are these depictions replicating or resisting post-colonial power? Do families of the 
deceased have the ability to claim and rebury the remains and artifacts of their loved ones? If a 
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memorial or other depiction is mostly viewed by Global North audiences, are the images of 
Global South bodies in danger of re-inscribing beliefs about the foreign other? If the audience is 
mostly Global Southern viewers, whom do these depictions serve, and how can they be framed 
in an expansive rather than exclusionary way? If the audience is international, how can narratives 
around the images avoid reproducing a narrative that denies the specificity and nuance of the 
particular history being depicted? Additionally, while the use of actual human remains will not 
be appropriate in all cases, memorials can depict the fragility of human bodies through other 
means. For example, in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, visitors walk past piles 
of hundreds of pairs of shoes taken from Jews before their deaths. Statues depicting violence, 
even without depicting the dead body, can use facial expressions, movement, and light to 






Many scholars doubt the potential for long-lasting peace in Rwanda as long as the 
government continues to depict the “Genocide against the Tutsi.” But the past two and a half 
decades have seen a tentative peace, the growth of some democratic institutions (even as others 
remain weak), and a lack of widespread ethnic violence. If the summum malum is future 
genocide, that at least has been avoided by the closed and exclusionary government narrative. Of 
course, many of the critiques of the regime detailed earlier, about the suppression of minorities 
and political opposition, are legitimate. But the current memorials, if reframed, could leave room 
for contestation, deliberation, and peaceful political conflict. Indeed, the memorials in some 
cases have already provided opportunities for processing and healing among survivors 
(Berckmoes et al. 2017). Depictions of bodily pain and violence do not preclude this; rather, 
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within an inclusive framing, they can work against future mass violence by helping viewers to 
contemplate their own and others’ bodily vulnerability, interdependence, and non-disposability.  
How might a memorial resonate with members of all ethnic and social groups in Rwanda 
while avoiding the pitfalls of false equivalence? It would have to accept the contradictions and 
flaws inherent to Rwanda’s post-genocide rebirth and the complexities of its history. It would 
have to give up on closed, self-resolving commemorative narratives and embrace open, 
contested, unresolved commemorative narratives. A gradual opening of political restraints is 
compatible with a more inclusive narrative of the genocide in Rwanda’s memorials, national day 
of mourning, national curriculum, and other commemorative efforts. And memorials depicting 
an aesthetic of vulnerability can be used outside the Rwandan context; depictions of bodily pain 
and violence can operate in Global North contexts, for example, to memorialize victims of 
colonial violence, genocide, and slavery.  
Memorials should not be expected to do this work on their own, but rather as part of a 
larger program of political commemoration that includes civic education, commemorative 
holidays, and museums. For example, the inclusion of more Hutu voices in victims’ rights 
groups and the removal of the “Genocide against the Tutsi” from commemorative markers, 
memorials, events, media, and speeches are small steps the government can take to include more 
voices and narratives. We cannot expect memorials alone to further the anti-violence project. 
After all, they are “just” memorials.  
If we are willing to accept that memorials are instruments – that is, they have a political 
or social purpose within the political and are not just art objects or representations of “pure” 
remembrance – then we should think critically about what that purpose should be. Whereas 
negative accounts of memorials that depict bodily vulnerability to violence criticize the danger of 
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expressing pain, I want to refocus on the purpose of memorials. One way we can open up the 
political imagination to a politics that resists future mass violence is through an aesthetic of 








CHAPTER THREE: A POLITICAL AESTHETIC OF FUGITIVITY IN THE MEMORIAL 
LANDSCAPE OF U.S. SLAVERY 
 
 
“What happens instead of solely seeing people as victims… the idea that people who 
were enslaved – and surely victimized – could still make choices and based on the limited 
choices they had and the resilience it takes to do that, and the creativity that takes? 
Because then you have to decide, so if we’re going to live, what do we need to do to live, 
and what do we have here at our fingertips to live with? What are we going to eat? How 
are we going to have a shelter over our head? How are we going to build a family? How 
are we going to, you know, get married in the swamp? How are we going to laugh in the 
swamp and be fully who we are?”  
— Carolyn Finney, in Landscape of Power (film), 2015 
 
Beginning in the late seventeenth century and continuing to the close of the Civil War, 
thousands of formerly enslaved African-diaspora people and their descendants in the United 
States fled within the South. In swamps, forests, and towns throughout the South, enslaved 
people escaped by taking refuge in nearby areas where they had no formal or legal claim to 
sanctuary, engaging in forms of fugitivity within territories of enslavement. They hid for a few 
hours or days or months, they plotted to bring their loved ones along, and they even formed 
permanent and semi-permanent communities of refuge. This picture may be unfamiliar to 
Americans accustomed to learning about fugitivity as flight all the way north to freedom on the 
Underground Railroad. But fugitives, their enslaved contemporaries, and free people alike 
understood that in the antebellum South, fugitivity took many different forms. Enslaved people 
escaped both temporarily and permanently. They “lurked” nearby on the swampy or wooded 
peripheries of plantation labor camps and farms; they skipped work or escaped for short periods 
of time; they settled in remote maroon communities; and they blended into free Black 
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communities in the South. They settled with free or other fugitive family members to avoid being 
separated from them, travelled to reunite with enslaved kin, or made new lives for themselves 
alone or in ad hoc groups. 
What can we learn from those liminal spaces of flight and from those who engaged in 
fugitivity? What can we learn about the different ways that enslaved people resisted the violence 
of enslavement through flight – forms of flight other than escape to the North? Writers such as 
Saidiya Hartman, Juliet Hooker, Fred Moten, Neil Roberts, and Christina Sharpe have advanced 
what Cedric Robinson (2000) calls the “Black radical tradition,” positioning slavery and 
antiblackness within the context of global capitalism and flight from systems of oppression. 
These scholars have excavated many important ideas within the North American Black literary 
and aesthetic tradition. In particular, many of these scholars take up the idea of fugitivity, a type 
of resistance that takes the specific form of flight.  
For these thinkers, fugitive thought sometimes takes the form of thinking about the actual 
fugitivity undertaken by enslaved people and what their experiences can show us about “the 
options of flight available to an agent living in unfreedom” (Roberts 2015, 135). Because chattel 
slavery in the Americas and in particular the United States was rare among other slave systems 
of the world in its low levels of manumission (Patterson 2018), self-emancipation through flight 
was a particularly important political process there. Historians have done much important recent 
work to show that fugitivity in what is now the United States was especially extensive, took a 
variety of forms, and had many important social and political functions. Fugitivity was much 
more than, as W.E.B. Du Bois once called it, “the Safety valve of Slavery” that kept revolts 
down and tensions at a simmer (Du Bois 1999, 13); it was an important way for enslaved people 
to resist the system of violence they found themselves trapped within. 
 67 
Other times, fugitive thought takes the form of what anthropologist Lia Haro and political 
theorist Romand Coles (2019, 650) call “fugitive theorizing”: “embracing the intellectual 
orientations arising from fugitivity, such as imagining alternate racial orders, futures, and forms 
of subjectivity” (Hooker 2017b, 34). Writing in his Freedom as Marronage, political theorist 
Neil Roberts calls this “intellectual marronage,” “an epistemological blueprint functioning as a 
corollary to the enactment of actual flight” (Roberts 2015, 13). Black fugitive theorizing is itself 
in flight from “the colonial and racial hegemony of [the concept of] Western liberty” (Hesse 
2014, 289) and other hegemonic ideas and frameworks. And several thinkers bring together 
thinking about actual historical fugitivity and fugitive thought (ex. Hooker 2017b; Roberts 2015; 
Hesse 2014). 
As this recent scholarship demonstrates, fugitivity is not monolithic, either in the history 
of those who escaped slavery or within fugitive theorizing. In this paper, I distinguish between 
several visions of fugitivity, drawing from primary texts, historical scholarship, and 
contemporary Black political thought. I argue that although the American imaginary of fugitivity 
has been preoccupied with the idea of complete flight north on the Underground Railroad, there 
are other important ways that fugitive enslaved people engaged in resistance through flight. I 
discuss these other forms – hiding nearby, truancy, “blending in” among free Blacks, and 
marronage – and how they have (or have not been) captured in the U.S. memorial landscape. I 
argue that memorializing these multiple forms of flight can not only capture a fuller, richer 
picture of the historical flight of enslaved people in the U.S., but they can also enrich fugitive 
theorizing and fugitive political action. I focus on some of the themes and ideas that come out of 
enslaved people’s various forms of flight – in particular, entanglements of care and kinship and 
escape within systems of violence and oppression – and I show how these themes and ideas 
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might be generative of fugitive politics and theorizing as resistance to violence in the current 
day. 
 




Scholarship on enslaved people’s fugitivity in the United States has emphasized escape 
on the north-south axis, for the most part ignoring escape within slaveholding states and 
territories (Pargas 2018b). The dominant conception of fugitivity from enslavement emphasizes 
individualism, flight to the north, freedom, and closure or the completion of struggle.  
Although the Underground Railroad was in actual fact a flexible, relational network of 
connection and interdependence, as recent historical and literary re-readings have portrayed, the 
popular conception of the Underground Railroad goes something like this: a series of singular 
individuals, like the heroine Harriet Tubman and some courageous Whites, risked everything to 
ferry fugitives from slaveholding states to the North. However, this popular understanding of the 
Underground Railroad is clouded by inaccuracies and myth (Delle 2008, 65).  
The Underground Railroad in particular and fugitive slave narratives in general are 
conventionally defined by the story of escape from the South to the free North (Hesse 2014, 
301). A recent proliferation of novels, historical scholarship, and documentaries has reinforced 
the Underground Railroad as the hegemonic narrative about fugitivity in the American historical 
imagination. This narrative, which is based on simplified and partially inaccurate accounts of the 
Railroad published in histories by Wilbur Siebert and R. C. Smedley in the 1880s and 1890s that 
mixed factual accounts with tall tales (Blight 2004), inflates the lopsided awareness of sacrifices 
made by White abolitionists in the routes of escape in proportion to those made by Black 
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abolitionists. It also reinforces an misleading narrative that the Railroad reached deep into 
slaveholding states, bringing enslaved people from the middle and deep South to the North (K. 
Schulz 2016). Although this narrative is inaccurate, it is prevalent in public education in the 
United States and is the version that “most Americans” inherit (Haro and Coles 2019, 655) 
through textbooks that perpetuate this “romantic legend” (Gara 1996, 15). Civic education in the 
United States then draws on this simplistic depiction to support narratives of exceptional 
individuals, meritocracy, and heroism as opposed to recognizing systemic injustice and 
celebrating relational fugitive community-building. Beyond schools, the narrative has been 
perpetuated by everyone from public history museums to quilt sellers (Delle 2008). It has 
become so prevalent in the American imaginary that Eric Foner goes so far as to say that, for 
Americans, all fugitives bring to mind the Underground Railroad (Foner 2015). 
The version of the Underground Railroad that Americans are taught emphasizes the 
individualism of extraordinary heroes who did exceptional things to flee or rescue others. It 
emphasizes flight to the northern free states and Canada, representing complete escape from  
enslavement, together with legally protected freedom (even though fugitives lived under the 
shadow of the Fugitive Slave Act after 1850) and closure; in this narrative, the North represented 
the “Promised Land of freedom” (Gara 1996, 2). And it portrays the mystique of this almost-
supernatural phenomenon of extraordinary escape through a “prevailing mythic remembrance of 
secret rooms, underground tunnels, and other such romanticized phenomena” (Delle 2008, 64).  
One prominent depiction of this vision of fugitivity is Frederick Douglass’ Narrative of 
the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave. In the narrative, Douglass documents how 
he had to overcome extraordinary odds. He escapes without kin accompanying him as he flees to 
a free state. Take, for example, Douglass’ soliloquy where he determines that he will eventually 
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escape (Douglass 2014, 67–68). Note Douglass’ repeated use of the word “I,” his vision of how 
he will escape to the North (representing freedom or liberty, posited to be the opposite of 
slavery), and his lack of a need to consider caretaking ties to children or other relatives:13 
Could I but swim! If I could fly! O, why was I born a man, of whom to make a 
brute!... Why am I a slave? I will run away. I will not stand it. Get caught, or get 
clear, I’ll try it. I had as well die with ague as the fever. I have only one life to 
lose. I had as well be killed running as die standing. Only think of it; one hundred 
miles straight north, and I am free! Try it? Yes! God helping me, I will. It cannot 
be that I shall live and die a slave. I will take to the water. This very bay shall yet 
bear me into freedom. The steamboats steered in a north-east course from North 
Point. I will do the same; and when I get to the head of the bay, I will turn my 
canoe adrift, and walk straight through Delaware into Pennsylvania. When I get 
there, I shall not be required to have a pass; I can travel without being disturbed. 
Let but the first opportunity offer, and, come what will, I am off. 
 
The conventional version of the Underground Railroad is a simplified narrative for 
several reasons. First, it overemphasizes the role of White abolitionists and understates the role 
of and risks taken by Black abolitionists (Gara 1996). The “idea that the Underground Railroad 
was a disciplined, coordinated institution, which featured regular lines and stations, much like 
real railroads, and that this organization was run like a corporation by altruistic white men” 
undermines the leadership of Black fugitives and free Blacks who aided fugitives (Delle 2008, 
 
13For a discussion of the masculinism of Douglass’ and some other slave narratives, see Hooker 
(2017b) and Roberts (2015). Hooker argues that visions of fugitivity that are predicated on the 
individual escapee are often masculinist fugitivity in that they can “privilege male experience” 
(Hooker 2017b, 36). Roberts argues that Douglass relies on a masculinist framework of fugitivity 
and freedom (Roberts 2015, 205, footnote 117). For example, he argues that Douglass “uses the 
lexicon of man/men rather than human or woman/women, treats effeminacy as a weakness, 
constructs a lack of manhood as an epistemological, physical, and spiritual deficiency, and views 
progress as an effect of manhood” (Roberts 2015, 83–84). However, it should be noted that 
Douglass does account in a limited way for the resistance to enslavement by his female relatives, 
including his mother’s nighttime visits, when she walked twelve miles each way to see him 
(Douglass 2014, 18). Douglass, as a symbol of rugged individualism, may have been more 
palatable than other figures to a White audience in the eyes of his abolitionist sponsors and 
colleagues. To say that his vision of fugitivity is often a masculinist framework is not to discount 
its legitimacy and its necessity for those who, like Douglass, engaged in it. 
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72) and supports “a nostalgic structure of white benevolence” (Haro and Coles 2019, 655). In 
this narrative (Gara 1996, 3): 
the hero of the legendary struggle for freedom was not the slave who panted for 
release from his chains. Indeed, the slave often received only a secondary role in 
the exciting drama. All he had to do was leave the land of whips and chains and 
wend his way to the nearest underground line. His role was largely passive. It may 
have required courage to risk a long and dangerous trip from slavery, but 
whatever was demanded of him was as nothing compared to the bravery and 
daring of his white abetters. 
 
In reality, there was no central organization to begin with, let alone a sophisticated centralized 
organization run by White abolitionists. Moreover, the risks to Black abolitionists (let alone to 
Black fugitives themselves) were much higher when they helped fugitives than were the risks to 
White abolitionists. The conventional version of the Underground Railroad undermines the 
important and risky roles taken by Black conductors and the sanctuary communities that took 
them in when they crossed over to free states (Haro and Coles 2019). 
 Second, the emphasis on closure and complete freedom once fugitives reached the North 
is incomplete and partially inaccurate. “Like a Hollywood movie, the legend implies a happy 
ending when the fugitives reached a haven of free soil” (Gara 1996, 7), but in reality, flight to 
“free” territories or states included not only flight to northern states and Canada. It also included 
flight to Mexico (Nichols 2018) and to the Caribbean (Kerr-Ritchie 2018). Additionally, once 
flight to the North or Mexico was secured, the Fugitive Slave Act after 1850 (Pinsker 2018) and 
Texan slave-catchers in Mexico (Ainsworth 2018) made fugitives’ freedom precarious, a form of 
“semiformal freedom” that was never totally without the threat of capture and return (Pargas 
2018a). 
Third, the Underground Railroad likely did not start until the nineteenth century (although 
recent research has revealed a predecessor to the Underground Railroad, the “freedom-making” 
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networks of Black Loyalists who joined the British in the Revolutionary Period” (Hodges 2018)), 
so it was not around for most of the time enslavement was the law of the land. Fourth, the legend 
depicts fugitives escaping in large numbers, a “flood rather than a trickle” (Gara 1996, 7). 
However, in reality, a very small number of enslaved people escaped at all, and only a fraction of 
those who did escape used the Underground Railroad and/or successfully escaped to the North. 
Last, the Underground Railroad did not extend into the deep South, only into parts of border 
states – so the most difficult part of the journey through slave territories and states was 
completed by fugitives without help (Gara 1996, 18). 
Despite these problems with the conventional narrative of the Underground Railroad, the 
Railroad is perhaps the most prevalent depiction among memorials to enslaved people or about 
slavery in the U.S. that deal with fugitivity. These include the National Underground Railroad 
Freedom Center in Cincinnati, Ohio; dozens of smaller museums and exhibits in historical 
houses throughout the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern U.S. that claim to be stops on the Railroad; 
monuments in Detroit and across the river in Windsor, Ontario; hundreds of roadside markers; 
sites dedicated to Harriet Tubman in Manhattan and Maryland; and thousands of miles of 
freedom trails (Berlin 2004). The National Park Service’s Network to Freedom preserves and 
links over 650 sites that were stops or routes on the Underground Railroad, including sites that 
can be visited in 38 states, Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands (National Parks 
Service 2021). Further, there are numerous markers commemorating Frederick Douglass, 
including in New York, NY; Washington, D.C.; College Park, MD; Rochester, NY; Fort Pierce, 
FL; and Elmira, NY. 
What does the dominance of the narrative of the Underground Railroad in the American 
imaginary about fugitivity and among memorials dealing with fugitives tell us about race and 
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politics? Not only does it provide an example of the whitewashing of Black history, but it also 
provides a more comfortable narrative about the completion of the journey to freedom. In what 
follows, I will argue that we ought to consider more than just the kinds of fugitivity that escapees 
on the Underground Railroad experienced, and I will demonstrate the new kinds of thinking 
about politics that other types of fugitivity – and memorializing those other types of fugitivity in 
the built environment – might generate. 
 
“Lurking” on the Periphery: Harriet Jacobs and Liminal Fugitivity 
 
 
Much of the recent scholarship on runaway enslaved people focuses on flight to free 
areas in the North (or South), or what the historian Damien Pargas calls “formal freedom” (flight 
to free soil where there was little to no threat of legal capture) or “semiformal freedom (flight to 
territory that was free but with restrictions or ambiguity, like the U.S. North during Fugitive 
Slave Act) (Pargas 2018a, 10). Meanwhile, other modes of fugitivity remain “relatively 
understudied” (Pargas 2018a, 11). These include stories and histories that reveal different 
conceptions of freedom, agency, and community, such as families escaping together and women 
resisting sexual subordination (Hooker 2017b, 36). I argue that theorizing and memorializing 
these other modes of fugitivity can both provide a more nuanced version of history and offer 
interesting new ways of thinking through fugitivity in Black political thought and for 
contemporary politics. The first of these other modes of fugitivity that I will explore is the 
phenomenon of “lurking” on the periphery of slave society.  
As she describes it in her autobiography, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Harriet 
Jacobs stayed for seven years after escaping in a small attic space in the town where her children 
and enslaver lived (H. Jacobs 2000). She hid in silence, extreme temperatures, and isolation in 
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order to be able to peer out at her children playing, but her children did not know she was there – 
nor did her enslaver, who sometimes walked within feet of Jacobs’ hiding spot but thought she 
had escaped further, perhaps to a free state. Historical evidence from travelers’ accounts, 
runaway advertisements, and court documents, as well as oral histories collected by the Works 
Progress Administration and autobiographies of fugitives who later escaped to the North or were 
freed during or after the Civil War (Diouf 2018) all confirm that Jacobs was not alone; this 
liminal type of fugitivity was a common occurrence in slave states and territories. For example, 
one enslaved woman in Alabama hid herself and her children in the woods for two years, hiding 
in an underground shelter covered with leaves and depending on family and friends to leave food 
for them (Pargas 2018b, 124). An early nineteenth century runaway advertisement predicted that 
a North Carolina woman “will probably lurk about the Plantations” of her former enslaver, 
presumably where she still had family members (Hill 1814). Other fugitives are documented as 
hiding in a hole under their mother’s house on a plantation labor camp, in a potato cellar, or in 
the woods surrounding the plantation labor camp (Diouf 2018, 175). And enslavers knew of 
these patterns: an overseer told the landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, who was 
travelling at the time as a young journalist in the antebellum South, that these particular fugitives 
“’did not like to go where they could not sometimes get back and see their families’” (Olmsted 
1860, 48, cited in Diouf 2018, 169).  
These fugitives often show up in the archives of runaway slave advertisements as being 
suspected of “lurking” or “skulking” nearby. Indeed, according to historian Sylviane Diouf, 
fugitives like Jacobs, who stayed near the plantations or properties that they had fled, may have 
comprised the majority of those who fled enslavement permanently without leaving the South 
(Diouf 2018). However, these “invisible” fugitives have been neglected in historical accounts. 
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This neglect may be partially because their status (whether as temporary truants or permanent 
borderland dwellers) was often ambiguous or only determined when they had been gone for a 
longer time. 
The story of Harriet Jacobs and the experiences of those who “lurked” nearby their sites 
of enslavement shows that the dominant paradigm of fugitivity does not encapsulate all fugitive 
experiences. Thinkers interested in fugitivity as a fruitful concept can learn from Jacobs' 
interstitial or liminal flight. I am particularly interested in how these fugitives’ experiences 
illustrate the importance of kinship and social ties, as the “lurkers” usually could only survive on 
the periphery of slave society with the support of family networks, and as the reason they fled 
was often to reunite or keep together their families. As such, I read Harriet Jacobs’ Incidents in 
the Life of a Slave Girl as an alternative depiction of fugitivity. Jacobs both shows how the 
realities of enslaved women’s lives necessitated other kinds of fugitivity than the dominant 
narrative of the Underground Railroad and illustrates some of the generative possibilities of such 
a vision of fugitivity.  
Jacobs is locked up in a garret for seven years, a literally and figuratively in-between or 
interstitial space (Green-Barteet 2013) where she is confined without the ability to fully stand up 
or move around. This “loophole of retreat,” as Jacobs names the chapter about the garret in her 
narrative, signifies both withdrawal and partial escape – a form of resistance through flight that 
allows her to change her and her children’s circumstances (Smith 1987, 30). Nevertheless, from 
the garret she (with the help of her grandmother) convinces her children’s White father to buy 
her children and move them north, away from their abusive enslaver; Jacobs herself escapes 
north on a ship soon thereafter. In this interstitial space, Jacobs formulates the opposite of 
enslavement not as individual freedom but as the type of fugitivity that will allow her to remain 
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close to her children and out of the clutches of her enslaver until her children can come north 
with her. Through her “spatial improvisation for survival” (Berlant 1997, 230) and her network 
of family members who feed her and help her scheme her escape and her children’s 
emancipation, Jacobs thus demonstrates how conceptions of fugitivity as liminal and as 
relational can help with the world-building projects of carving out space of resistance within 
unjust systems, or as the African American folk expression goes, “making a way out of no way.”  
The philosopher and social critic Kwame Appiah (2000, xiv) calls Jacobs’ slave 
narrative, although not the first in the United States published by a woman, as nevertheless 
“having as central a place in speaking for the lives of women slaves as Douglass’s has in 
speaking for slave men.” Appiah contrasts Douglass’s account, in which “the driving energy of 
the book is Douglass’s need to live not just as a free person but as a free man” (Appiah 2000, 
xiv) with Jacobs’ account, which focuses on her familial ties that bind her to stay close to her 
children even after her escape, only going north after she is sure her children will, too. Jacobs 
herself articulates both the benefits and the drawbacks – in a society drawn to ideas of complete 
freedom – of a more relational form of fugitivity. Reflecting on these drawbacks, Jacobs recounts 
her love story with a free-born Black carpenter, writing heartbreakingly of her fear of attachment 
(H. Jacobs 2000, 161): 
Why does the slave ever love? Why allow the tendrils of the heart to twine around 
objects which may at any moment be wrenched away by the hands of violence? 
When separations come by the hand of death, the pious soul can bow in 
resignation, and say, ‘Not my will, but thine be done, O Lord!’ But when the 
ruthless hand of man strikes the blow, regardless of the misery he causes, it is 
hard to be submissive. I did not reason thus when I was a young girl. Youth will 
be youth. I loved, and I indulged the hope that the dark clouds around me would 
turn out a bright lining. I forgot that in the land of my birth the shadows are too 
dense for light to penetrate. 
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And she reflects on the dread she felt after giving birth to her second child, knowing that 
as a girl the child will grow up to face the threat of sexual violence (H. Jacobs 2000, 
207): 
When they told me my new-born babe was a girl, my heart was heavier than it 
had ever been before. Slavery is terrible for men; but is far more terrible for 
women. Superadded to the burden common to all, they have wrongs, and 
sufferings, and mortifications peculiarly their own. 
 
Enslaved women were particularly constricted because of childbearing, childrearing, and 
cruel family separation policies. As such, enslaved women could often not as easily escape fully 
north to a free state or territory if they had children too young for the journey or who had been 
moved away from their parents to another plantation labor camp. For enslaved women, leaving 
for a free state, as Douglass did, often meant severing kinship ties that for men were often 
already severed or frayed by enslavers.14 To say that the dominant paradigm of fugitivity is 
masculinist, then, is compatible with a critique of the system of enslavement; it is not a critique 
of the individual men who fled to northern states or took the Underground Railroad. Individual 
fugitivity is masculinist in its emphasis on the increased ability of enslaved men, who were often 
relatively untethered compared to enslaved women, to flee further away, perhaps to a free state. 
It was the system of enslavement – its gendered division of labor and its policies of family 
separation – that caused inequalities in relational and kinship ties between enslaved men and 
enslaved women. 
 
14As Hortense Spillers points out, enslavement undermined enslaved people’s kinship ties, 
making family a tenuous formation that was ultimately subject to their status as property. 
Enslavement also undermined enslaved women’s status as feminine figures and mothers. As 
such, Jacobs’ story of occupying space between captivity or enclosure and freedom is also 
illustrative of the liminal nature of Black women’s gender dynamics, “a tale writ between the 
lines and in the not-quite spaces of American domesticity” (Spillers 1987, 77). 
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And yet Jacobs also writes of the joys of these ties that bind her to the zone of 
enslavement. Describing Betty, her childless aunt who urges her to be less “’chick’n hearted’” 
about her children, Jacobs seems to feel sorry for her: “Good old soul! She has gone through the 
world childless. She had never had little ones to clasp their arms round her neck; she had never 
seen their soft eyes looking into hers; no sweet little voices had called her mother; she had never 
pressed her own infants to her heart, with the feeling that even in fetters there was something to 
live for. How could she realize my feelings?” (H. Jacobs 2000, 235) The passage is an example 
of Jacobs’ situating of her work within the literary genre of the sentimental novel (Appiah 2000, 
xv), a literary style that is likely a product of Incidents’ White editor, Lydia Maria Child 
(Tricomi 2007). Nevertheless, Jacobs transformed the White-dominated sentimental style for her 
own purposes, emphasizing the domestic resistance of Black women through expressions of 
beauty and dignity (T. Davis 2010). She also rejected the then-prevalent Cult of True 
Womanhood, which centered femininity in domesticity, purity, and submissiveness, by writing 
about her sexual abuse and her resistance to it (Daniels-Rauterkus 2019).  
Scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins (Collins 2000, 198) have identified Jacobs’ tethers 
to her children as self-sacrificial motherhood that results in “denial of her own self-actualization” 
and giving up her freedom for her children. However, this view overlooks Jacobs’ eventual 
escape to a free state and her reunion with her children, the way that she delights in subverting 
the power dynamic with her enslaver by writing him letters postmarked in northern states (Smith 
1987, 32), and the generative possibilities that tethers can offer. For Jacobs, it was never an 
option to flee all the way to the North without her children. While she suffered greatly in the 
garret, she was also free from the sexual assault of her enslaver and able to keep a watchful eye 
on her children. Jacobs’ story of lurking on the periphery and occupying the space between 
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freedom and enslavement shows how such tethers can facilitate rather than only hinder survival 
and how relational fugitivity can offer alternative frameworks for escaping within, and not only 
escaping from, systems of oppression and violence in ways that are tied to and supported by 
others. 
The bonds and obligations that relationships to others require could keep fugitives 
tethered to the world and enable their longer-term flight north or to more permanent sites of 
refuge. After suffering a beating at the hands of her owner, Jacobs recounts, “My life was spared; 
and I was glad for the sake of my little ones. Had it not been for those ties to life, I should have 
been glad to be released by death, though I had lived only nineteen years” (H. Jacobs 2000, 208). 
Reflecting about her hopes for escape, Jacobs writes, “I could have made my escape alone; but it 
was more for my helpless children than for myself that I longed for freedom. Though the boon 
would have been precious to me, above all price, I would not have taken it at the expense of 
leaving them in slavery. Every trial I endured, every sacrifice I made for their sakes, drew them 
closer to my heart, and gave me fresh courage to beat back the dark waves that rolled and rolled 
over me in a seemingly endless night of storms” (H. Jacobs 2000, 221). Her bonds to her 
children, while making her own escape more difficult, also strengthen her resolve to survive and 
resist in the long term. And her bonds to her grandmother and other family members who 
schemed to thwart her enslaver and kept her alive for seven years in the garret show how 
networks of care enabled lurking nearby as a form of fugitivity centered on bonds between 
fugitives and kin. 
Liminal fugitivity, rather than telling a story of how the extraordinary individual can 
escape by dint of their own physical strength and luck, leaving behind their kin and being unable 
to return once freedom is reached, tells a story of the precarity of escapees. By unearthing stories 
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of liminal fugitivity, and depicting them in the memorial landscape, we may find new ways to 
think through possibilities for escaping and fleeing injustice within systems of oppression that 
are impossible to fully escape. The ties to others may prevent or hinder escape to formal 
freedom, but they may enable a different kind of freedom: importantly, Jacobs considers her self-
emancipation to have begun when she entered the garret, not when she crossed into the free 
states (Smith 1987). They also point to innovative ways that fugitives, including women and 
others with ties binding them to a place, can carve out opportunities for a kind of escape that is 
often temporary, unresolved, or in the liminal space between enslavement and “freedom.”  
Compared to other figures like Harriet Tubman and Frederick Douglass, there are few 
sites dedicated to Jacobs’ story. North Carolina’s Division of State Historic Sites and Properties 
runs occasional walking tours in Edenton, North Carolina that show the locations of the major 
landmarks in Jacobs’ story, many of which have been demolished (NC Historic Sites 2021; 
Whitacre 2019). Visitors can also see brief mentions of Jacobs in the Contrabands and Freedmen 
Cemetery Memorial in Alexandria, Virginia, where a marker describes the Jacobs Free School 
that she helped found to help recently escaped Black communities who were under the care of 
the Union Army (VisitAlexandria 2021; H. Jacobs 1862). Other than these and her grave in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts (Friends of Mt. Auburn 2013), there are few reminders of Jacobs’ 
existence in the physical landscape of the United States. This dearth of Jacobs memorials is 
especially striking in contrast to the relatively numerous Frederick Douglass memorials and sites. 
Depicting Jacobs’s experience with flight – not to mention the stories of the less famous 
fugitives who engaged in liminal flight – could vastly expand popular conceptions of the forms 
fugitivity can take and the ways it can resist violence from within. 
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Truancy: Short-Term Fugitivity as Resistance 
 
 
Lorenzo L. Ivy, a man formerly enslaved in Virginia, told a Works Progress 
Administration interviewer in 1937: “Dere was two kin’s of runaways – dem what hid in de 
woods an’ dem what ran away to free lan’. Mos’ slaves jes’ runaway an’ hide in de woods for a 
week or two an’ den come on back” (Perdue Jr., Barden, and Philips 1991, 153). It is that first 
group to which I now turn. These were short-term fugitives, often called “truants,” “absentees,” 
or those engaging in  “petit marronage” (Morgan 1998; Roberts 2015). Truancy was a type of 
fugitivity in which enslaved people stole away temporarily, for hours, days, weeks, or months. It 
was usually undertaken by individuals (Roberts 2015) but sometimes by groups; and it was often 
a way for individuals to strengthen relationships with others. It was a mode of resistance: 
resistance to the system of family separation that was central to American slavery, resistance to 
forced labor, and resistance to the regime of social death (Patterson 2018) that characterized the 
life of the enslaved person. 
That is because truancy, though it had a variety of purposes – to celebrate a holiday, to 
visit a loved one in a nearby town or plantation labor camp, to resist forced labor, to rest, to 
worship or observe a wedding, to avoid sexual violence, or to resist punishment – was often 
about running away temporarily to be with others. As such, truancy contributed to enslaved 
people’s dense networks of kinship and social ties (Morgan 1998; Kaye 2007). Truancy and the 
work that women did to support truancy (stealing food and supplies for truants, lying and hiding 
truants) “complicate the distinction between individual and collective resistance, and between the 
personal and the political” because although truancy itself was often an individual act, 
“individual truants partially depended upon others for assistance” (Camp 2002, 10–11). Further, 
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truancy resisted enslavement’s natal alienation, or alienation from cultural networks and 
traditions (Patterson 2018), when enslaved people fled to celebrate holidays or engage with kin.  
These fugitives did not follow the dominant model of escaping alone all the way north 
but rather escaped from forced labor for short periods of time. Truants survived hunger, cold, 
rain, wind, and loneliness to stay away from plantation labor camps and other enslavement sites 
temporarily. They hid out in nearby swamps, woods, and other areas that White settlers deemed 
too wild for human habitation, or they escaped within a farm or plantation labor camp or to a 
nearby town. Truants were a substantial number of all runaways. It is hard to determine exact 
numbers because not all runaways resulted in wanted ads being posted and historians must rely 
on the written archive, which captures the point of view of White society, not of enslaved people 
(Spillers 1987). However, among advertised mid-eighteenth century runaways, those engaging in 
absenteeism to maintain contact with loved ones comprised a majority of runaways in South 
Carolina, half of runaways in Southern Maryland, and a third of runaways in Virginia (Morgan 
1998, 526). 
Truancy was a particularly important form of fugitivity for enslaved women. Many 
enslaved women, despite being “enmeshed in dense social relations” (Camp 2002, 3) and often 
with dependent children (since the processes of family separation often resulted in female-
headed households), engaged in truancy. Although men were the majority of truants, more 
women were truants than women who permanently escaped. Perhaps this was because permanent 
escape was more difficult for women than for men; because women had to take care of or leave 
behind children; because men often were loaned out or ran errands or received passes to visit 
family members in the area and so their presence on the road was less suspect than the presence 
of women outside the plantation; or because women had less knowledge of the geography 
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beyond the plantation – although truancy may have helped women’s spatial knowledge by 
allowing them to explore their surroundings (Camp 2002).15  
Women could thus engage in truancy near their families, temporarily escaping work but 
able to visit their families at night – as Frederick Douglass’s mother and Harriet Jacobs both did 
– or get food from other enslaved people who were working in the fields. Truancy to visit loved 
ones was a way to preserve family bonds and refuse the alienation of family separation. Thus, 
through truancy enslaved people found ways to survive and even to create joy and connection in 
the wake of separation. However, truancy challenges the view of fugitivity as merely a safety 
valve that allowed enslaved people to escape for a while in order to get a little freedom without 
overthrowing the whole system. Rather, truancy threatened “planters’ sense of mastery and their 
security in the moneymaking purpose of their farms” (Camp 2002, 3). Truants challenged 
slaveholders’ dominion over the bodies, labor, and movement of enslaved people, including 
women who used truancy to resist sexual violence. Hence, truancy was a form of protest and 
resistance to the broader system of violence and enslavement that Black people faced in the 
antebellum South.16 
The broader community of women was also critical for the survival of other truants: 
women prepared meals or shared their food with truants, thus converting their reproductive labor 
 
15Indeed, enslaved people may have engaged in absenteeism rather than some other form of 
fugitivity in part because they did not have much knowledge of the geography of the surrounding 
area and therefore could not reach the more remote maroon settlements or free territories or 
states (Genovese 1972, 650).  
 
16Truancy also helped further enslaved people’s “long-term freedom struggle” because absentees 
ran away to join the Union Army (Camp 2002, 14). 
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into a source of resistance to the enslavers who sought to control it (Camp 2002, 8–9).17 As such, 
truants and those who supported them were engaging in a kind of radical fugitive praxis – one 
grounded in relational ties, interdependence, and the come-and-go nature of short-term fugitivity. 
Truancy would have been much more difficult without the support of the community of enslaved 
and free Blacks. Thus, truancy was one way of strengthening and revealing community bonds. 
As one historian puts it: “Visiting, rather than any simplistic equation of running away with 
resistance, merits investigation. Visiting is most significant for revealing the range, strength, and 
tragic dimensions of kin attachments under slavery” (Morgan 1998, 526).  
Memorial depictions of truants are mostly absent from the U.S. memorial landscape. 
However, archival research (Parker 1994; Windley 1983; Ainsworth 2018) and digital archives, 
such as the Texas Runaway Slave Project (Ainsworth 2021) and the N.C. Runaway Slave 
Advertisements database (Gwynn et al. 2021), have documented the escapes of both permanent 
fugitives and those who engaged in absenteeism. Additionally, some efforts to memorialize or 
document the Underground Railroad have acknowledged the phenomenon of truancy – such as 
the Freedom Roads Project of the North Carolina African American Heritage Commission (NC 
African American Commission 2014) or the Underground Railroad Network to Freedom, which 
include sites like Somerset Place and Stagville Plantation, where truancy and other acts of 
defiance are discussed on tours. However, there are few sites in the U.S. memorial landscape 
dedicated to the often-invisible phenomenon of truancy. This absence reinforces the conventional 
narrative of the Underground Railroad and the paradigm of flight to the North.   
 
 
17However, some enslaved people did refuse to help truants or even turned them in in exchange 
for pardons of their own truancy. 
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Hiding in Plain Sight: Blending in Among Free Black Communities 
 
 
Truancy and lurking nearby were important ways for enslaved people to engage in 
everyday resistance to the system of enslavement, whether by resisting family separation, 
restrictions on cultural expression, or the exploitation of slave labor. However, truancy was 
always short-term, and lurking nearby was often temporary. When it comes to permanent escape 
from enslavement, the largest number of permanent runaways did not escape to the North, as the 
conventional narrative of the Underground Railroad that many Americans receive would have it. 
Rather, the majority of permanent runaways escaped within slaveholding states (Pargas 2018b). 
In the following two sections, I will discuss two forms of permanent escape within the South: 
hiding in plain sight as a free Black person and escaping to maroon communities. 
One way that runaways sought to escape permanently within the South was by 
integrating into free Black communities and networks and passing as free. For example, the 
enslaver of a fugitive named Quacko, in a runaway ad said he expected Quacko to have forged 
his own free papers and to “lurk about Wilmington, Newbern, Edenton, or Beaufort, or perhaps 
get to some retired place in the Country,” passing as a free man (Baker 1809). Large numbers of 
Black fugitives who fled permanently did so by blending into free Black communities in cities, 
towns, or (more rarely) rural areas.18 This was a common enough phenomenon that many 
enslavers looking for fugitives looked first with their free Black family members (Berlin 1974, 
42). 
 
18Similarly, many fugitives who fled into Northern states and territories decided not to move on 
further north, but rather to stay in the first communities they encountered north of the Mason-
Dixon Line. There they blended in among free Black communities, joining the dense networks 
there that included churches, abolitionist groups, political activist groups mobilizing for equal 
citizenship, vigilance committees that thwarted slave-catchers, and childcare groups – all Black-
led (Haro and Coles 2019).  
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Fugitives who hid themselves in Southern free Black communities were, as Damian Alan 
Pargas puts it, “permanent freedom seekers, at least by intent, and often by outcome – who made 
illegal yet quite earnest attempts to rebuild their lives in informal freedom rather than bolt for 
geographic spaces of formal freedom” (Pargas 2018b, 118). These fugitives may have been 
escaping to cities where loved ones lived, to reverse recent family separations or prevent 
upcoming family separations, or to prevent their sale further south or to a harsher enslaver. 
Fugitives escaping in this way took enormous risks and often used cultural cues, language, dress, 
and complexion in creative ways. For example, the couple Ellen and William Craft escaped by 
passing as a White man (Ellen, cross-dressing and exploiting her pale complexion) and his 
enslaved servant (William) (Marshall 2010). However, the skills needed for employment, 
culturally passing as free, and potentially forging one’s own papers meant that only a small 
percentage of all fugitives could blend into free Black communities. Having spent time around 
Whites and free Blacks, having spent time in cities, being literate, owning the right kinds of 
clothing, and having employable skills or experience selling their labor were all helpful to 
fugitives who wished to blend in (Marshall 2010) – and this meant that enslaved field hands were 
at a disadvantage. These fugitives who hid in plain sight occupied areas of “informal freedom” 
(Pargas 2018a) or “quasi freedom” (Marshall 2010), where their escape was always contingent 
and precarious in comparison to those who had escaped to Canada or to free U.S. states that were 
not under fugitive slave capture laws. 
As extraordinary as the risks that these fugitives took to pass as free was the sophistication 
and daring of the networks of free Blacks who sustained this type of fugitivity. The antebellum 
period saw a spike in manumissions and self-purchases (Berlin 1974), leading to the rise of free 
Black communities in slaveholding territories and states, especially in cities, but this was also the 
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period of the intensification of slavery that occurred once the import of enslaved people ended in 
the early nineteenth century (Pargas 2018a). Enslaved people, freed Blacks, and fugitives 
generated new forms of political, social, and religious associations; new languages, artistic 
expression, and cuisines; and ways of surviving despite being “clandestine and fugitive, fragile 
and unrecognized by the larger society” (Berlin 2004, 1264). 
In cities, towns, and rural areas, Black communities housed, hid, funded, employed, and 
educated fugitives blending in as free – all at the risk of long prison sentences, public whipping, 
or worse. Adding to the individual risk of punishment for those found to be helping a fugitive 
was the danger to the community, since many states and towns passed laws and ordinances 
meant to subject free Blacks to additional surveillance and violence when the White populations 
suspected that they were harboring large numbers of enslaved fugitives (Pargas 2018b). These 
“freedom-paper laws” used a variety of tactics to distinguish free Black persons from enslaved 
ones, including requiring patches to be worn, registries, vagrancy laws, and regulations on 
commerce with free Blacks. Although often cumbersome and unsuccessful (Berlin 1974), these 
measures brought increased racial terror to free Black communities.  
Nevertheless, in resisting them, members of these communities engaged in tricks, 
performances of sanctuary, and outwitting White supremacy and slavery, and in the process both 
reimagined politics for their own communities and expanded the broader (White and Black) 
abolitionist imagination and project (Haro and Coles 2019, 661). Hiding in plain sight was thus 
generative not only of sanctuary and non-enslavement for fugitives but also of new political 
orders for the communities that provided sanctuary to them. Among their political innovations 
were “disruptive hospitality that interweaves law-breaking harbor with strategies for juridical 
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and institutional change” (Haro and Coles 2019, 647) and “durable patterns of mutualistic care” 
(Haro and Coles 2019, 659).   
Accounting for hiding in plain sight in the South also helps correct an omission within the 
existing scholarship. Recent studies have pointed to the important and often-ignored role that 
enslaved, free, and fugitive Black abolitionists played in resisting slavery, whether through the 
abolitionist movement or the Underground Railroad (Sinha 2016; Haro and Coles 2019; Hodges 
2018). “Blending in” shows that the dominant paradigm does not encapsulate all fugitive 
experiences and helps enrich and complicate the broader picture of fugitivity (Pargas 2018b, 
117). As such, thinkers interested in fugitivity as a fruitful concept that is generative of new ways 
of thinking through politics can learn from these fugitives’ and communities’ practices. The 
actions of not only the fugitives but also the communities that sheltered them may point toward 
new ways of resisting violence and oppression in contemporary politics when those systems of 
violence and oppression cannot be fully abolished in the near term. 
Like many of the other alternative forms of fugitivity already discussed, there is a dearth of 
memorialization around the phenomenon of hiding in plain sight within free Black communities 
in the South. The Network to Freedom includes some sites that memorialize the importance of 
blending in within the South, like the markers in Halifax, North Carolina that acknowledge the 
role of free Black communities in hiding fugitives (National Parks Service 2021). Nevertheless, 
historical sites and tours of freedmen’s towns in the South often focus on their twentieth century 
histories with urban renewal, the rise of the Black middle class, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights 
Movement rather than on their antebellum origins or their role in hiding fugitives in plain sight 
(ex. Addy 2021; Wintz 2020). Thus, fugitivity as hiding in plain sight is yet another form of 




Marronage: Creating Fugitive Communities 
 
 
 In one runaway ad, the enslaver of a man named Bev thought he “was probably aiming 
for the Dismal Swamp” (Kellogg, Jr. 1854). In his 1850s tour of southern states, Olmsted noted 
(Olmsted 1856, 159–60): 
 
The Dismal Swamps are noted places of refuge for runaway negroes… Children 
were born, bred, lived and died here. Joseph Church told me he had seen 
skeletons, and had helped to bury bodies recently dead. There were people in the 
swamps still, he thought, that were the children of runaways, and who had been 
runaways themselves all their lives. What a life it must be; born outlaws; educated 
self-stealers; trained from infancy to be constantly in dread of the approach of a 
white man as a thing more fearful than wild-cats or serpents, or even starvation. 
 
The Great Dismal Swamp is just one community of marronage among what may have 
been hundreds. From the maroons of the Caribbean and the English colonies and territories 
(Price 1979) to the “contraband” camps of Black fugitives who fled to refugee communities 
under the control of the Union Army (Manning 2017), there were many other forms and varieties 
of marronage. Hundreds of thousands of maroons settled in Cuba, Venezuela, the Caribbean, 
Jamaica, Suriname, Brazil, Haiti, Mexico, Guyana, and Kenya. Some maroon communities were 
fully independent and fought off white settlers, as in Suriname (Price 2002) and Jamaica 
(Sheridan 1985), or helped lead revolutions, as in Haiti (Roberts 2015). Marronage in what is 
now the U.S. occurred in every colony and every state. Although the Underground Railroad did 
not start until the nineteenth century, marronage likely began as early as the first arrival of 
captive Africans in North America in 1619 (Sayers 2014), and its height was probably early-mid 
nineteenth century (Lockley 2009, 129). Marronage was a phenomenon in which enslaved 
people escaped to live permanently or semi-permanently in community with one another outside 
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of slave society, often carving out spaces to survive and even generate new political orders. It 
was a refusal of enslavement and a collective experiment in building communities apart from 
slave society. The fugitive communities of the Great Dismal Swamp and other maroon 
communities are another alternative mode of fugitivity that expands our ideas of what fugitivity 
means to include carving out space for survival and finding new ways to live together within 
regimes of terror and violence. 
The Great Dismal Swamp is an area of swampland spanning land in eastern Virginia and 
North Carolina, originally home to Algonquin communities and today preserved by a National 
Wildlife Refuge and a North Carolina state park. Starting in the early seventeenth century – two 
hundred years before the Underground Railroad began – thousands of formerly enslaved 
African-diaspora people and their descendants created communities in this area. The swamp was 
hostile to human habitation. Starting fires in wet swampland, trudging through mud, risking 
snake bites, and braving mosquitoes were significant difficulties that deterred White settlement. 
Thomas Moore’s ghost ballad “The Lake of Dismal Swamp” describes the Great Dismal Swamp 
as having (T. Moore 1806): 
tangled juniper, beds of reeds,  
Through many a fen where the serpent feeds,  
And man never trod before 
… where the deadly vine doth weep  
Its venomous tear and nightly copper-snake 
 
These conditions made life difficult for Black people who escaped to the swamp, but they also 
deterred Whites and helped support the falsehood that people had “never trod before,” or, as one 
formerly enslaved person interviewed by the Works Progress Administration recounted, the 
belief that swamp-dwellers lived in holes in the ground (Perdue Jr., Barden, and Philips 1991, 
252). Protected by the undesirability of the land for Whites, thousands of Black fugitives began 
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joining Indigenous people in the Swamp in large numbers around 1680 and became the majority 
of newcomers to the Swamp by around 1700 (Sayers 2014).  
The invasion of the lumber industry and canal builders, combined with the end of chattel 
slavery, led to the eventual dissolution of the last maroon communities in the Great Dismal 
Swamp in the nineteenth century. These communities survived for over ten generations, with 
children of formerly enslaved people being born free in the Swamp and living their whole lives 
there (Richard Grant 2016). 
A radically communal form of social and political structure flourished in the Great 
Dismal Swamp. These communities were autonomous from European society and saw 
themselves as independent and self-sufficient (Lockley 2009). They had porous borders and 
relationships with the outside world, including with American Indian communities, Whites, and 
freed Blacks. It is estimated that as many as thousands of maroons lived there at once, and they 
built large structures and buildings, planted crops like sunflowers, raised families, and kept 
livestock (Sayers 2014; Richard Grant 2016). Unlike in some other maroon communities in the 
Americas, these communities do not appear to have been in a state of constant conflict with each 
other or the outside world; their form of political rule was not as centered on violence as was 
plantation society; and the different maroon communities circulated materials and resources in a 
system based on reciprocity rather than territorial control (Sayers 2014). 
Moreover, these maroon communities had a different, more relational internal social 
structure than did White society. Archaeologist Daniel Sayers’ excavations show that the 
maroons of the Great Dismal Swamp created societies that rejected the exploitation and 
alienation of capitalism and instead embraced a “Praxis Mode of Production.” Because maroons 
lacked commodities such as liquor, clay pipes, iron tools, nails, and mass-produced ceramic 
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vessels, “there was no exchange-value-driven market within the swamp.” Rather, maroons 
excavated and re-used Indigenous objects from centuries earlier and found innovative ways to 
make substitutes for necessary tools and supplies (Sayers 2014, 157). Labor was likely 
communal (Richard Grant 2016). Materials were owned not by individuals but by the community 
as a whole or by kinship groups. Commodity fetishization was not present in these communities 
because land was not privately owned but rather shared, there was not an unnecessary surplus of 
unneeded materials, and there was not a culture of worshipping commodities or material goods 
(Sayers 2014, 170–71). The world-building that maroons engaged in, which because of the 
precarity of their situation was always world-building in flight, was a type of fugitive politics, 
what political theorist George Shulman calls “independent and reparative sociality” (Shulman 
2020, 20).  
Moreover, although research on marronage has increased in recent years, it is still a 
concept foreign to many laypeople. As Diouf puts it, “the idea of black people taking their lives 
into their own hands and not wanting to be any part of the larger community, not wanting to be 
free blacks in the North or pass for free in the South, but being self-ruled and living their own 
kind of freedom. That was not part of the larger discourse of this country” (Mars n.d.).  
The Great Dismal Swamp National Wildlife Refuge and the North Carolina Dismal 
Swamp State Park are not obvious markers of the United States’ history of slavery. The maroon 
communities who lived there for centuries (and the American Indians who inhabited it before 
European and African arrivals) are briefly depicted in park materials, alongside the natural 
history, lumber industry, and birdwatching and fishing opportunities. In its brochures the Great 
Dismal Swamp National Wildlife Refuge gives very little information about the maroon 
communities that lived there, stating only that the “swamp’s history includes land deeds for 
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George Washington and evidence of large communities of freedom seekers, known as maroons, 
that once lived deep within the swamp” (“Great Dismal Swamp National Wildlife Refuge” 
2019).  
 
The welcome sign at the visitor’s entrance to the national wildlife refuge (which is 
dominated by information about plant and animal life in the refuge) includes a short explanation 
of the swamp’s role as a home for maroons as well as a waypoint to the North on the 
Underground Railroad. The Underground Railroad Pavilion, the only exhibit or trail dedicated to 
this history in the refuge, was closed when I visited, seemingly due to flooding; it was the only 
trail that was closed. Similarly, the state park that takes up part of the Great Dismal Swamp on 
the North Carolina side, Dismal Swamp State Park, has some signage about “freedom seekers” 
who used the swamp as a temporary refuge on the way north or a more permanent community. In 
Figure 1: Great Dismal Swamp National Wildlife Refuge 
 94 
both parks, the focus is on the swamp’s ties to the Underground Railroad by virtue of the 
National Park Service’s designation of it as a site on the National Underground Railroad 
Network to Freedom in 2003. It is a striking emphasis, given that the Underground Railroad was 
the route of escape for such a small percentage of fugitives (most of whom escaped within the 
South or by other means, including escaping to maroon communities) and a small percentage of 
enslaved people, most of whom did not escape at all.  
 
A Political Aesthetic of Fugitivity 
 
 
 How might these alternative visions of fugitivity – and their depiction in the memorial 
landscape – enrich our ideas of fugitivity and of politics more generally? I argue that these 
themes and ideas might be generative of fugitive politics and theorizing as resistance to violence 
in the current day. I have pointed out that the political aesthetic of fugitivity in the U.S.’s 
depictions of slavery is mostly an aesthetic of absence. Most depictions of enslaved people’s 
fugitivity seem to be about the Underground Railroad or flight to the North. When it comes to 
liminal fugitivity, truancy, and hiding in plain sight, the political aesthetic includes very few sites 
or markers in the physical landscape. Even for marronage, the case of the Great Dismal Swamp 
is a site of omissions and absences. In the remainder of the chapter, I will lay out some initial 
ideas for an expanded political aesthetic of fugitivity that includes alternative forms of fugitivity 
(focusing on the Great Dismal Swamp and marronage as an example), describe the implications 
of depicting such a broader view for politics, and show how thinking through and depicting this 




An Expanded Political Aesthetic of Fugitivity 
 
The U.S. memorial landscape is dominated by monuments to individual White men and 
memorials to fallen soldiers, including Confederate monuments that still preach the religion of 
the Lost Cause from Southern town squares (Savage 1999), even after many of them have been 
removed by protesters and city governments in the wake of antiblack violence in Charleston, 
Charlottesville, Louisville, and Minneapolis. Tours of plantation labor camps in the South 
ignore, romanticize, and mis-represent the history of slavery (Modlin Jr. 2008; Shields 2017). 
Additionally, several “faithful slave” monuments still stand: the Heyward Shepherd Monument 
in the Harpers Ferry National Historic Park (Shackel 2003); the Confederate Monument in 
Arlington National Cemetery; and the monument to enslaved Confederate soldiers in Fort Mill, 
South Carolina.  
Far fewer monuments honor slaves or decry the brutality of slavery. Despite the presence 
and deaths of millions of slaves over more than two hundred years in what is now the United 
States, the presence of slavery remains largely unrepresented in the American commemorative 
landscape.19 Toni Morrison noted this in 1988, when there were even fewer public spaces 
dedicated to enslaved people, and pointed to her books as memorials to enslaved people in the 
absence of physical memorials (Morrison 1988): 
 
19Exceptions include a monument to Harriet Tubman in Harlem and the African Burial Ground 
in Lower Manhattan; a monument to Denmark Vesey in Charleston, South Carolina; the Harriet 
Tubman Underground Railroad National Historical Park in Maryland; the National Underground 
Railroad Freedom Center in Cincinnati; a sculpture about the Underground Railroad in Oberlin, 
Ohio; the Ark of Return memorial at the United Nations; and memorials to enslaved laborers 
who built the University of Virginia and Monticello. In addition to memorials and monuments, 
there are multiple sites of resistance and counter-narratives around the history of slavery in the 
United States. For example, as a way to resist the proposed Daughters of the Confederacy-
sponsored Black Mammy monument, Black women’s club members purchased and restored 
Frederick Douglass’ house in Washington D.C. (J. M. Johnson 2005). 
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There is no place you or I can go, to think about or not think about, to summon 
the presences of, or recollect the absences of slaves; nothing that reminds us of 
the ones who made the journey and of those who did not make it. There is no 
suitable memorial or plaque or wreath or wall or park or skyscraper lobby. 
There’s no 300-foot tower. There’s no small bench by the road. There is not even 
a tree scored, an initial that I can visit or you can visit in Charleston or Savannah 
or New York or Providence, or better still, on the banks of the Mississippi… I just 
have the hunger for a permanent place. It doesn’t have to be a huge, monumental 
face cut into a mountain. It can be small, some place where you can go put your 
feet up. It can be a tree. It doesn’t have to be a statue of liberty. 
 
The 2003 legislation proposing a National Slave Memorial in a prominent location in 
Washington, D.C. has still not been adopted. In spite of the opening of the Smithsonian’s 
National Museum of African American History and Culture in 2016, the Equal Justice 
Initiative’s National Memorial for Peace and Justice in 2018, and the International African 
American Museum (opening in 2022), individual White, male “heroes” still dominate the 
memorial landscape, with a relative lack of representation of enslaved people and the legacy of 
slavery. Depictions of Black suffering and Black flourishing are often relegated to art museums, 
popular literature, and the spontaneous memorials and art such as murals that Black community 
members create themselves. Moreover, with the exception of the National Museum of African 
American History and Culture and the Harriet Tubman memorials, fugitivity is largely missing 
from most of these depictions of slavery and enslaved people. Further, the dominance of the 
Underground Railroad in the memorial landscape of fugitivity downplays other forms of 
fugitivity, which reflects “a reluctance to acknowledge the strength of black resistance and 
initiative” (Richard Grant 2016). 
What would it mean for the United States’ memorial landscape to depict the fugitivity of 
enslaved people? What would it mean for such depictions to have an expanded vision of 
fugitivity instead of re-inscribing the assumption that the story of fugitivity is one of lone 
fugitives escaping to the North, as on the Underground Railroad? How can we attend to the dead 
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and the presence of death in a system like slavery, especially when there are “no bones to 
recover” from many of the victims of the transatlantic slave trade (Sharpe 2016, 38)? As Roberts 
notes, “The environment, physical and embodied, metaphysical and mythic, is where the 
transformative in freedom begins. But marronage cannot occur until the slave, as the most 
liminal agent in an order, confronts a submerged, abyssal history. To understand political 
freedom and embark upon sustainable rather than fleeting flight, we must revisit the site of 
enslavement, to the point of our entanglement in unfreedom, and ascertain the processes of 
relation at that moment and thereafter in the landscape” (2015, 160, emphasis in original).   
As an example, the Great Dismal Swamp is a site that could depict this history. What 
would it look like for the existing state and national parks to tell a clearer story about marronage 
and its role in allowing enslaved people and fugitives to carve out space within racist European 
settler-colonialism? There is power in landscape, in being present at the place where something 
really happened. What if, instead of scenic nature trails and occasional informational signs 
giving general histories (that focus on the Underground Railroad and escape north rather than 
documenting those maroons who stayed and found ways to survive and nurture the 
undercommons in the Swamp), these parks provided trails and boardwalks to specific sites of 
maroon settlements? Sayers describes trudging through the swamp, off-trail, to get to 
archaeological sites of these settlements. Historical exhibits could highlight these areas and bring 
visitors right to them, just as exhibits in “living history” museums like Jamestown and 
Williamsburg do. Signage could introduce the concept of marronage as well as detailing the 
political structure, astounding survival, and resistance of those who overcame incredible odds 
and built whole life-worlds and alternative social structures outside of colonial society.  
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The need for monuments and memorials that depict enslaved people and the African 
diaspora in general is acute, but this site could tell a specific and an often-forgotten story that 
brings nuance to popular myths of subservience and acquiescence (or extraordinary, individual 
escape). And its situation in the haunting space where these communities carved out life and 
resistance within total violence means that the Great Dismal Swamp could be a site that 
embraces an expanded vision of fugitivity and acknowledges this extraordinary history. Rather 
than only fishing and tree species and the temporary stopover on the Underground Railroad, this 
site could evoke the ghosts of those who nourished life in marronage, life that leaned on 
relational ties, life in excess of the system of enslavement. As it is, these ghosts know how to 
speak to those who know to listen (Savoy 2015, 112): 
Private and communal meanings, elements of self-autonomy and agency, emerged 
from endurance and strength grown in place… The physical terrain may roughly 
remain, but secret paths, symbolic networks for navigating one’s way, and any 
shared ways of defining or making sense of their known world linger as ghosts. 
That landscape’s fabric, its vitality and dailiness, left little physical expression to 
those not taught to see. 
 
Thus, lieux de mémoire like the Great Dismal Swamp already convey meaning for some viewers. 
However, without more didactic markers, frameworks, and narratives surrounding such a site, it 
will only convey meaning to those already interested in and knowledgeable about the history of 
marronage. 
The political aesthetic of fugitivity can show up in monuments and memorials, but also in 
street art, murals, urban design, and vernacular signage. These might include depictions that 
draw on various formulations of the “black aesthetic” as itself fugitive or fleeing capture by 
conventional understandings and narratives.20 Or they might draw on what political theorist 
 
20Debates about whether Black art in North America is (or ought to be seen as) fulfilling a 
political purpose of advancing Black liberation or just serving its own ends as art, free from a 
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Bonnie Honig, borrowing from Derrida, identifies as “sur-vivre,” or “more life” or “overliving… 
that surprise extra, the gift that exceeds rightful expectations, the surplus that exceeds causality” 
(Honig 2009, 10). The fugitives who engaged in survival and resistance to slavery through flight 
might be identified in memorial depictions as engaging in resistance to the politics of survival 
(“mere life”) that emergency politics and regimes of violence impose on subjects. Resisting 
“mere life,” they identified ways to create “more life,” drawing on existing support networks, 
creating new political communities, and sabotaging enslavers through flight. 
The political aesthetic of fugitivity might include counter-monuments (J. Young 1992) 
and vernacular forms like those documented by Erika Doss in her study of contemporary 
American memorials (2010). For example, street art, murals, and impromptu memorials to 
shooting victims and victims of police violence are examples of contemporary memorial forms 
that often resist dominant narratives and aesthetic forms, engaging in issues around flight, racial 
violence, and withholding from violent state power. The political aesthetic of fugitivity might 
 
political purpose, have been ongoing since at least the 1920s, when W. E. B. Du Bois argued that 
“all Art is propaganda” (Du Bois 1926) and Alain Locke argued that “propaganda… perpetuates 
the position of group inferiority even in crying out against it” (Locke 1928). However, there may 
be more agreement between these two camps than there initially seems. For example, Du Bois’ 
position was nuanced and shifted over time, from arguing that art is expressive of beauty to 
arguing that art ought to be positive propaganda for Black people to arguing for Black self-help 
and art by, for, and about Black people (Mallocci 2018). Moreover, Du Bois and Locke agreed 
that Black art’s purpose is promoting the recognition of Black people as worthy of honor (Harris 
2004). Regardless, these debates foreshadowed more recent discussions of Black aesthetic forms 
as expressing flight, fugitivity, and “luxuriant withholding” (Harney and Moten 48); an “inner 
space” of “black life and creativity beyond the public face of stereotype and limited imagination” 
(Alexander 2004, 5, x); and melancholy hope (Winters 2016). As Joseph Winters argues, even 
those works of art, music, or literature that unsettle, that express ambiguity, or that “invoke 
feelings of sorrow, loss, alienation, pleasure, joy and ambivalence within the context of black 
people’s strivings, have the potential to alter and show the limits of traditional conceptions of 
politics and political resistance” (Winters 2016, 58). In these discussions, Black aesthetics are 
themselves fugitive in that they both disclose something and withhold something from the 
viewer, what Saidiya Hartman calls the “right to obscurity” (Hartman 1997, 36). 
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rethink community responses to antiblackness and how Black fugitivity can enable escape from 
state violence (Sojoyner 2017). Such fugitive acts and counter-memorials, following the tradition 
of fugitive enslaved people who “gained their freedom by committing the crime of ‘stealing 
themselves,’” might require “active resistance that does not fit easily within the bounds of liberal 
democracy” or respectable discourse (Hooker 2016, 451, 465). 
The political aesthetic of fugitivity might include memorials, monuments and museums 
that draw direct parallels between institutions of racial capitalism from early American history 
and their modern-day incarnations. For example, this could include depictions of plantation labor 
camps that have been replaced with the modern-day slavery of prison labor (Chammah 2015). 
Such an aesthetic could go further to depict incarcerated people’s modes of flight, escape, and 
community-building within those institutions. This possibility echoes Christina Sharpe’s call for 
memorial representations to avoid representing slavery as existing only in the past, since this is a 
“past that is not yet past” (Sharpe 2016, 73). The art, scholarship, poetry, podcasts, and videos 
created by the collective Electric Marronage, which explores issues of fugitivity, theft, 
Blackness, and futurity (Figueroa et al. 2020), certainly reflects these parallels. Finally, such an 
aesthetic might include memorials and art exhibits depicting absenteeism, truancy, and nearby 
forms of flight such as Jacobs’ experience in the garret.  
How might memorial installments disclose or explore ideas about liminality and 
interstitial space, bondedness or tethers to others, and community care within relational 
fugitivity? How might such projects inspire thinking about our own bonds to others and our own 
ability to resist injustice and violence through an expanded vision of fugitivity? These depictions 
offer possibilities for a new vision of memorializing the fugitive: they reveal the abundance of 
life in marronage, in the undercommons, in the interstitial garrets, that cannot be contained. They 
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offer openings for a vision of the future that includes resistance to systems of violent oppression, 
rather than narratives that only offer possibilities for total escape of those systems.  But the life 
that exists in these alternate modes of fugitivity, in resistance to the violence of slavery, may 
itself be fugitive: that is, it may resist depiction. We might think here of Fred Moten and Stefano 
Harney’s description of how Blackness “cuts the regulative, governant force of (the) 
understanding (and even of those understandings of blackness to which black people are given 
since fugitivity escapes even the fugitive)” (Harney and Moten 2013, 50). A mix of historical 
narration, evocative art exhibits, the use of archaeological artifacts, and the haunting specificity 
of a lieu de mémoire (Nora 1989) may be necessary at a site such as the Great Dismal Swamp, 
since when it comes to depicting a history of fugitivity, perhaps memorials need to themselves be 
fugitive, fleeing and evading total comprehension, synthesis, and closure. While more didactic 
forms might be appropriate in commemorating other histories of violence, when it comes to 
commemorating those who engaged in various forms of fugitivity, perhaps more counter-
monumental forms, or “memorial spaces conceived to challenge the very premises of their 
being” that “jar viewers from complacency” and “challenge and denaturalize the viewers’ 
assumptions” (J. Young 1992, 271–72) are more appropriate. Moreover, these fugitive depictions 
would be projects of unearthing what is already present in Black political activity and thought 
past and present. As Shulman writes of Moten’s vision of Black fugitivity, instead of asking 
“’what can we do?’” such a vision of fugitivity asks from the point of view of Blackness, “what 






Fugitivity in Contemporary Politics 
 
Memorializing these multiple forms of flight can not only capture a fuller, richer picture of 
the historical flight of enslaved people in the U.S., but they can also enrich fugitive theorizing 
and fugitive political action. In particular, an expanded concept of fugitivity evokes generative 
possibilities for how to find moments and pockets of escape within systems of oppression when 
it is impossible to fully escape or overcome them.  
Continuing the example of marronage and the Great Dismal Swamp, what can the maroon 
settlements of fugitive Black people such as the Great Dismal Swamp tell us about fugitivity? 
Sheldon Wolin’s (1994) idea of “fugitive democracy” – the concept that democracy flourishes 
only periodically in revolutionary moments of natality, is largely silent on questions of settler 
colonialism and racism (Aslam, McIvor, and Schlosser 2019, 32). For this reason, there is a 
disconnect between Wolin’s conception of fugitive democracy (democracy as itself in flight) and 
Black fugitivity (Blackness and Black people in flight from various instantiations of White 
supremacy).21 However, several scholars have read the histories of Black fugitive communities 
as generative of radical new ways of living together in community. These scholars include Neil 
Roberts, Daniel Sayers, and Lia Haro and Romand Coles. 
First, for Roberts (2015), marronage can help us think through alternative conceptions of 
freedom. He distinguishes “sociogenic marronage” from petit marronage (or individual acts of 
 
21George Shulman’s discussion of Fred Moten’s disavowal of politics shows how this disconnect 
between Black fugitivity and fugitive democracy is less than it might appear (Shulman 2020); 
Juliet Hooker argues that democratic fugitivity and Black fugitivity can sometimes complement 
each other, as her discussion of Frederick Douglass shows (Hooker 2017a); and Haro and Coles 
show how Black communities were themselves sources of fugitive democracy (Haro and Coles 
2019). However, Wolin’s essay ultimately describes democracy itself as the protagonist that flees 
stagnation and rot, while Black fugitive traditions and thinkers describe Blackness itself (as an 
entity or method) or Black fugitives themselves as the subjects of flight.  
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truancy), grand marronage (mass flight from plantation labor camps), and sovereign marronage 
(mass separatist societies of maroons organized around a single charismatic leader like Touissant 
L’Ouverture). Roberts argues that sociogenic marronage is “the supreme ideal of freedom” 
constituted by liberation, constitutionalism, and collective and individual agency (Roberts 2015, 
10). However, this model is most relevant to the case of Haiti, as maroon communities in the 
United States did not stage successful rebellions. Nevertheless, Roberts sees marronage as a rich 
source for theories of fugitivity and new conceptions of freedom.22 He thus articulates freedom 
as marronage as offering a radical vision of politics and for living together (Aslam, McIvor, and 
Schlosser 2019, 35). 
Second, Sayers (2014) articulates his fusion of marronage and radical communal political 
forms through the “Praxis Mode of Production.” The maroons of the Great Dismal Swamp, he 
argues, can help us see that “thoughtful and influential transformational social resistance is 
possible and actionable” by developing “the kinds of consciousness that are necessary to truly 
transform society” (Sayers 2014, 5). He sees these societies as generative of new ideas about 
how to create social worlds outside of capitalism that undermine inequality and oppression.  
 
22Is freedom really the opposite of slavery, or – in a society built on antiblackness and the labor 
of enslaved people, is such freedom from oppression impossible? Roberts says that “freedom in 
our contemporary world not in the permanent evasion of Leviathan, but the taming of Leviathan 
through these lines of flight” (Roberts 2015, 171). However, it is unclear why it is freedom that 
Roberts chooses as the product of fugitivity and marronage, especially given freedom’s lineage 
as a Western colonial and imperialist tool of conquest. For example, Barnor Hesse describes the 
“unremitting silencing of the colonial-racial formations of Western political ideas of liberty,” 
arguing that “these particular foreclosures make a virtual outlaw of black political thought” 
(Hesse 2014, 290) – although certain Black fugitive reformulations of freedom are possible, “as 
forms of escape from the Western hegemony of liberty” based on colonialism and racism (Hesse 
2014, 302). Damien Sojoyner also argues for the incompatibility of liberalism with fugitivity, 
implying that fugitivity is incompatible with a focus on liberty: “the fugitive strategy is revealed 
to be both illegible and dangerous within a liberal framework” (Sojoyner 2017, 518). 
 104 
Third, by reading Black frontline communities of the Underground Railroad on the borders 
of the U.S. North and South, Haro and Coles (2019, 646) “reconceive sanctuary as the generative 
twin of fugitivity.” Together, they argue, these twin concepts “illuminate a crucial political path 
for generating transformative power—especially as increased numbers of people are displaced, 
targeted, and rendered precarious” (Haro and Coles 2019, 459–60). For example, frontline 
communities of free Black people on the border of slave states and free states who protected 
recent fugitives provided sanctuary and care, using sophisticated networks of warnings if Whites 
came looking for fugitives and innovative community care and education systems through Black 
churches. As such, Haro and Coles see these sanctuary communities as a kind of fugitive 
democracy, inspiration for “creating better alternatives so that we are less and less fleeing from 
danger and increasingly fleeing toward and into alternative horizons and relationships with 
others that transform the status quo” (Haro and Coles 2019, 655). Haro and Coles’ account of 
these Black communities that were built on fugitivity is a theory of living together more 
democratically, “democratic theory by the light of fugitivity” (Aslam, McIvor, and Schlosser 
2019, 33). 
These scholars all make the case, in one way or another, that marronage is a model for either 
the fleeting moments of “fugitive democracy” that Sheldon Wolin (1994) describes as arising 
only occasionally and temporarily or the “radically democratic politics” that Shulman argues 
Black “fugitive ingenuity” can generate (Shulman 2020, 4,2). Together, these accounts suggest a 
vision of fugitivity that emphasizes surviving together rather than individual escape and total 
freedom.  
I suggest that we can use an expanded vision of fugitivity to think through the problems of 
contemporary politics. Several modern-day incarnations of maroon fugitivity arise from this 
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discussion. First, we might use these insights to think through some of the big questions of 
contemporary racial politics. As political philosopher Juliet Hooker suggests, the “fugitive 
tradition within black political thought could thus be reclaimed to rescue contemporary black 
politics from the strategic dead-ends produced by the enshrinement of a romantic narrative of the 
civil rights movement as an exemplary moment when racial progress was achieved via political 
activism that fully acquiesced to liberal democratic norms” (Hooker 2016, 465). She suggests 
that Black Lives Matter might be seen as a fugitive form of Black politics in its rejection of the 
politics of respectability and its insistence on the radical assertion that Black lives ought to be 
valued.  
Next, we might also think of the need for activists, including Black Lives Matter activists and 
members of workers’ movements such as Academics for Black Lives, to retreat to community 
and to self-care, as a type of modern-day fugitivity. The idea is that activists need to occasionally 
retreat to themselves and to their communities in order to rest and heal before returning to the 
longer-term, more abolitionist-minded work of activism and social repair. 
We might also think of modern-day instantiations of marronage. With the migration crisis 
from the Middle East and North Africa, several refugee communities have reshaped their 
physical spaces in their camps and temporary settlements to their communities’ needs for public 
squares and meeting spaces that balance openness and protected space (Kimmelman 2014). 
Collectives, mutual aid groups, and other alternative or collectivist economic experiments can be 
thought of as a modern-day form of marronage. For example, the Earthseed Land Cooperative in 
Durham, North Carolina, which borrows ideas about creating refuge during disaster from 
Octavia Butler’s dystopian novels, is attempting “not only to survive dystopia, but also to build 
the relationships to other people, to nonhumans, and to the land itself necessary for survival 
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beyond Earth” (Purifoy 2020). It envisions both a longer-term political vision of interrupting 
capitalism, antiblackness, and racism and shorter-term refuge for its participants. The collective 
sees itself as “holders of space where people of color can come and get free and feel safe” 
(Purifoy 2020). Not only is it a fugitive space of sanctuary, but it also embodies some of the 
characteristics of marronage and the world-building of free Black sanctuary communities – 
reimagining relationships, collective liberation, and new practices around property and economic 
resources. 
Finally, Harney and Moten’s formulation of the “undercommons” of academia can help 
illuminate how fugitivity travels both to fugitive theorizing and to institutions such as 
universities. Harney and Moten take the example of subversive intellectuals in the university, 
who form a kind of  “downlow low-down maroon community of the university… where the 
revolution is still black, still strong” (Harney and Moten 2013, 26). Oppressed workers of the 
university thus form a subaltern community to which they retreat to imagine alternative worlds 
and engage in informal, “fugitive planning” for the future. Moreover, ties to others are 
foundational for undercommons workers, who are predisposed for “Hapticality, or Love” 
because they are thrown together and thus touch and “feel (for) each other” (Harney and Moten 
2013, 97–98). These ties, forged out of fugitive necessity, echo the ties of reciprocity and 
relationality found in the maroon communities of the Great Dismal Swamp and elsewhere.  
These contemporary examples of fugitivity allow us to re-imagine what escape within an all-
encompassing system of injustice (such as racism or colonialism) might look like when it is 
impossible to fully escape – or when fugitivity is necessary while the longer-term work of 
abolition continues. Moreover, they open up possibilities for a vision of sociality in flight – the 
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life that exists in excess in the undercommons despite every attempt to contain and violently 
obliterate such life and such sociality. 
 
Working against Future Mass Violence 
 
By thinking through the project of fleeing and resisting depicted in a political aesthetic of 
commemoration, we might imagine how to resist and flee contemporary systems of violence and 
oppression and work against them (through fugitivity and resistance) in the future.23 Fugitivity 
(in all its forms) is resistance to systems of violence: resistance that takes the specific form of 
flight. By thinking through the project of fleeing and resisting depicted in a political aesthetic of 
commemoration – and particularly through a more nuanced vision of fugitivity that accounts for 
forms of fugitivity other than the Underground Railroad – we might imagine how to resist and 
flee contemporary systems of violence and oppression and resist them in the future. I suggest 
that this expanded concept of fugitivity leaves room for those who need places and ways to 
escape within unjust systems but who cannot flee these systems entirely. The generative 
possibilities of an expanded vision of fugitivity – its gestures toward finding new ways of living 
together outside of relationships of domination, the space and time it carves out for rest and 
community, its creative potential for helping us think of new ways of living together – may open 
up new ways of thinking about how to resist and abolish systems of violence and oppression in 
the long term. For example, the activity of fugitivity created, in Black sanctuary communities, 
new ways of doing politics, in particular political tactics that resisted state violence and 
 
23Although, as with my discussions of the political aesthetic in every case study of this 
dissertation, memorials will likely only ever play a small role in working against future mass 
violence, the aesthetic does have an important role to play. As Neil Roberts puts it: “The sight 
and site of moving black bodies in flight and the aesthetics of flight have repercussions for 
observers who wish to deny such movement” (Roberts 2015, 48). 
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expanded commonsense notions of who could be included in the demos (Haro and Coles 2019, 
661) that might prove generative to those interested in resisting systems of violence in 
contemporary politics. 
Within a politics that reproduces Black death as normative and Blackness as negation, is 
there anything to be unearthed that “survives this insistent Black exclusion, this ontological 
negation?” (Sharpe 2016, 14). What escapes and survives is the fugitive. Expanded depictions of 
fugitivity that move beyond the Underground Railroad might encourage a political imagination 
of reciprocity, carving out space for community within inescapable systems of oppression, 
remembering our bonds to others, attending to liminal and interstitial spaces, and resisting within 
systems of violence and oppression when they cannot be fully escaped. These lessons can be 
applied to injustices resulting from racial capitalism, migration and xenophobia, heterosexism, 
and colonial oppression of Indigenous people. An expanded vision of fugitivity and its emphasis 
on resisting mastery and violence through always-incomplete flight and ties to others might lead 
us forward into a vision of resisting violence in contemporary politics.  
I have argued in this dissertation for various aspects of a political aesthetic of 
commemoration that may work against future mass violence. The aesthetic of fugitivity is 
another way we might open up the imagination to different futures that are free of the mass 
violence of slavery, colonial violence, and genocide. By gesturing to different ways of living 
such as the radical/fugitive/undercommons community structures of the maroon communities of 
the Great Dismal Swamp, the interstitial and liminal ways of surviving as truants and absentees, 
and the ties to others of relational fugitivity, fugitive memorials may unearth something beyond 
the politics of state violence and oppression. Within the U.S.’s current creeping fascism, 
staggering inequality, and racism, the aesthetic of fugitivity may help uncover ideas that are 
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already present in the Black radical tradition and the history of Blackness in the U.S. more 
generally: ideas about mourning, carving out space for joy and pleasure within conditions of 
oppression, making a way out of no way, and imagining other ways of living together. 
In the face of seemingly intractable systems of violence and oppression, fugitivity can 
provide communities opportunities to escape within those systems, allowing them space to 
survive and participate in community care. As such, a political aesthetic of fugitivity provides 
new ways of thinking about how to escape within a system of injustice and violence: how to live 
within the liminal space of escape, how to escape and join others in community, and how to find 
new ways of living together that resist the violence of the state and enable the flourishing of 
community.  
This does not require an escapist fantasy and disengagement with the ongoing struggle to 
resist systems of oppression and violence. Fugitives from systems of oppression and violence can 
continue to use other methods of resistance and weapons of the weak, like maroon communities 
that harbored rebel enslaved people and resisted local enslavers from the outside. Sometimes 
escape is necessary for survival, and as such commemoration of past violence can include 
narratives and depictions of fugitivity alongside narratives and depictions of other modes of 
resistance, abolition, solidarity, bodily vulnerability, and other themes. Fugitivity can help 
communities imagine and plan for the abolition of systems of violence and oppression – their 
total overthrow and replacement with more just and equitable institutions. Indeed, Harney and 
Moten describe a fugitive undercommons as compatible with an abolitionist vision (2013, 42). 
Fugitivity, thus, is can be a kind of repair that supports other modes of resistance, allowing 
fugitives to flee from violence, retreating to return to the struggle or to engage in it in new ways. 
Meanwhile, the generative possibilities of fugitivity – its gestures toward finding new ways of 
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living together outside of relationships of domination, the space and time it carves out for rest 
and community, its creative potential for helping us think of new ways of living together – may 
open up new ways of thinking about how to resist and abolish systems of violence and 








CHAPTER FOUR: A POLITICAL AESTHETIC OF SOLIDARITY IN MEMORIALS TO 
INDIGENOUS VICTIMS OF AUSTRALIAN COLONIAL VIOLENCE 
 
 
More I think than most Australians recognise, the plight of Aboriginal Australians affects 
us all…We committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. We practiced 
discrimination and exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice. And our failure to 
imagine these things being done to us. With some noble exceptions, we failed to make the 
most basic human response and enter into their hearts and minds. We failed to ask—how 
would I feel if this were done to me?... And if we have a sense of justice, as well as common 
sense, we will forge a new partnership. 
 
– Prime Minister Paul Keating, Redfern Park Speech, Sydney, 1992   
 
In 1967 we were counted, in 2017 we seek to be heard. We leave base camp and start our 
trek across this vast country. We invite you to walk with us in a movement of the Australian 
people for a better future. 
 
– The Uluru Statement from the Heart, 2019   
 
 
In May 2017, over 250 delegates from Australia’s Indigenous communities crafted a 
statement asserting Indigenous ties to and ownership of land, calling for “substantive 
constitutional change and structural reform” that would improve political and social conditions 
for Indigenous people (“Uluru Statement from the Heart” 2017). After decades of advocating for 
constitutional and statutory measures to include, empower, and recognize Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples, the Uluru Statement from the Heart represented an especially broad, 
grassroots Indigenous-led organizing effort. Over six months, organizers consulted over 1,200 
representatives from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities (Chrysanthos 2019). The 
delegates lament the “torment of our powerlessness,” the broken link between peoples and land, 
the overincarceration of their adults, and over-institutionalization of their youth. The statement 
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ends with three demands for reform: an “Indigenous Voice,” or permanent representation, in the 
Australian Parliament; a Makarrata (treaty) Commission; and a historical truth-telling process.  
The language of the Uluru Statement is the language of activity, reciprocity, contestation, 
and collaboration (Little 2019). It hopes that Indigenous children will “walk in two worlds and 
their culture will be a gift to their country”; it calls Makarrata “the coming together after a 
struggle”; and it outlines the beginning of a process of Indigenous Australians walking together 
with non-Indigenous Australians and the Australian government. It assumes that Indigenous 
community members exist in both their own communities and the Australian nation. It does stop 
at a request for multicultural recognition, the core demand of the earlier “Recognise” campaign 
of the 2010s and of many social movements of the late twentieth century. Rather, the Statement 
outlines the beginning of a multi-step, active political process in which settler populations and 
Indigenous communities will collaborate to create justice within an unjust, settler-colonist 
political order.  
The Statement could have emphasized how Indigenous Australians are tied together in 
solidarity by their Indigenous identities, or how all Australians, Indigenous and not, can come 
together as members of the same nation out of patriotic pride or civic duty – but it does not. 
Instead, it emphasizes how Indigenous and settler communities might act, walk, and work 
together in the name of justice. Here, the condition of bridging differences and finding 
commonality comes not from a set of shared characteristics like nationality, ethnicity, language, 
or history. Rather, it comes from shared practice: the activity of seeking justice for an oppressed 
population, in which both the oppressed and the oppressor must work together. 
What does it mean for solidarity to come from shared activity rather than from shared 
characteristics? In this chapter, I lay out what I see as one of the major debates among political 
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theorists of solidarity: solidarity as shared characteristics versus solidarity as shared practice. I 
then show, through close textual readings of two memorials to colonial violence against 
Indigenous Australians, how a political aesthetic can cultivate political solidarity as practice. I 
tease out themes and issues of solidarity through these texts and ultimately describe the contours 
of a radical vision of political solidarity: one that extends to one’s enemies, even to perpetrators 
of violence and their descendants. This paper thus contributes to the overall goal of the 
dissertation, which is to suggest various imagination-expanding aesthetics that aim to work 
against future mass violence. I have argued that mass violence is a summum malum. In this 






Solidarity is a widely used concept in political thought – and it carries a wide array of 
definitions. The concept has roots in the Greek polis, ideas of civic friendship, and Christian 
caritas (brotherly love) as well as the specifically civic bonds between members of a political 
community that the French and American Revolutions emphasized. Catholic social teaching, 
which grew out of Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, emphasizes solidarity and 
solidarism as concepts of our mutual obligations to each other as humans. For Emile Durkheim, 
solidarity is “between two or more people a feeling… that gives rise to these associations of 
friends and sets its mark upon them” (Durkheim 2014, 46); for Iris Marion Young, it is “a sense 
of commitment and justice owed to people” (I. M. Young 2002, 222); for Juliet Hooker, it is “the 
reciprocal relations of trust and obligation established between members of a political 
community that are necessary in order for long-term egalitarian projects,” like democracy, “to 
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flourish” (Hooker 2009, 4); for Andrew Mason, it is mutual concern (A. Mason 2000); and for 
Latin American Catholicism’s liberation theology, it is fellow-feeling with, and uplifting of, the 
poor (Gutiérrez 1973). Despite different uses and definitions of the term, it has been used by a 
wide array of political and scholarly movements to promote the coming-together of members of 
a community. Solidarity has been taken up by racial justice movements, feminism, and the labor 
movement (Scholz 2008). But philosophers have explored similar concepts under different 
names – mutual trust, political friendship, and other-thinking or other-feeling – since at least 
Aristotle, who was concerned with the question of whether citizens would trust each other 
(1998). I consider solidarity to be 1) a set of prosocial practices that, 2) by cultivating 
understanding of others who are different from ourselves, 3) orients us to oppose forms of power 
that are debasing to others.  
The first part of this definition, the prosocial practices, emphasizes relationality – the idea 
that mutually constitutive lives are made meaningful, and politics made possible, through 
connections to others. As I discuss in the next section, solidarity as shared activity or practices is 
a more compelling basis for solidarity than solidarity as shared characteristics. The second part 
of the definition, understanding those who are different, is purposefully vague. We can 
understand some aspects of another without having to understand them fully; for example, 
understanding the basic facts of the different experiences of others may be more desirable than a 
homogenizing view of human experience that emphasizes commonalities across differences (for 
example, see the Obama Era’s “post-racial” political rhetoric in the United States). The work of 
Showing Up for Racial Justice (SURJ), a group that aims to educate White people about racial 
injustice in the United States and bring them into solidarity with people of color through political 
organizing, is a good example of how we can work to understand others across difference 
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without erasing or downplaying the social significance of those differences. SURJ focuses on 
educating White people to understand the effects of racism on people of color, declaring in their 
values statement that “change happens when we build with millions of other people to change 
culture, policies and practices… The system of white supremacy harms all of us -- including 
white people, though in very different ways than people of color” (“SURJ Values” 2019). This is 
a nuanced example of drawing on what is shared (antiracist action) without erasing difference (of 
racial identity and racism). 
The last part of the solidarity definition, helping us oppose forms of power that are 
debasing to others, works against future mass violence by orienting us toward opposition and 
resistance to the political preconditions for such mass violence. Solidarity works against the 
politics of violent forms of state power and politics that oppress and debase groups of people. 
However, in racial caste societies such as the United States, solidarity is often racialized, only 
extended within ingroups (Hooker 2009). Thus, it is crucial that the conception of solidarity I 
propose allows us to resist forms of power that are debasing and threatening not only to members 
of our own group, but also across difference. A conception of solidarity as resisting debasing 
forms of power across difference and disagreement can be an antidote to visions of solidarity that 
draw on a unifying or overarching identity, such as nationality – “We are all Americans” – in 
order to supposedly overcome politically meaningful identities such as religion or partisanship.  
 
Solidarity as Common Characteristics 
 
Many theories of solidarity consider common or shared characteristics as the basis for 
solidarity, but these theories ultimately fall prey to critiques that their utility is limited by the 
very characteristics on which they base solidarity. This is what Emile Durkheim termed 
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“mechanical solidarity,” or “solidarity by similarities” (Durkheim 2014, 57), which he argues 
was gradually replaced by the “organic solidarity” of advanced societies characterized by the 
division of labor. Sally Scholz (2008, 5) calls solidarity based on shared characteristics “social 
solidarity” (as opposed to political activism based on collective responsibility, which she calls 
“political solidarity”). Many theories of solidarity emphasize common or shared membership or 
identity, such as community-based (I. M. Young 2002, 222)24 or national (Miller 1997) 
solidarity.25 However, this concept of solidarity has its limits: it is limited to those in the 
community and excludes others (A. Y. Davis 2005, 83); much of the history of nationalism is a 
history of violence and the rearticulation of racism (Winters 2016, 199); and even national 
fellow-feeling is often not enough to overcome racial animus within a nation (Hooker 2009).  
There are those who theorize solidarity as based on the common humanity of all people, a 
shared identity that means we should be able to find solidarity with any other human qua human 
– for example, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach” to human rights 
(Nussbaum 1995). Theories of human solidarity have been widely criticized on the grounds that 
there is no ontological basis for a claim either to innate human solidarity or to a non-contingent 
human identity (Rorty 1989); on the grounds that such claims have historically excluded 
marginalized groups, such as women (MacKinnon 1985); on the grounds that it is often elites 
who undemocratically decide which characteristics count as human (Ferguson 2012); and on the 
 
24Although Young denies that her theory of solidarity is one based on “fellow feeling or mutual 
identification” (I. M. Young 2002, 222), even those aspects of her theory of solidarity that 
emphasize political and social practices apply only to those who share membership in a political 
community. 
 
25Similarly, these questions have long been the subject of debate around the coherence of a 
category of “women” and the extent to which such a category can be the basis for political 
claims and organizing (Okin 1994; Nussbaum 2000; Zerilli, Linda M. G. 2005; Bunch 1987). 
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grounds that the criteria for counting as “human,” while claiming to be universal, actually 
smuggle in the values and judgments of the powerful (Zerilli 2009). Ultimately, it is all too easy 
for an emphasis on what we share to exclude those who do not share those characteristics.  
 
Solidarity as Shared Activity 
What might we build solidarity on if not shared characteristics? I suggest that 
frameworks of solidarity as shared practice and activity – such as Hannah Arendt’s sensus 
communis, Michaele Ferguson’s sharing, Danielle Allen’s political friendship, and Juliet 
Hooker’s discursive practices – provide a way forward for solidarity, avoiding the pitfalls 
described above. These theories emphasize solidarity as praxis or activity, not commonality or 
shared characteristics. Below, I illustrate these frameworks’ advantages over frameworks based 
on common characteristics.  
Hannah Arendt’s ideas of representative thinking and “common sense,” or sensus 
communis, approximate solidarity as activity rather than passive resemblance. These ideas 
encompass the practice of understanding others in public life in a way that accounts for their 
differences from ourselves. Arendt proposes sensus communis as a way to link people without 
relying on common characteristics. Common sense is thinking “in the place of everybody else… 
claim[ing] assent from others because in judging he has already taken them into account and 
hence hopes that his judgments will carry a certain general, though perhaps not universal, 
validity” (Arendt 1966, 140). She draws on Kant’s theory of critical thinking, which relies on a 
community of others to (and with) whom we must think and communicate (Arendt 1992). As 
such, sensus communis is what makes us part of a community (Arendt 1992, 70). Importantly, it 
is not “an enormously enlarged empathy through which one can know what actually goes on in 
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the mind of all others,” but rather an individual practice of actively engaging with others’ lives 
imaginatively (Arendt 1992, 43).  
Aside from connecting people, sensus communis is also important for our discussion of 
solidarity because it embraces plurality and difference (Arendt 2006a, 221; 1951, 476). 
Difference is a basic fact of the world, as individuals share the world as common ground but still 
occupy their own locations in it (Arendt 1998, 57). For Arendt (who recognizes solidarity as a 
“principle that can inspire and guide action,” as distinct from the emotions or sentiments of 
compassion and pity), “it is out of solidarity that [people] establish deliberately and, as it were, 
dispassionately a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited” (Arendt 1963b, 88). 
Thus, solidarity includes an acceptance of different others, such as subordinated people. 
A similar concept in Arendt’s political thought is “representative thinking,” or political 
thought that considers the viewpoints of others. “The more people’s standpoints I have present in 
my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and 
think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the 
more valid my final conclusions” (Arendt 2006b, 237). Thus, representative thinking is a kind of 
thinking with others, an individual practice that can open us up to collective practices such as the 
solidaristic commemoration I discuss in this chapter. Representative thinking allows us to do this 
by transforming an “object” (an external stimulus) “into something I do not have to be directly 
confronted with but that I have in some sense internalized, so that I now can be affected by it” 
(Arendt 1992, 66). Importantly, for Arendt sensus communis and representative thinking are not 
just traits that are passively possessed, but rather – as shown by her exploration of its failure 
under totalitarianism – actively practiced and cultivated. These practices illustrate many of the 
most important capacities of solidarity: they are active, they can help us understand others who 
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are different from us, and they can help us avoid the kind of thinking that justifies the 
extermination of different others. Sensus communis and representative thinking stand in contrast 
to totalitarianism, which she says comes out of a politics in which the nation is conflated with the 
family, rejecting different others and conflating politics with unity (Arendt 1998, 57). In her 
imaginary condemnation of Adolf Eichmann, she indicts the Nazi primarily for his crime against 
humanity – that is, his crime against the pluralistic nature of humanity (Arendt 1963a). The 
ability of the solidaristic practices of sensus communis and representative thinking to embrace 
pluralism and difference while opposing forms of power that are debasing to others makes them 
a powerful weapon against totalitarianism’s politics of fear and exclusion by opening us up to 
other collective practices, such as solidaristic commemorative ceremonies, interactive exhibits, 
and political action across difference. 
Borrowing from Arendt’s sensus communis, political theorist Michaele Ferguson argues 
that we shift away from a claim that members of a democracy must have some commonality – of 
language, institutions, ethnicity, or history – and toward a claim that members of a democracy 
engage in the shared activity of self-government by exercising political freedom (Ferguson 
2012). In this vision, “sharing is a first-person experience of relating to others: I experience that I 
inhabit the world together with other persons who are themselves subjects… without my 
awareness of the existence of other subjects, it would be meaningless to say that I share: With 
whom could I share, if there were no others?” (Ferguson 2012, 38) In this account of democracy 
as a shared activity, what is in common is a set of meanings that are created through social 
interactions. In Ferguson’s vision of politics, we are sharing with plural others in a society of 
difference. Because we no longer need to find characteristics that we share with others, sharing 
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as activity or practice opens up the possibility for solidarity with others who, like us, also 
participate in world-building.  
Also indebted to Arendt, Danielle Allen (2004) emphasizes shared practice across 
difference. Allen proposes political friendship as an antidote to racial animus in democracies. 
She identifies the central problem of U.S. democracy as distrust, especially between racial 
groups. Her remedy is the practice of political friendship, based on Aristotle’s view of utility 
friendship. For Allen, political friendship is built on the recognition of having a shared life with 
another, namely, our shared practices as members of the same polity. Citizens practicing political 
friendship are “interacting with strangers in ways that look like friendship even if, since they lack 
the emotional charge, they don’t feel like friendship… the core practices of the best friendships 
can be separated from the emotions of love and goodwill and be distilled into habits for resolving 
rivalrous self-interest in any context – whether friendly, commercial, or political” (Allen 2004, 
127). Political friendship requires individual “habits of imagination that generate politically 
transformative experiences out of ordinary interactions among strangers” (Allen 2004, 171) and 
distribute benefits and sacrifices equitably (Allen 2004, 137). Democracy, thus, is a system of 
reciprocity and equity that is enabled by the individual habits and practices of political friendship 
among citizens, especially between strangers (Allen 2004, 29). 
Likewise, Juliet Hooker sees solidarity not as commonality-based, but rather as a 
normative orientation and a practice (Hooker 2009, 21). For Hooker, solidarity is based on 
“structural conditions that require people to develop contingent solidarities… that are not 
dependent on mutual identification (i.e., thinking of others as being ‘like us’) or shared 
nationality” (Hooker 2009, 37). The problem of political solidarity, she argues, is that it is 
fundamentally shaped by race. The U.S. and other racialized societies have not achieved full 
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solidarity, but rather racialized solidarity, “the diametrically opposed ethical-historical 
perspectives developed by dominant (White) and subordinated (nonwhite) groups in a racial 
polity” (Hooker 2009, 88). This racialized solidarity stems from Whites’ failure to acknowledge 
and remedy racial injustices. In fact, many Whites see nonwhites’ calls to remedy racial injustice 
as the real threat to solidarity. As a result, nonwhites experience the dominant race-blind 
discourse as hypocritical and see racism as the status quo while Whites see racism as an 
aberration or exception to a status quo of equality (Hooker 2009, 44). This creates a solidarity 
gap between nonwhites and Whites. As a result of this framing of the problem, Hooker’s solution 
to overcoming racialized solidarity is at the systemic or discursive level (at the level of narrative 
frames and common conceptions that shape social or shared meanings). 
However, unlike Allen, who focuses on individual practices of friendship, Hooker argues 
that individual practices like charitable giving are insufficient to overcome racialized solidarity.  
Rather, we should engage a series of discursive political practices that work to change the 
underlying “normative orientations among dominant groups that need to be overcome” (Hooker 
2009, 49). We might not be able to fully overcome racialized solidarity, but an important first 
step would be a practice of making Whiteness visible to Whites in order to facilitate a “radical 
reevaluation of the meaning of the categories themselves” (Hooker 2009, 50) and “transform the 
ethical self-understanding of the political community as a whole” (Hooker 2009, 52) by 
revealing inequalities and confronting questions of justice. Expanding on the work of Hooker, 
Greta Fowler Snyder (Snyder 2015) calls these the discursive practices of “lifeworld alignment” 
and suggests that popular culture that challenges the dominant construction of Whiteness as 
unraced and neutral can facilitate cross-racial solidarity. Hooker emphasizes solidarity rooted in 
practice, but unlike Allen, she highlights not individual but rather systemic practices that create 
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change at the discursive level. Hooker emphasizes memory work and commemoration as one 
particularly important discursive practice: altering the historical narrative to make Whiteness and 
the racial polity visible can be one early step in the process of cultivating solidarity across racial 
lines. 
Some of the most compelling elements of the theories of solidarity as practice that I have 
described above are the imaginative exercises that ask us to actively think about others, the 
embrace of difference, and the ways that these practices can orient us towards a politics that 
opposes mass violence and debasing forms of power. Solidarity as practice is also appealing 
because it is not subject to the same critiques as is solidarity as shared characteristics – for 
example, the critiques of nationalism or of ontological determinism. And importantly, it also 
emphasizes that solidarity must be sought and cultivated, not automatically found wherever a 
group of people share similar characteristics or group memberships. Indeed, contemporary 
politics’ many failures of cross-racial, transnational, and cross-gender solidarity indicate that 
solidarity as shared identity cannot be taken for granted. 
In fact, it seems that the real power of solidarity is when it is extended to people who are 
not like us, when mutual identification is not a requirement of solidarity (Rushing 2010, 300). 
Solidarity based on shared practices of uncomfortable political struggle across difference can be 
a basis for community when identity cannot, like for multiracial communities of political 
struggle (A. Y. Davis 2005, 30, 97). One common use of the term solidarity is in labor 
movements, which encapsulate solidarity as both shared characteristics and shared activity – the 
characteristic of union membership and the activity of union organizing (Scholz 2008, 9). Labor 
often emphasizes building coalitions of diverse groups and extending solidarity within and across 
unions and social movements, as seen in arguments to support another union by not crossing 
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picket lines out of solidarity. For labor unions, it is the activity or practice of organizing that 
empowers workers and builds solidarity – not just the passively shared common characteristic of 
union membership. Solidarity as practice (as opposed to solidarity as shared characteristics) is 
less prone to whitewashing difference. It better enables us to, as Audre Lorde writes, “reach 
down into that deep place of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any 
difference that lives there. See whose face it wears. Then the personal as the political can begin 
to illuminate all our choices” (Lorde 2007, 113, italics in original). Tentative, awkward 
connections and alliances across difference can be especially potent tools in commemorating 
historical mass violence. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe the case study of Australian 
depictions of colonial violence against Indigenous peoples before showing how two memorials 
to colonial violence in Australia exemplify the idea of active solidarity I have proposed. 
 
Australian Colonial Violence and its Memorials 
 
 
For about 60,000 years, hundreds of communities of Indigenous peoples lived in 
Australia and the Torres Strait Islands in complex hunter-gatherer (Macintyre 2009) and 
horticultural (Pascoe 2014) societies. While Dutch explorers “discovered” the continent in the 
early seventeenth century, it was the British who settled it as a naval base and penal colony by 
the eighteenth century. Until 1868, Britain exported convicts and settlers to various penal and 
“free” colonies in Australia. The long history of colonial violence has been well documented. It 
included hundreds of massacres killing tens of thousands of people (Reynolds 2006); poisonings 
(Ryan 2012); the rape of Indigenous women; forced removal from land (Boyce 2013); and the 
theft of children from the 1910s-1970s, creating what is called the “Stolen Generations” 
(“Bringing Them Home” 1997). There was also cultural and spiritual theft, contamination with 
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deadly diseases brought by Europeans, harm to land through European cattle and sheep grazing, 
and the exhumation of Indigenous bodies without consent for anthropological research. By 1901, 
when the colonies federated into the Commonwealth of Australia, the Indigenous population had 
declined significantly from about a million people at the time of European arrival (Macintyre 
2009) to below 90,000. Despite mid-twentieth century Indigenous activism and reforms that, 
among other things, gave Indigenous Australians citizenship, lynching, restrictive social policies, 
and state-level legal discrimination (Irving 2001) continued well into the twentieth century. Only 
in 1992 was the legal doctrine of terra nullius (the assumption that the land was owned by no 
one pre-colonization) struck down and Indigenous land rights were reinstated. 
Throughout the end of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, the 
government launched several programs attempting reconciliation between Indigenous peoples 
and the Australian government. Demands that colonial violence be documented and recognized 
escalated in the 1970s. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy provided an epicenter for protests near the 
Parliament building in Canberra; protesters have been active in demanding land rights for 




Figure 2: The Aboriginal Tent Embassy 
In 1999, Parliament, under Prime Minister John Howard, passed a Motion of Reconciliation but 
Howard refused to formally apologize, worried that a “black armband” narrative of Australian 
history would chip away at national unity and pride. The government under Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd formally apologized for the forcible removals resulting in the Stolen Generations in 
2008, even as social policies toward Indigenous communities failed to improve Indigenous 
material conditions to equal White conditions. 
The brutality of colonial history was largely ignored by historians and school curricula 
for much of the twentieth century. It was not until the 1990s that scholars really began to 
document colonial massacres of Indigenous Australians (Ryan 2012). The “History Wars” 
debates that emerged in the late twentieth century split scholars who call colonial violence 
“genocide” (Dwyer and Ryan 2016; Neath and Andrew 2018; Tedeschi 2018) and those who call 
it a “war” (Reynolds 2013), as well as those who favor the “Aboriginal resistance model” 
(Reynolds 2006; 2013) and those who see the conflicts as more one-sided (Boyce 2013). 
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Memorialization of colonial violence toward Indigenous people has increased in recent decades, 
with a renewed interest among historians, artists, and the public in commemoration. Many 
existing memorials to colonists have been contextualized since the multiculturalism of the 1980s 
and 1990s, especially through plaques describing colonial massacres and land seizures (Batten 
and Batten 2008). Several monuments and memorials related to Indigenous exploitation have 
been created since the reforms of the 1960s, including memorials to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples in general, to the Stolen Generations, to Indigenous Australian military 
personnel, and to Indigenous victims of colonial massacres and violence. However, there are 
over 180 documented Indigenous massacres by the British in Eastern Australia alone, most of 
which do not have memorials marking the Indigenous people slaughtered there (Ryan et al. 
2017).  
 
A Political Aesthetic of Solidarity in Australian Memorials 
 
 
If we think solidarity is worth pursuing, to what ends should we pursue it? Societies 
thinking through how to memorialize their histories of violence are often interested in preventing 
future violence, working toward a future that does not mirror the past. I suggest that memorials 
to historical mass violence can work, by cultivating solidarity, against the summum malum of 
future mass violence. Memorials to colonial violence like massacres, brutal executions, or 
kidnapping seem especially well-equipped to work against the possibility of future colonial 
violence and its modern iterations. Moreover, since violence against Indigenous bodies at the 
hands of the carceral and child welfare systems remains a problem in Australia, colonial violence 
is more an immediate reality than a remote possibility or a past relic. 
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 Below, I discuss two memorials to colonial violence against Indigenous Australians: the 
Myall Creek Massacre Memorial in northern New South Wales and “Standing by 
Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner” in Melbourne. Both were created through cooperation 
with Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors and both encapsulate solidarity as I have defined it: 
as a set of prosocial practices that, by cultivating understanding of others who are different from 
ourselves, orients us to oppose forms of power that are debasing to others. These memorials are 
only one part of the ongoing process of reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians and between Indigenous communities and the Australian government. As such, they 
constitute part of a political aesthetic that works against future mass violence.  
 I chose these cases because of their very different aesthetic styles – one uses “natural” 
materials and is integrated into a rural landscape, while the other uses sleek industrial materials 
and is situated in a cityscape – and because they represent two different types of colonial 
violence to Indigenous bodies – vigilante massacre and execution by hanging. They are not 
necessarily exemplary monuments or as perfect encapsulations of ideas of solidarity,26 but it is 
instructive to tease out how certain themes of solidarity – specifically, solidarity as difference-





26Aside from the formal memorials I discuss here, Australia is also dotted with also many 
informal memorials and lieux de memoire (Nora 1989), including what Neil Carter, Indigenous 
member of the Australian Government’s Advisory Committee for Indigenous Repatriation calls 
“living memorials,” which include waterholes in the desert that are significant only to members 
of Indigenous communities (Neath and Andrew 2018, 99). A database of formal and informal 
markers can be found at the citizen-compiled Monument Australia database (“Monument 
Australia” n.d.). 
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The Myall Creek Massacre Memorial 
 
 
The Myall Creek Massacre is one of the best-documented massacres of Indigenous 
people in Australia. In New South Wales in 1838, eleven White settlers killed 28 Wirrayaraay 
men, women and children who had been living in peace with White cattle hands around the 
Myall Creek station – one of many massacres that year alone. The next day, the killers came 
back to burn the bodies. The massacre was ostensibly in retaliation for the theft of cattle and the 
killing of a White stockman in the region, although even contemporaries of the murderers 
recognized this not only as revenge but also as an act of terror (Ryan and Lydon 2018, 15). 
Unlike in most such massacres, seven of the perpetrators of these crimes were successfully 
prosecuted by the colonial government, despite the only witness to the massacre, a station hand 
named Yintayintin, being legally unable to testify in court because he was Indigenous (Tedeschi 
2018). The seven men who were found guilty became Australia’s first Whites executed for 
killing Aboriginal people. However, the ringleader, John Fleming, escaped arrest and quickly 
returned to public life (Ryan and Lydon 2018). The settler population of New South Wales was 
outraged not by the murder of Aboriginal people but by the prosecution of the murderers for a 
commonplace crime like murdering Aboriginal people (Maynard 2018). Massacres continued 
throughout Australia, often unreported, until the 1920s. 
 Pressure to create a memorial at Myall Creek began in the 1960s, but the memorial was 
organized in the late 1990s by a group led by Sue Blacklock (a descendant of the survivors of the 
massacre), other members of the local Wirrayaraay community, and Indigenous and non-
Indigenous members of the Uniting Church in Australia. This group, which became the Myall 
Creek Organizing Committee, unanimously decided to include equal numbers of Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous community members and ultimately included descendants of massacre survivors 
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and descendants of local settlers, including one woman descended from a perpetrator of the 
massacre (D. Johnson 2002). According to original Committee member Paulette Smith, early 
meetings were strained and Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people sat on separate sides of the 
room, but “this changed as people got to know each other over endless cups of tea…the process 
of the meetings themselves was a journey of understanding, acceptance and healing” (D. Johnson 
2002, 67). Equal representation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous leaders was paired with a 
practice of deferring to Indigenous leaders’ cultural and epistemic perspectives.27 The committee 
ran through Aboriginal design protocols and the design process was Indigenous-led; Myall Creek 
elders led and were consulted; and Colin Isaacs, the designer of the informational plaques, is 
Aboriginal (although not Wirrayaraay). It is important for Indigenous leadership to guide 
memorial projects for many reasons, including avoiding settler frameworks’ tendency to 
essentialize Indigenous cultures and views of nature. 
A permanent memorial, designed by heritage architect Tim Shellshear, was built and 
opened in 2000 and added to the National Heritage List in 2008 (Ryan and Lydon 2018). It 
consists of a winding “Story Path” walkway, representing the creator figure Rainbow Serpent, 
through bush and trees, lined with seven granite markers with illustrations and etchings in 
English and the local Indigenous language, Gamilaroi. The etchings tell a brief history of the 
 
27Some Indigenous activists have emphasized the need for an “Indigenous-led, but obviously 
intercultural” process of memorial collaboration (Andrew et al. 2019, 36). Such processes that 
are led by Indigenous people but that also bring in participants and observers from outside 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities “not only allow public acknowledgment of 
trauma or histories, but also accommodate community mourning and mutual support” (Andrew 
et al. 2019, 38). In the case of Myall Creek, the Organizing Committee consulted with the 
Wirrayaraay community about whether they wanted to organize the project themselves or 
continue it as an Indigenous and non-Indigenous collaboration (Batten and Batten 2008). 
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Wirrayaraay people, the violence inflicted on them by settlers, their raiding of settlers’ sheep, 
and the brutal massacre that the settlers perpetrated in retaliation. The final etching says: 
THIS MONUMENT WAS ERECTED ON 10 JUNE 2000 
IN MEMORY OF THE WIRRAYARAAY PEOPLE 
WHO WERE MURDERED NEARBY ON 10 JUNE 1838 AND 
IN HONOR OF ALL THOSE WHO DIED IN MASSACRES IN 
THIS REGION AT ABOUT THAT TIME. 
ERECTED BY A GROUP OF ABORIGINAL AND NON-
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE COMMITTED TO RECONCILIATION 
 
The path culminates in an overlook over the massacre site, where a large boulder is 
etched with words of remembrance. Many memorials integrate “natural” materials and 
landscaping in an effort to honor Indigenous practices surrounding respect for country, in 
contrast to a “European” tradition of memorializing significant figures through stone or metal 
busts and statues of individual figures (Batten and Batten 2008). This aligns with Laura Hall’s 
view of Indigenous aesthetics as “rooted in culture and community, with the enmeshed 
responsibilities of living well in the ecologies of our ancestors” (Hall 2015, 283), as well as other 
principles of Indigenous design, such as thinking of structures as habitats rather than ornaments 
and designing spaces as part of a whole rather than as individual structures (Rees 2020). Crushed 
white granite surrounds the memorial stone, representing the local Aboriginal color of mourning; 
red gravel on the walkway represents the blood shed on the land; and stones brought from around 
Australia represent ownership of the history of Myall Creek by the whole country (“Timeline of 
the Creation the Memorial” 2019). The Myall Creek Memorial also blends into the landscape 
around it. This was a conscious effort by the committee to respect and integrate the memorial 
into the natural surroundings.  
The memorial is not only an art piece and educational marker but also a site for an annual 
ceremony. Every year a memorial is held, with remarks by a historian, public figure, or 
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community member and a ceremonial walk of hundreds of participants through the memorial 
site. At the first ceremony, in 2000, non-Indigenous Committee member Paulette Smith spoke to 
a crowd of 1,500 Indigenous and non-Indigenous visitors about all participants “tak[ing] a 
journey together” and asked visitors to “[t]hink about those who died, speak to them, say a 
prayer for them, remember them. And as you return back along the path, take a stranger by the 
arm and walk back in peace, knowing that today you have taken a very big step towards justice, 
truth and reconciliation” (“Timeline of the Creation the Memorial” 2019). At that same opening 
ceremony in 2000, three descendants of perpetrators of the massacre and two descendants of 
survivors of the massacre made remarks and then embraced each other (D. Johnson 2002, 70). 
Graeme Cordiner, a White man who was involved in the early days of the Committee, said of 
that moment in an interview, “Without that Welcome to Country, which is what Sue [Blacklock, 
descendant of a survivor] signified in hugging Desmond [descendant of a perpetrator], it was a 
Welcome to Country. Now there’s only one people in this country who can welcome you to 
country; that’s Aboriginal people. There’s just no way around it. Doesn’t matter I was born here. 
So in that embrace we are reconnected, through them, with Australia” (Cordiner 2018). 
Recent ceremonies have involved lighting candles representing blood spilled and new 
hope for healing, lit together by Indigenous and non-Indigenous community members; smoking 
ceremonies and prayers; speeches (D. Johnson 2002); and Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
schoolchildren lining the path and reading the text of the plaques (“Text of the Myall Creek 
Memorial Plaques” 2019). The ceremony is an important part of how the site is a living 
memorial rather than a static artifact. As Graeme Cordiner put it in an interview, “This is all for 
me this is all the memorial – not just the rock. So the garden’s a memorial. The programs that we 
 132 
run out of that, year-round, that’s all part of the memorial… Memorials don’t have to be rocks in 
the ground. We’ve got that, but Myall Creek is about far more than that” (Cordiner 2018). 
   
“Standing by Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner” 
 
 
In 1841, two Tasmanian Aboriginal men, Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner, were 
convicted of the murder of two White whale hunters in the bay around Melbourne. 
Tunnerminnerwait had served as a guide for George Augustus Robinson, “Chief Protector of the 
Aborigines,” from 1830-1835 after both he and Maulboyheenner survived the “Black War” in 
Van Diemen’s Land (now Tasmania). After Tasmania had been almost completely emptied of 
Indigenous people by murder, abduction, and material hardship, Robinson brought fifteen of the 
89 surviving Indigenous individuals to Melbourne. At least Tunnerminnerwait and perhaps 
others in that group continued to work for Robinson; Tunnerminnerwait helped Robinson 
investigate a massacre of Indigenous people by whalers in Victoria  (Land 2014). Five of those 
fifteen – three men and two women – escaped Melbourne in 1841 and began raiding White 
settlements, gathering arms as they travelled. Eventually the group killed two White whalers, 
possibly in retaliation for violence perpetrated against the women in the group, Pyterruner and 
Trugernanner; possibly as an act of resistance; possibly in self-defense. Some Indigenous 
activists and allies refer to them as “freedom fighters” (Toscano, Briggs, and Oke 2019). 
In front of an audience of thousands, they became the first people hanged in the 
burgeoning city of Melbourne; after only a few more public executions, the Melbourne Gaol was 
built and further executions were conducted inside (Land 2014). Contemporary reports of the 
hanging describe a cruelly botched job performed on poorly built gallows. They were buried in 
the Old Melbourne Cemetery, now under Queen Victoria Market. The sentencing judge 
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explained that the hangings were meant to send a threatening message to Aboriginal people 
considering armed resistance (Land 2014). Thus, Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner, in 
their deaths, became symbols of the criminal justice system in Victoria, the violence inflicted 
upon Indigenous people by colonists, and the state’s disciplining power.  
 In a city whose memorial landscape is dominated by statues commemorating White, male 
figures of power, including settlers known for their violence against Indigenous Australians 
(Perkins 2017), there is a dearth of markers to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
Acknowledging this lack, starting in 2004, a group of citizens, led by activists such as Joe 
Toscano, Torres Strait Islander Ellen Jose, and the Anarchist Media Institute began organizing 
for a commemoration of the lives and deaths of Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner 
(Toscano 2010). After activist pressure, the city of Melbourne agreed to commission a memorial 
at Gallows Hill, where the two men were hanged. The permanent memorial that resulted in 2017, 
“Standing by Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner,” was created by Wiradjuri, Ngunnawal, 
and Celtic artist Brook Andrew and Trent Walter, Andrew’s collaborator and an independent 
publisher. It is the first government-sponsored monument to the “Frontier Wars” in a major 
Australian city. 
The memorial has several different aesthetic elements. Surrounding the built structures 
are landscaped plants of Indigenous cultural significance. These include, according the 
memorial’s explanatory text, “bush food, weaving, and medicinal plant including saltbush, 
prickly currant, blueberry lily, weeping grass, wallaby grass and honeypots” for “Giving 
sustenance, life and rejuvenation.” These plants, native to both Tasmania and Victoria, connect 
the men’s homeland with the site in Melbourne (Andrew and Walter 2018). 
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Another element is the six brightly covered boxes resembling newspaper vending 
machines. The newspaper boxes are in the colors of the Australian and Aboriginal flags (Andrew 
and Walter n.d.) and display text and pictures inside, including accounts of the history of these 
two men’s deaths and of the historical context of the colonization of Tasmania and Melbourne. 
The boxes riff on the theme of newspapers and newsworthiness, including the sensational way 
that colonial newspapers depicted the trial and hangings in the nineteenth century. The text 
inside one box includes an explanation of the design and intent of the memorial alongside 
nineteenth-century advertisements for sheep and for safe passage to Hobart, Australia. Another 
promises “AN INCREDIBLE STORY OF A CLASH OF CULTURES AND COLONIAL 
‘JUSTICE.’” These boxes stand out because Australia does not have a history of newspaper 
boxes on the street like many North American and European countries do. Moreover, their stark 
aesthetic stands out in contrast to many other pieces of Indigenous art and markers of Indigenous 
history, including the Myall Creek Massacre Memorial, Reconciliation Place in Canberra, and 
the “Aboriginal Memorial” in the National Gallery of Australia. In addition to the Indigenous 
plants, the memorial is made of metal, chain, and stone – all materials that make up the 




Figure 3: Standing by Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner 
Another element is a structure resembling a swing set with chains connecting to a 
stationary stone that resembles grave markings and that reads “Tunnerminnerwait” and 
“Maulboyheenner.” The bluestone block connects to the swing set like a swing but is the 
opposite of a swing: stationary, solid, and immovable. The artists describe the stone as a place 
for “visitors to the site to sit, contemplate and reflect. The children’s swing seat becomes the 
tomb, laden with memory and history” (Andrew and Walter n.d.). Likewise, the swing set evokes 
the crude gallows where Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner were hung, juxtaposing the 
cheerful primary colors of the newspaper boxes and the swing set with the tomblike stone and 
the symbolism of the gallows. This imagery is especially haunting considering the botched, 
prolonged execution. The site’s location next to the Old Melbourne Gaol and the use of 
bluestone on the swing/tomb and the path connecting the memorial to the grounds of the Gaol 
was a deliberate symbol of crime, punishment, and injustice in colonial and contemporary 
Melbourne (Andrew and Walter n.d.). The artists’ statement at the memorial reads, “Massacres 
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were a colonial phenomenon and some argue that their legacies still exist today in the context of 
Aboriginal deaths in custody and the treatment of indigenous people in juvenile detention.” 
Indigenous architect Rueben Berg had a powerful reaction to the piece: “The first time I saw the 
new work, there was no one around and I was incredibly moved. I push my son on a swing all 
the time, so even though there was no movement, I could hear the creaking of hanging, and it 
was quite a disturbing and distressful situation. It was powerful” (Neath and Andrew 2018, 104). 
These aesthetic elements of the memorial – the colorful newspaper boxes, the striking 
swing/tomb – draw visitors in, including those to whom the names Tunnerminnerwait and 
Maulboyheenner might mean nothing. Then, with the newspaper boxes’ internal text telling the 
story of the hangings, the view from the memorial across the green to the Old Melbourne Gaol, 
and the realization that the memorial sits on the site of these two men’s deaths, the memorial is 
visually striking and asks us to think more critically about the history of Australia and 
Melbourne as sites of colonial and carceral violence. Is this a playground or a dark symbol? Is 
that a swing or a tomb? Are these Indigenous plants symbols of healing as much or of cultural 
destruction? Some of these questions are answered, and more are raised, by the text inside the 
newspaper boxes. As such, the memorial is conducive to solidaristic discursive and everyday 
practices of learning about the history of mass violence in the settler-colonial state. Visitors are 
prompted to think across difference, imagining the lives and deaths of these two men as well as 
the White institutions that condemned them, and practice the enlarged imagination of solidarity – 
what it might mean in the twenty-first century to “stand by” Tunnerminnerwait and 
Maulboyheenner or Indigenous communities more broadly. 
 Like the Myall Creek Massacre Memorial, “Standing by Tunnerminnerwait and 
Maulboyheenner” is not a static site for passive viewing but an active site for the practice of 
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solidarity. The space of the memorial itself leaves room for gathering, and the path leading to the 
Old Melbourne Gaol and to the sidewalk allows for walking to or from the memorial with others. 
The Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner Commemoration Committee holds an annual 
memorial service at the site, a ceremony that started in 2006 (Toscano 2010). Indigenous 
community leaders as well as non-Indigenous Australians are involved in this ceremony. 
Participants have a remembrance ceremony at the memorial and then walk silently to Queen 
Victoria Market, where the men are buried under bustling stalls, paved parking spaces, and 
customers. The artists’ statement explains that the intended audience for the piece is for 
“Melbourne locals and visitors” alike (Andrew and Walter n.d.). Indigenous voices are 
prominent in the ceremony’s speeches and songs, and the annual ceremony is also a chance for 
Indigenous people and non-Indigenous people alike to practice solidarity through 
memorialization – including through by observing and participating in speeches, Indigenous 
ceremonies, and protest songs. In the 2012 ceremony, head of the Tunnerminnerwait and 
Maulboyheenner Commemoration Committee Joe Toscano said, “When we remember them, 
what we do is we promote that struggle to finish the unfinished business that we spoke about 
today between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians in this country. And that’s this 
ceremony is about. It’s about remembering the past, using the past to understand the present, and 
most importantly of all, to change the future for our children and our children’s children. And 
unless that reconciliation happens, based on justice – not charity – nothing will ever change in 
this country” (Toscano 2012). In the 2019 ceremony, Gunai and Gunditjmara man Steven 
Thorpe performed a poem that included the lines, “Remember that to walk this journey with us / 
you need to walk the mud with us / not skim the surface. We are not worthless” (Toscano, 
Briggs, and Oke 2019). 
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The ceremony is powerful because it allows participants to honor Tunnerminnerwait and 
Maulboyheenner’s lives at the place where they ended, because the memorial carves out a 
physical space for the activity of solidaristic commemoration to occur, because the speeches 
often draw connections between these men’s stories and the contemporary over-incarceration of 
Indigenous Australians (Toscano, Briggs, and Oke 2019); and because the aesthetic of the 
memorial is a rich cultural text around which conversations about colonial violence and its 
contemporary manifestations (detention, health crises, climate injustice, etc.) can take place. 
Even the title of the artwork, “Standing by Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner,” provides a 
way for visitors to reflect on the practice of solidarity. As Trent Walter puts, it “it’s very 
colourful. It ends up being quite engaging of a public, and people are drawn to it and want to 
read about it. They may not know what they’re walking in to when the walk up the slope but 
they’re engaging with it in a different way” (Andrew and Walter 2018). What does it mean for a 
contemporary observer of this memorial to “stand by” these two men? How might we stand, 
walk, or practice solidarity with these men, both for their own stories and for their story’s ability 
to represent broader Indigenous suffering at the hands of the settler-colonial state? 
 
A Radical Political Aesthetic of Solidarity 
 
 
I suggest that these memorials give us some conceptual tools for commemoration that 
work against a repetition of the mass violence that they memorialize. This radical political 
aesthetic of solidarity helps to work against future mass violence by bringing people and groups 
together to commemorate violence and injustice, putting into practice solidarity as a practice that 
works across difference. Political solidarity is the final element of the political aesthetic I outline 
in this dissertation: while bodily vulnerability makes violence difficult to ignore or downplay and 
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fugitivity prompts us to think about how to carve out space within irredeemable systems, 
political solidarity as practice unites people (even, sometimes, those from privileged and 
oppressed groups) in the shared activity of commemorating the past, healing old wounds and 
forging new, if tentative, connections. 
I have defined solidarity as a set of prosocial practices toward others that, by cultivating 
understanding of others who are different from us, orients us to oppose forms of power that are 
debasing to others. First, solidarity is grounded in prosocial, shared practices rather than 
common characteristics. Both memorials’ aesthetic elements are conducive of solidaristic 
practice. The Myall Creek Massacre Memorial’s physical structure encourages the active 
practice of walking through the landscape in a practice of active commemoration with others. 
“Standing by” draws visitors in with its colorful, ambiguous symbols and then draws connections 
between the deaths of Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner and the carceral and colonial 
violence of the Australian state, urging viewers to engage in the solidaristic practice of learning 
more about the history of colonial violence and Australian penal history and thinking through 
what it means to “stand by” these men. Both are fertile ground for starting conversations with 
others about colonialism and its legacies, as well as how we might work against future violence 
and injustice by orienting us to oppose the kinds of politics that Tunnerminnerwait and 
Maulboheenner were exposed to. Further, the creation of these memorials was solidaristic in 
nature. Organizers of both memorials engaged in shared practices of organizing, agitating for 
change in their local governments, documenting history, engaging in political negotiations, and 
coordinating with various stakeholders. 
In addition to the aesthetics and structures of the memorials themselves being conducive 
to solidaristic practices, the community-organized ceremonies that take place annually at both 
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memorials are also models of solidaristic practice. These memorials are thus not only static 
markers but also sites for political practices that bring people together to commemorate lives lost 
to colonial violence. These ceremonies are exemplars of solidaristic practices of 
commemoration: they engage deeply in the local community; they include both Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous participants; and they are active, shifting focus slightly every year and keeping 
the commemoration of these Indigenous lives relevant for each present year. They involve site-
specific and culturally specific rituals such as walking on specific paths together, performing 
smoking ceremonies, giving and listening speeches, and documenting historical record through 
oral and written histories. These ceremonies are active, alive, evolving, practices of solidarity – 
practices of “coresistance and freedom” (L. B. Simpson 2017, 231) rather than a passive idea of 
solidarity based on shared characteristics. 
The second characteristic of solidarity is that it cultivates understanding of different 
others. The Myall Creek Memorial’s markers, written in both English and Gamilaroi, conjure 
questions about how mourners from other backgrounds may experience the memorial differently. 
The colors of the newspaper boxes in “Standing by” evoke both the Australian and Aboriginal 
flags, symbolically reaching across difference and historical oppression. Both memorials were 
created by Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, from the artists to the committee 
organizers. Because the work of organizing does not end with the erection of the monuments but 
rather continues with the annual ceremonies, these stakeholders are engaged in long-term, 
solidarity-building political praxis with others across political and cultural difference. And even 
for permanent memorials that do not host regular ceremonies, there is still the possibility for 
generating discourse and involvement with the local community.  
 141 
 Further, the Myall Creek Memorial was a conscious effort to bring different communities 
together in shared activity. Its creation and mission, from the committee’s equal representation 
by Indigenous and non-Indigenous members to its goal to educate all visitors about the 
Wirrayaraay people, reflect a shared, cross-cultural mission. In contrast to some other memorials, 
whose lack of markings and location suggest they are for local Indigenous communities to 
quietly reflect and build solidarity within their community,28 the Myall Creek Memorial attempts 
to be “for” both Aboriginal audiences and non-Indigenous audiences alike (Cordiner 2018). As 
Brook Andrew puts it, “There’s this kind of guilt, or people kind of bow their heads when certain 
Indigenous issues are raised, and I think that regardless of if you’re Indigenous or not, or of 
mixed heritage, it doesn’t matter what you are, if your [sic.] Australian I think we should all 
know about this and own it together. So being visible like the Myall Creek Massacre walk that 
you can go on up there in that community, and also other sites that are being more active now. I 
think that is a positive step towards a complete version of being a real Australian” (Andrew and 
Walter 2018).The tradition of an annual ceremony, a continuing and repeated collective activity, 
helps keep commemoration an active, alive practice rather than passively consumed content. Just 
as it was only due to the tireless activism of Indigenous-led coalitions that these memorials were 
built, so too does the ongoing activity or shared practice of memorializing Tunnerminnerwait, 
 
28For example, the Aunty Ida West Healing Garden and Memorial Gate in Tasmania does not 
include markings that explain its historical connection to the local Palawa community or Ida 
West’s successful campaign to return the Wybalenna historical site to the Palawa people. This 
indicates that the site is not meant to be a tourist destination or wider educational resource, but 
rather a site of reflection for the Palawa people (Batten and Batten 2008, 109–10). Another 
example in an Aboriginal neighborhood, far from tourist attractions, is “Remember Me” (a 
monument to the Stolen Generations in the Atherton Gardens public housing project in 
Melbourne), by Reko Rennie. Memorials that focus on solidarity-building or cultural reflection 
within a community rather than across difference can be generative as well; there is room and a 
need for both reaching across difference and honoring Indigenous cultural sovereignty and 
refusal. 
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Maulboyheenner, and the victims of the Myall Creek Massacre owe its effectiveness to the active 
engagement of Indigenous leaders and multiple communities working together to memorialize. 
 It is important to note that the practice of solidarity requires critical thinking and self-
awareness of non-Indigenous participants. For non-Indigenous partners, there are crucial skills of 
humility; self-interrogation; historical self-education; confronting their own complicity in the 
settler-colonial system; and long-term commitment to allyship (Land 2015). Without these, any 
meaningful solidarity built across difference will not translate into opposition to debasing forms 
of power in the form of political attitudes, policy and candidate support, or grassroots organizing 
– since uncritical or tokenistic work is not meaningful solidarity work.  
 I suggest that together, all these elements of the aesthetic of solidarity, which manifests 
differently in these two memorials, work against a politics of mass violence. Through the 
commemorative practice of solidarity-building that aims to engage people across difference and 
position themselves against debasing forms of power, an aesthetic of solidarity in representations 
of historical violence might cultivate an aversion to the indifference toward others that allows for 
violence and oppression. Aesthetic depictions of historical violence can guide individuals toward 
choices for political actions in the present in subtle ways, such as through the design of 
memorials, or in more straightforward ways. For example, memorials could offer a list of 
political action items such as talking to neighbors and family members about the legacy of settler 
colonialism, or donating money to Indigenous-led mutual aid groups or initiatives. 
 The final aspect of solidarity I have explored is its ability to enable us to oppose forms of 
power that are debasing to others, forms of power that generate the background conditions for 
many forms of mass violence. I thus read these memorials as a form of commemoration that 
works against future mass violence. The activity and practice of solidarity-building 
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commemoration, both of working together in commemorative ceremonies or walking together as 
a way to remember and mourn and of practicing the imaginative exercise of sensus communis, 
aims to engender an opposition to the debasing forms of power that are the preconditions of 
settler-colonialism and other forms of mass violence. By learning about their violent historical 
subjugation through commemorative practices, non-Indigenous Australians may be able to learn 
to oppose the forms of power that are debasing to Indigenous Australians, such as paternalistic 
cultural practices, oppressive policy regimes, and a lack of funding for services needed in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. Commemoration will not automatically 
produce such an opposition to debasing forms of power in every participant in the aesthetic of 
solidarity, but I want to point out the possibilities for such an aesthetic to open the political 
imagination to feelings of solidarity towards others.  
While the process of forging solidarity can be tentative and awkward, and while 
solidaristic relationships are not the same as friendship or kinship love by any means (Land 
2015), it can be precisely the unfamiliarity of others with whom we practice solidarity that makes 
solidarity politically powerful. If we only practiced solidarity with familiar and homogenous 
others, we would not be doing much of the difficult work across difference that is required when 






I have proposed a radical vision of solidarity – the possibility of practicing solidarity 
between oppressor and oppressed groups, leading us to oppose debasing forms of power that 
inflict violence upon others. If solidarity can comprehend the perpetrator as well as the victim of 
crime and the complicit bystander, if members of dominant and violently subordinated groups 
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can come to see each other as active practitioners of solidarity together, it may disrupt historical 
patterns of settler-colonial violence and oppression and make future violence against historically 
subordinated peoples less palatable. This may happen on an individual level among participants 
in active practices of solidaristic commemoration, such as visitors to annual ceremonies at 
memorials, but it may also happen at the level of local or national politics, in which practices of 
solidaristic commemoration and debates around memorialization work to transform political 
discourse and paradigms. This radical vision, I argue, gets us closer to a political future free of a 
cycle of settler-colonial violence.  
It is important to note, while I am discussing solidarity reaching across difference, that 
the project of solidaristic memorialization goes beyond mere recognition of Indigenous culture. 
Memorials need not be – and the memorials I have discussed here are not – merely 
representations of liberal recognition. Rather, many memorials to colonial violence against 
Indigenous Australians reflect a desire to repair and document injustices, not just recognize or 
include Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander cultures. Important critiques of campaigns for liberal 
or multicultural recognition have been made by Indigenous scholars and activists from Australia 
and elsewhere. For example: Mick Dodson’s assertion of the need for self-determination and 
resistance to state power (Dodson 1994); Glen Coulthard’s rejection of the politics of recognition 
for First Nations in Canada on the grounds that recognition reproduces colonialist power 
structures (Coulthard 2014); Audra Simpson’s theory of Indigenous refusal of recognition, 
arguing that the Mohawk community of Kahnawà:ke’s refusal of certain cultural and political 
forms of recognition represents a demand for self-determination and survival within settler-
colonialism (A. Simpson 2014); Taiaike Alfred’s argument for a nonviolent revolutionary 
resistance (Alfred 2005); and Leanne Betasamosake Simpson’s emphasis on Indigenous 
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freedom, resistance, and the resurgence of Indigenous epistemologies and politics (L. B. 
Simpson 2017).  
As these accounts demonstrate, acknowledging difference is not enough; recognition can 
often entrench and reinforce the imbalances of power that settler-colonialism creates by allowing 
the settler-colonial state to merely recognize Indigenous culture while avoiding substantive 
policy reforms around land sovereignty or economic redistribution. Moreover, a focus on state 
recognition can center the settler-colonial state as the authoritative body that can recognize or 
withhold recognition, as opposed to Indigenous communities’ ability to recognize themselves 
and others in reciprocal recognition (L. B. Simpson 2017). Acknowledging difference does not 
require that we work across difference, and in fact it may bolster difference as a category of 
subjugation rather than empowerment. There is always a danger that feigned solidarity will be 
used to support an exclusionary politics or used as a weapon against the oppressed. Empty claims 
of multicultural pluralism and recognition without political action – solidarity that claims to 
resolve all problems of power and injustice between all people universally – are examples of this 
problem. Solidarity’s ability to accept difference and its reliance on practice, not commonality, 
can help us get around this possibility – and moreover, solidarity goes beyond mere recognition 
to forge connections between people, across difference. Moreover, memorials and 
commemorative practices may be able to go beyond the hollow promises of cultural recognition 
because of the discursive power of memory work. Unlike recognition’s often-vacuous references 
to “Indigenous culture,” memorials and commemoration makes a political claim about whose 
lives are worthy of mourning and which histories ought to be told.  
A political aesthetic of solidarity is only one way that a society can cultivate solidarity, 
but monuments and memorials cannot be expected to achieve this goal alone. Solidarity-building 
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practices between dominant and marginalized peoples can go beyond the reflection that 
commemoration can generate. They should be (and, in Australia, are) part of a larger project of 
reconciliation that also includes state apologies and documentation of atrocities; education in 
public schools and civil society about histories of violence and how they connect to 
contemporary politics; a resurgence of Indigenous cultural practices starting from within 
Indigenous communities; Indigenous-led, multi-racial political organizing for Indigenous 
sovereignty and economic and land justice movements; and a healthy culture of debate about 
history and its significance in the media and public life. The political aesthetic of solidarity can 
and should provoke deliberation and debate rather than foreclose it. 
Many public events in Australia open with Acknowledgement of Country or Welcome to 
Country statements, both solidaristic commemorative practices. In Acknowledgements of 
Country, Indigenous or non-Indigenous speakers state that they recognize the Indigenous 
community who were traditionally custodians of the land where they stand. In Welcomes to 
Country, members of the Indigenous community who were custodians of the land where the 
event takes place acknowledge past and present Indigenous custodians and then welcome the 
newcomers to the land. In 2008, Ngambri-Ngunnawal elder Matilda House Williams delivered 
the first ever Welcome to Country to Parliament, at the occasion of the government’s formal 
apology to the Stolen Generations. In her address (House Williams 2008), she said: 
A Welcome to Country acknowledges our people and pays respect to our 
ancestors’ spirits who created the lands. This then allows safe passage to visitors. 
For thousands of years our peoples have observed this protocol. It is a good and 
honest and decent and very human act to reach out to make sure every one of us 
has a place and is welcome… Prime Minister, my grandchildren have handed you 
a gift of a message stick, a tangible symbol of today’s ceremony. This message 
stick, a means of communication used by our peoples for thousands of years, tell 
the story of our coming together. 
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Solidarity can extend not only from oppressed to oppressor groups, as in Welcomes to Country, 
but also from oppressor to oppressed groups. For Graeme Cordiner, the White Sydney resident 
involved with the Myall Creek Memorial, doing reconciliation work and commemorating this 
history of violence allows White people to find connection to the land, country, and their own 
identity through connecting to Aboriginal people. As he put it, “Who needs the help the most? 
Well, I think we [non-Indigenous people] do. So I’m not at Myall Creek to ‘help Aboriginal 
people.’” (Cordiner 2018). White settlers must follow the lead of Indigenous organizers, respect 
Indigenous refusal and reciprocal recognition, and work for and with Indigenous communities in 
order for solidaristic political organizing to avoid reproducing settler-colonial violence and 
injustices. The ability of solidarity that is grounded in practice rather than shared characteristics 
to enable organizing together across difference may make it easier to avoid some of the pitfalls 
of such organizing, such as reproducing racialized solidarity (Hooker 2009) or the White co-
opting of Indigenous demands. 
Welcomes to Country and Acknowledgments of Country are especially striking 
solidaristic practices. They offer not just resistance to the oppressive power structure of settler-
colonialism, but they also extend solidarity out – either from colonizers to the colonized or vice 
versa. Here, a practice of radical solidarity might enable a political imaginary that works against 
future violence by cultivating understanding of others and even orienting us against the forms of 












In Blacksburg, Virginia, a few weeks after the 2007 mass shooting at Virginia Tech in 
which a college student killed 32 people and then himself, someone painted a sign on the side of 
the road that read, “Pray for 33.” Soon, a vandal crossed out the last digit and changed the sign to 
read, “Pray for 32.” The sign’s vandal obviously protested the idea that the shooter should also 
receive prayer. The idea that someone (the perpetrator, an East Asian student) who committed 
violence also deserved mourning was politically controversial; the conflict between the sign’s 
creator and its vandal represented a political struggle over narrative meanings, power, and 
mourning. Conflicts over who gets to be commemorated and how play out constantly through the 
visual and aesthetic, on the smallest and largest of scales, in neighborhoods and national capitols, 
in the everyday activity of politics and in moments of exception and rupture. 
In this dissertation, I have presented three ways that the political aesthetic of 
commemoration might work against the politics of mass violence: bodily vulnerability, 
fugitivity, and solidaristic politics. Through case studies of memorialization in different national 
contexts, I have shown how the particular contexts of commemoration can foster or inhibit an 
open, inclusive politics of commemoration that works to foster sensibilities that counter the 
politics of mass violence in the future. Although my treatment of each theme – vulnerability, 
fugitivity, and solidarity – is grounded in the particular political and historical context of 
Rwanda, the United States, and Australia, these themes can be taken up by actors in other 
countries.  
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For example, depictions of bodily vulnerability include the Equal Justice Initiative’s 
Community Remembrance Project, in which the racial justice organization works with 
community leaders throughout the U.S. South to gather soil from the sites where Black people 
were lynched. The Equal Justice Initiative then displays the soil in hundreds of glass jars, each 
with the name of the lynching victim, location of the murder, and date of death in its museum in 
Montgomery, Alabama. Because lynching victims’ bodies were often burned or destroyed 
beyond recognition and they were often denied both a trial and a funeral, this is a form of 
reckoning with the legacy of this visceral, bodily violence in the twenty-first century.  
Fugitivity, meanwhile, is a theme of public art in many Indigenous and postcolonial 
contexts; for example, in their discussion of an art exhibit by and about urban Indigenous artists, 
Indigenous education scholars Susan Dion and Angela Salamanca describe how, sometimes, “the 
art conceals more than it reveals, in service of protecting [Indigenous] knowledge from abuse, 
oversimplification and to acknowledge that some knowledge is not translatable” (Dion and 
Salamanca 2014, 168). Indigenous artistic forms that engage in this kind of refusal – resisting 
capture by settler understandings, evading reappropriation by hegemonic settler-colonial forms – 
are fugitive. As fugitive works, they work to resist regimes of historical and ongoing violence 
and oppression by settler-colonial states and societies, preserving cultural forms of knowledge 
and creating new forms of discourse meant to empower Indigenous communities. 
Finally, solidaristic memorial and aesthetic forms abound in pluralistic societies seeking 
reconciliation after historical injustice and violence. For example, architects Ronald Rael and 
Virginia San Fratello’s protest art installation “Teeter Totter Wall,” which installed three pink 
seesaws across the U.S.-Mexico border wall, allowing children from both countries to play 
together from either side of the wall. Rael describes the project as being about themes related to 
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solidarity such as balancing, imbalances or inequalities, collaboration, and reciprocity (Barajas 
2019). A rare opportunity for potentially solidarity-building acts of collaboration and play across 
the border, “Teeter Totter Wall” was also protest art that stood against regimes of violence in 
border territories.  
Furthermore, any one depiction might draw on multiple aesthetic themes, including those 
I have discussed in this dissertation and others. If “[s]olidarity requires that we care about the 
pain and suffering of others” (Hooker 2009, 6), then solidarity across difference might 
sometimes build on understandings of bodily vulnerability. While it is sometimes crucial to 
evade capture by hegemonic aesthetic forms understandings by creating memorial spaces meant 
to be more intimate healing spaces for oppressed communities, this fugitive sensibility is not 
incompatible with solidarity-building practices in memorialization (Batten and Batten 2008). 
And a political aesthetic of fugitivity might also draw on gestures towards the body and bodily 
vulnerability. One size does not fit all contexts (L. Moore 2009), and yet themes and motifs 
emerge and are repeated across memorials on multiple continents.   
The political aesthetic of commemoration has important implications for scholars and 
practitioners of history, public history, museum studies, material culture, architecture, city and 
regional planning, philosophy, archaeology, sociology, political science, and political theory. 
More importantly, grappling with the big questions of the political aesthetic can help activists, 
artists, political actors, and the public work with the problem of how to commemorate – and 
work against – mass or state-sponsored violence. Because monuments, memorials, and the built 
environment are “right there,” accessible to viewing and interpretation by everyone, they are an 
exciting laboratory for textual and aesthetic analysis and critique by everyday people. Where else 
do members of the public feel qualified to walk up to an aesthetic form and interpret its meaning, 
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critique its artistic or visual merits, and engage in debate about its significance for history and 
contemporary politics? Perhaps more so than art pieces mounted on white walls in museums, 
monuments and memorials are “up for debate” about their political meaning, history, and 
continued value or appropriateness in public spaces. These rich debates can be sites of politically 
productive dialogue and deliberation, making memorials more than just static objects. 
It might be objected that if the public does not notice the commemorative element in the 
built environment, there will be no uptake and no change in public attitudes or behavior. 
Additionally, interpretations can vary: for example, individuals can perceive bodily vulnerability 
as desirable and go out to inflict pain on others, inspired by aesthetic depictions of violence. To 
the first concern, I would respond that the political aesthetic is only one element of 
commemoration of violence; others include civic education, public education of children, and 
political activity more broadly. It is not an urgent problem if citizens do not notice monuments in 
their physical surroundings, since all these other activities can supplement the public’s education 
about histories of violence. Moreover, innovative forms like multimedia displays or projections 
involving text, image, and video may enrich displays and capture the attention of passers-by. The 
possibilities for depicting nuanced history through the built environment are varied.  
To the second concern, that of varying interpretations, this is of course possible. Some 
critics argue that the political aesthetic will not educate people against violence (e.g. Williams 
2007) or might actually inspire people toward rather than divert people from violence. To 
counter false interpretations that support the politics of violence – like the idea that enslaved 
people were mostly well-taken care of by benevolent enslavers – depictions can present 
narratives about the historical facts as they are understood by experts while leaving space for 
deliberation, ambiguity, and tragic encounters with violence that resist oversimplification and 
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triumphalism. That individuals will interpret collective remembrance differently is an 
unavoidable problem; the political aesthetic I discuss in this dissertation will not be able to 
convince everyone. However, it can convince some people – and just as importantly, as a form of 
politics, it can shape the political conversation about historical violence and its contemporary 
legacies. Memorialization and commemoration are fundamentally social and political processes. 
Their creation, the ceremonies they host, and the debates they spark are themselves part of the 
political process of working against the summum malum of future mass violence. The debates 
around the building, framing, preservation, and use of memorial spaces in the built environment 
are political debates that engage the public, political elites, and cultural institutions in the politics 
of commemoration – a politics that themselves may raise some of the themes and narratives that 
I have argued can work against the politics of mass violence. As Alain Locke wrote of Black art 
in the Harlem Renaissance confronting White supremacy, “Art cannot completely accomplish 
this, but I believe it can lead the way” (Locke 1928). 
Ultimately, aesthetic depictions of loss and violence are paradoxically sites of hope and 
futurity. As Joseph Winters puts it, attending to violence and negation can prompt a “risky, 
precarious hope, prompted by desires to build new relationships and communities,” a hope 
“marked by reciprocity, vulnerability, and heightened attunement to loss and damage” (Winters 
2016, 213). Through a thoughtful political aesthetic of commemoration that aims to counter the 
politics and sensibilities of mass violence, memorialization can be one way to attend to loss and 
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